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P R E C I S 
This is an essay on John Dewey's philosophy of 
education. The scope of the essay may be described in a 
general way as the exploration and examination of the 
supposed point or points of contact between Dewey 1 s 
technical philosophical formulations on the one hand and his 
views about the aims and general character of education on 
the other. This is outlined in Chapter One. 
In Chapter Two I have attempted to give a general 
account of Dewey's views as to what philosophy is. The 
chapter is entirely expository and is intended to be read as 
a preparation for the more critical examination of some of 
the main concepts and arguments that is provided in the 
following chapters. 
Dewey 1 s metaphysical perspective is the subject of 
examination in Chapter Three. I have tried to clarify and 
determine the meaning (i.e., Dewey's meaning) of the 
concepts of nature, experience, and intelligence which 
appear as fundamental notions in Dewey's philosophical 
writing as well as in his thinking about social and 
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educational matters. These notions are found to lack 
clarity and precision. I have also tried to draw attention 
to some of the basic difficulties involved in Dewey's 
conception of metaphysics and in his metaphysical position. 
This is followed by an account in Chapter Three of the 
pattern of ~nquirY as Dewey has formulated it. I have tried 
to indicate the important role of the method of inquiry in 
Dewey's philosophical framework. I have discussed certain 
fundamental issues raised by Dewey 's account of the phases 
of inquiry. I have also analyzed the model of inquiry to 
determine Dewey 's conception of science and scientific 
method. 
The first section of Chapter Five contains an 
examination of Dewey's theory of valuation. Here I have 
examined his model of inquiry in the more direct form of the 
method of evaluation and indicated its major shortcomings. 
In the following section I have analyzed his conception of 
growth as a moral end or ideal and have argued that in terms 
of his philosophical position this has serious limitations. 
Before turning directly to the problems occupying us in 
the pages to come I have tried in Chapter Six to clarify 
certain points about the nature of contact between technical 
philosophical categories and social and educational theory. 
I have attempted to draw certain lines to explain our 
present purpose and to indicate the scope of the following 
discussion. 
The follo~~ng chapter consists of an analysis of 
Dewey's reconstructed conception of the democratic way of 
life. I have tried to show that Dewey's model of inquiry 
does not apply to complex social situations and that the 
kind of society he seems to envisage - a great majority 
integrated around a common core of ethical values - could 
be destructive to liberty and other values. 
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Next, in Chapter Eight I have analyzed Dewey's 
educational writing with a view to determine his views about 
the aims and general character of education. I have tried 
to examine whether Dewey 1 s basic recommendations about 
educational aims and methods are logically connected with 
his technical philosophical formulations or are rendered 
more likely by them. 
Conclusion: At almost every point, the upshot of this 
analysis has been to suggest that the logical or 
philosophical links that Dewey claimed or assumed between 
his technical philosophical formulations and educational 
recommendations do not in fact exist. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Philosophy of education, like some of the other 
'philosophies of', is an intellectual territory 'of 
doubtful ownership and ambiguous borders'. The reason is 
simple. As H.S. Broudy explains: 
This is because philosophy can denote anything 
from the logic of modern physics to a reflective 
mood about life. Education, for its part, is 
used to name anything from the reciting of nursery 
rhymes to the taking of a university degree. 
Philosophy of education compounds two welters of 1 meaning into a sea in which all meaning is drowned. 
A cursory glance on the various sorts of work bearing the 
titles of 'philosophy of education', 'educational philo-
sophy', 'philosophical basis of education', and the like 
will make it abundantly clear that these expressions do not 
indicate any single or definite kind of approach to the 
problems of education; they are used to denote many different 
kinds of talk about the aims and methods of education. 
It may not, however, be difficult to recognize the more 
non-technical uses of the word 'philosophy' or 'philosophical' 
1
H·?,· Broudy, "How Philqsophical can Philosophy of Education 
be?, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LII (1955), 613. 
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in such contexts. One encounters such expressions as 'the 
Catholic philosophy of education' or 'the Buddhist philo-
sophy of education'. These usually mean talking about the 
aims and methods of education in terms of a certain set of 
ideals or guiding principles which are accepted as such 
without serious critical (or technically philosophical) 
consideration. In this usage the word 'philosophy' means 
what we colloquially and rather loosely describe as a way of 
life, such as, the Christian or the Hindu way of life. In 
educational writings the word 'philosophy' is also frequent-
ly used in other non-technical senses. D.J. O'Connor refers 
to Godfry Thompson's well-known book A Modern Philosophy of 
Education where Thompson uses the word 'philosophy' in the 
title of his work 'to indicate' that he wishes 'to look at 
education as a whole and try to make as consistent and 
sensible an idea of that whole' as he can. 2 A survey of the 
aims and practices of education in modern India by Humayun 
Kabir has recently appeared lUlder the title The Indian 
Philosophy of Education. 
There are, on the other hand, philosophers who have 
made notable contributions to philosophy and have also 
developed views on social and educational matters without, 
2See D.J. O'Connor, An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Education, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957, 1. 
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however, trying to connect the two. Kant is one example. 
Bertrand Russell is another. Russell has said that 'between 
my views on social questions and my views on logic and 
epistemology ••• there was no logical connection•. 3 But even 
so a philosopher's educational writing is apt to be referred 
to as his 'philosophy of education', and the essay on 
Russell's views on education in the Schilpp volume is 
entitled "Russell's Educational Philosophy". Now, in dis-
claiming any logical connection between his views on logic 
and epistemology and those on social matters Russell is 
obviously relying on a certain conception of the nature of 
philosophy; he believes that philosophical analysis does not 
reveal any course of action in the practical affairs of life. 
In other words, technical philosophy, as Russell understands 
it., cannot be in a logical sense programmatic. 
But there is, again, a way of doing philosophy - and it 
is nonetheless concerned with analysis - which attempts to 
arrive at certain theories, in metaphysics, epistemology, 
ethics, aesthetics, and the like, and which also attempts to 
relate these theories in a certain way to some sort of social 
and educational policies and practices. Philosophy of 
education in this usage means an analytical treatment of the 
3P:A· Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, 
Chicago, North-western University, 1944, 727; see also 729. 
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various issues and problems of education together with a 
conscious effort to develop the recommendations about 
policies and practices and to relate them logically or 
philosophically to a set of metaphysical, logical, epistemo-
logical and ethical positions. Consider, for example, 
Plato's philosophy of education. In The Republic Plato 
analyzes the nature of man (the three components: appetite, 
spirit and reason, their moral worth or virtue being 
respectively temperance, courage and wisdom); he offers a 
class-structure theory of society (the artisan, warrior and 
philosopher classes) related to the innate differences in 
the nature of human beings; he formulates a theory of 
knowledge (three levels of knowledge: sense, opinion and 
dialectic) which would more or less justify reason ruling 
both appetite and spirit, or the philosopher class governing 
the two other classes. The theory of knowledge is, again, 
related to such metaphysical formulations as the Idea or 
Ideal, and a prior life of perfect existence. Educational 
recommendations, such as control of appetite and spirit 
through habit formation, rational awakening for the more 
mature, the place and importance of mathematical thinking 
(which alone can give a clear idea of what a perfect circle 
is), and the like, are al1 shown to be related to Plato's 
wider metaphysical, epistemological and ethical formulations. 
These connections may not be very well worked out in The 
Republic, but the Platonic philosophy of education is un-
doubtedly one of the more remarkable attempts at formulat-
ing a coherent system of philosophy - an integrated whole -
where technical philosophical generalizations are employed 
to provide clarification and justification of the 
educational recommendations. 
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John Dewey is another systematic philosopher of 
education in this tradition. Dewey's instrumentalism is a 
very different sort of philosophical theory from that of 
Plato, but Dewey nonetheless believes that philosophy always 
has had a practical social role, and that philosophical 
formulations - metaphysical, logical and ethical theories -
are basically plans or proposals for the guidance of individ-
ual and social conduct. Dewey, therefore, thinks that 
'philosophy may even be defined as the general theori of 
education 1 • 4 Like Plato, Dewey has worked out in great 
detail a programme of education and has tried to demonstrate 
that his technical philosophical formulations - his concep-
tions of nature, experience and creative intelligence, the 
theory of inquiry and the method of valuation - clarify and 
justify the recommendations which his educational programme 
includes. 
4 Dewey, Democracy and Education, New York, Macmillan & Co., 
1916, 383. 
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Now, philosophy in this usage, of which the systemsof 
Plato and Dewey are typical examples, is a matter of theory-
building; it is concerned with the construction of 
metaphysical, logical and ethical theories to account for a 
wide range of problems. This kind of philosophizing no 
doubt involves analysis of concepts and of language, of con-
nections and presuppositions, but on the whole it is 
speculative and synthetic. It tries to synthesize available 
ideas and beliefs from the various fields of knowledge into 
some general perspective or total outlook about the nature or 
universe 'as a whole'; and it is often concerned with relat-
ing the general perspective to certain conceptions of social 
task and thus supporting certain definite social relation-
ships or some views about social ends and means. This sort 
of philosophizing on a rather grand scale is, however, 
currently unpopular, and often described as old-fashioned. 
We shall have a few words to say towards the end of 
this essay about the currently widespread conception of 
philosophy as an analytical study of basic concepts and 
arguments as they occur in various domains, and also what 
these procedures and standards of analysis - already applied 
to some selected aspects of education by a few philosophical 
analysts - can hope to accomplish in the domain of education-
al theory. 
In the following discussion we will, however, be 
mainly concerned with a philosophy of education of the 
speculative and synthetic kind. Nobody, we believe, will 
deny the need of analyzing and examining the assumptions, 
basic ideas and doctrines of the historically important 
theories of education purported to be based on philosophies 
of the synthetic kind. To study all such theories is 
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indeed a large task; and there is, again, a certain danger 
in trying to do it in a very general way. The basic ideas 
and assumptions, arguments and recommendations of the many 
educational philosophies that we might place in this 
category are no doubt varied and often conflicting; a 
'package deal' of systems would not only blur many important 
differences, but would make any close examination of the 
contact or connection between the philosophical formulations 
and the educational recommendations in the various 
philosophies of education rather difficult. We therefore 
propose to address ourselves in this essay to a detailed 
study of one such systematic philosophy of education. 
John Dewey has been called the greatest educational 
philosopher since Plato.5 Dewey's instrumentalism or 
experimentalism provides us with a closely knit system of 
5
see J. Park, Selected Readings in The Philosophy of 
Education, New York, Macmillan & Co., 1958, 74. 
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philosophy of education. His method of experience or the 
theory of inquiry is at the same time a theory of valuation, 
of learning and teaching, and of the democratic way of life. 
Being both a philosopher and an educationist Dewey has 
himself worked out in considerable practical detail what his 
technical philosophical formulations could imply for the 
theory and practice of education. There is obviously some 
definite advantage in studying a system of philosophy of 
education where the philosopher-educator himself takes the 
pains to indicate and elaborate the social and educational 
implications of his own philosophical position rather than 
in trying to examine what writers on educational theory may 
point out as the educational implications of such philo-
sophical positions as idealism~ realism., or any other 
traditional school of philosophical thought. The latter is 
no doubt one of the popular ways in which many have sought 
to develop or build systematic philosophies of education; 
but on the whole these seem to be usually somewhat loose 
speculation about what a certain complex philosophical 
position may imply or suggest in a general way for education. 
For our purposes it will be better to take up a particular 
philosopher who believes that philosophical speculation 
possesses great social significance, and who himself offers 
an elaborate educational theory which is claimed by him to 
be grounded on his o\m wider philosophical generalizations 
than to attempt a study of second-hand educational theories 
which may have been loosely influenced by some traditional 
school of philosophical thought. 
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John Dewey is, however, a difficult philosopher. He is 
not easy to follow; his sentences are complex, often over-
loaded with qualifications. Moreover, he has written over a 
long period of years about forty books and eight hundred and 
thirty papers on almost every aspect of philosophy and on 
many branches of social science. It is often difficult to 
disentangle the pervasive features of his philosophical 
position from the various contexts, or to recognize even the 
significant modifications of previously held views. In our 
attempt to present the salient aspects of his philosophical 
position we have found it necessary to quote extensively 
from his prodigious writings. It has not been easy to make 
nis ideas clear, and we do not claim to have succeeded always 
in bringing the many difficulties involved in his position 
into the open. A much closer study of Dewey's specific 
philosophical doctrines is necessary to achieve this; it 
cannot be undertaken in a single essay. 
What we have, then, primarily attempted in the following 
pages is firstly to determine as best as we can the precise 
meaning of Dewey's philosophical formulations - his 
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metaphysical, logical and ethical theories insofar as they 
appear to be especially relevant to his educational 
doctrines; we have then tried to follow his arguments about 
the democratic way of life and democratic education in an 
attempt to discover how and how closely his philosophical 
generalizations are connected to his social and educational 
recommendations. We have naturally found it necessary to 
concentrate upon selected aspects of Dewey's philosophical 
ideas and social and educational theories - aspects Dewey 
thinks are vital in linking the two. The following study is 
therefore not intended to be either an adequate assessment 
of Dewey's philosophy as a whole or of his educational 
theory; it is an attempt to explore and examine the supposed 
point or points of contact between his technical philo-
sophical formulations on the one hand and his recommendations 
about education on the other. 
CHAPTER II 
THE NEED FOR PHILOSOPHY 
An Exposition of Dewey•s Conception of Philosophy 
I 
Dewey's version of empiricism, which he calls by the 
name of 1 instrumentalism 1 to signify the purposive use of 
ideas as instruments for reconstruction of an unsatisfactory 
situation, claims a new insight into the nature of 
philosophy as the history of its practice shows it to be. 
Every idea, according to instrumentalism, has a genetic 
history and an instrumental value in the living of human 
life. To get a better understanding of ideas it is 
necessary to seek their origins, trace their developments 
and to see how they have been used and whether successfully 
or not, to serve specific needs. This is the basic argument 
of instrumentalist methodology; Dewey tries to explain the 
nature and historical role of philosophy from this 
standpoint. 
Man is engaged, like all creatures, in a struggle for 
survival. He has ambitions, ideals, dreams, perspectives. 
These do not come out of air but out of the conditions of 
11 
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life. Human experience in general or philosophising in 
particular must be viewed against this background - as 
happening within an existential matrix. Philosophy or, more 
generally, thinking occurs whenever problems are encountered, 
problems which cannot be resolved without thinking. Thus 
viewed, philosophy can be seen as part, an important part, 
of man 1 s effort to make his way in the world. Even the 
traditional conception of philosophy that it is an autono-
mous undertaking resting entirely on its own intellectual 
foundations arose, Dewey tries to show, out of genuine necess-
ity. Traditionally, the aim of most philosophers was to 
develop a system that would give the most inclusive and 
truest accoilllt of the universe. Different phases of their 
thinking were taken as either true or false and in so far 
as they were true, they would be true for all time. This 
search for fixed truths, the quest for certainty was, accord-
ing to Dewey, conditioned by man's longing for security 
which he lacked in a world of hazards. 
Philosophy, being primarily an attempt to solve 
problems that arise out of situations in life, has close 
social connections. Dewey writes, 'Philosophy, like 
politics, literature and the plastic arts, is itself a 
phenomenon of human culture. Its connection with social 
13 
history, with civilization, is intrinsic 1 • 1 To make it 
clear that this is not just a distinctive trait of his own 
particular kind of philosophy, but a characteristic of each 
and every philosophical enterprise, he continues, 
There is current among those who philosophize the 
conviction that, while past thinkers have reflected 
in their systems the conditions and perplexities of 
their own day, present-day philosophy in general, 
and one's own philosophy in particular, is emanci-
pated from the influence of that complex of 
institutions which forms culture. Bacon, Descartes, 
Kant each thought with fervor that he was founding 
philosophy anew because he was placing it securely 
upon an exclusive intellectual basis, exclusive, 
that is, of everything but intellect. The movement 
of time has revealed the illusion; it exhibits as 
the work of philosophy the old and ever new under-
taking of adjusting that body of traditions which 
constitute the actual mind of man to scientific 
tendencies and political aspirations which are novel 
and incompatible with received authorities. 
Philosophers are parts of history, caught in its 
movement; creators perhaps in some measure of its 2 future, but also assuredly creatures of its past. 
This statement not only emphasizes the connection 
philosophy bears to culture but also gives it a social 
function, the function of mediating the conflicts that arise 
between 'a stubborn past and an insistent future'. Con-
flicts, or what Dewey more specifically calls 'problematic 
situations', do arise in life in every department of human 
1Dewey, Philosonhv and Civilization, New York, Minton, Balch 
and Co., 1931, 3. 
2Ibid., 3-4. 
experience. The political and economic aspects of our life 
are seldom free from strains and tensions. Conflicts 
between the old and new ideas are not in the least 
uncommon in what we call the scientific, the moral, the 
religious spheres of our experience. The process of 
history is a process of change - changes in habits, of 
institutions, of ideals. As changes occur, points of 
tension between the inherited ways of life and thought 
and the new developments in knowledge and aspirations may 
grow and create problematic situations. In Dewey's view 
such problematical or tensional situations create the need 
and provide the subject-matter of all reflective thought. 
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We have mentioned earlier that such a view does give 
philosophy a social function. For Dewey, all thinking is 
functional. A problematic situation, that gives rise to 
thinking, is an impasse, an impediment or obstruction of 
man's way of life. It follows that he must act and act 
intelligently to solve his problem. To solve his problem 
and regain his equilibrium he might have to change his old 
habits. But a change of habits, since habits are modes of 
interaction with other things and persons, involves in some 
respect and to some degree an alteration not only of himself 
but of objects, that is to say, things and persons, within 
his environment. This is probably what Dewey means by the 
assertion that all thinking is inherently practical in 
character and that it involves an existential transformation 
of the original situation. We shall closely look into the 
matter in the following chapters. 
Philosophy, we now return to Dewey's point, is always 
in culture. Even those who claim, as philosophy's aim, the 
possession of absolute truth untouched by local influence of 
time and place cannot deny that philosophy 'as a concrete 
process is historical, having temporal passage and a 
diversity of local habitations'.3 History of philosophy, in 
Dewey's view, bears ample testimony to it. Philosophy in no 
land and in no epoch is free from the influence of the com-
plex of traditions and institutions that forms a particular 
culture. It is always a part of culture, interacting with 
other parts with varying degrees of sensitivity and effect-
iveness. It strives, or to put it in another way, a self-
conscious culture strives through it, to achieve a smooth 
and interactive integration of all the forces within the 
cultural environment. Dewey writes, 
Consider, for example, the uneasy, restless effort 
of Plato to adapt his new mathematical insights and 
3Ibid., 4. 
his political aspirations to the traditional habits 
of Athens; the almost humorously complacent union of 
Christian supernaturalism in the middle ages with 
the naturalism of pagan Greece; the still fermenting 
effort of the recent age to unite the new science of 
nature with inherited classic and medieval institu-
tions. The life of all thought is to effect a 4 junction at some point of the new and the old •••• 
16 -
The cultural role of philosophy is, however, neither one 
of all cause nor all effect. It is as much the product of 
the cultural forces in an environment as it is the sustain-
ing force behind the distinctive development of a cultural 
system. It grows within a load of traditions from the past 
and tries, in the face of conflicts, to mediate and to adapt 
the new insights with the traditional habits. It is thus 
not 'a passive reflex of civilization that persists through 
changes, and that changes while persisting. It is itself a 
change •••• ,5 On the whole, Dewey appears to agree with Hegel 
that philosophy is an expression in thought of cultural 
change itself: it is the intellectual phase of the process by 
which conflicts within a civilization are resolved and com-
posed. Thus conceived, Dewey maintains, philosophies are not 
simply •records', they are rather 'policies'; the pattern 
formed in the junction of the old and new, of old streams of 
traditions and the newly emerging directions of activities, 
4
rbid., 7 
5rbid. 
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are rather prophesies - attempts to forestall subsequent 
developments. 'While purporting to say that such and such 
is and always has been the purport of the record of nature, 
in effect they proclaim that such and such should be the 
significant value to which mankind should loyally attach 
itself. 16 We can find evidence of this, Dewey claims, by 
closely examining any philosophical idea that had for any 
long period a significant career. Taking, as examples, 
the Platonic patterns of cosmic design and harmony, 
the Aristotelian perpetually recurrent ends and 
grooved potentialities, the Kantian fixed forms of 
intellectual synthesis •••• [Dewey states]Discuss them 
as revelations of eternal truth, and something almost 
childlike or something beyond possibility of decision 
enters in; discuss themas selections from existing 
culture by means of which to articulate forces which 
the author believed should and would dominate the 
future, and they become preciously significant 
aspects of human history.7 
We must note that these general and somewhat rhetorical 
statements raise,oosides what they are intended to convey 
about the historical function of philosophy, such other · 
questions as to whether Dewey understands and represents 
correctly the views of Plato, Aristotle and Kant or whether 
he is just eager to find his own image of the philosopher in 
all who have come before him. Now, such questions, though 
6Ibid., 8, Italics in original. 
7Ibid. 
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legitimate, are not our primary concern; for we are interest -
ed at the moment not so much in the details of Dewey's 
exposition and interpretation of any particular philosoph-
ical system, but in bringing out what he considers to be the 
historical role of philosophy. 
What Dewey wants to say is that it is always the 
impingement of new experiences upon traditional beliefs and 
values that impels philosophers to construct their systems. 
In that, philosophy marks a change of culture. But such 
changes, he also points out, are not always revolutionary in 
character. As a matter of fact, new 'formulations have been 
often conservative, justificatory of selected elements of 
traditions and received institutions•. 8 But even the 
1 preservative systems' of philosophy have, what Dewey calls 
their 'transforming effect', since they are inherently bound 
up., in their attempt to resolve confltcts, with new emphases 
and new redistribution of the significance of values. A new 
philosophical pattern, whether conservative or revolutionary, 
once formulated enters 'into wont and use' and thereby gives 
philosophy an 1 additive and transforming' role in the 
history of civilization. 
8 Ibid., 8. 
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The view that philosophy grows within the load of 
traditions in an attempt to reconcile or adjust the old and 
new must not again, Dewey warns us, be taken to 'suggest a 
picture of a dominant system of philosophy at each histor-
ical period' . There are, he says, 'diverse currents and 
aspirations in almost every historical epoch' and these are 
'evidence' in favour of his contentions and a •reproach ••• 
(for) the standpoint of philosophy as a revelation of 
truth'. 9 He believes, for example, that the different 
elements in a population in any cultural complex and in any 
historical epoch will surely face different kinds of 
problems : the ruling and the oppressed classes or those who 
want to preserve the status quo and those who are interested 
in bringing in changes, cannot have the same philosophy. 
The divergence of philosophical systems, he claims, lends 
support to the view that they grow out of felt specific 
needs and sincerely set forth distinct, often opposing, 
aspirations. 
The conflicts that give rise to philosophy and through 
it effect changes in culture are, again, not of one type; 
nor is there a type of conflict which is controlling or 
dominating. There can be widely spread conflicts in any 
9Ibid., 9. 
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sphere of social experience (say, in economic or political), 
or between two or among more spheres of experience (say, 
between economic and moral, scientific and religious). We 
can call these conflicts, in a very broad sense, cultural 
and psychological. They are cultural because they take 
place within a cultural set-up, and psychological because 
they arise out of opposition between old habits of believing 
and acting and the new ideas. Philosophy can take its start 
from any of these conflicts. The historical function of 
philosophy is to make men believe and act in new ways to 
resolve the cultural conflicts they face from time to time. 
Philosophy does this by formulat.ing a new plan of 
action, i.e., by finding out a way to gain control over the 
conflicting situations. This defines the nature of philo-
sophical systems; they are born as programmes for some 
particular task of cultural adjustment. They are 'policies' 
or 1 proposals 1 • Each philosophical system, Dewey writes, 
is, in effect, if not in avowed intent, an 
anticipation of man and nature on the basis of 
some program of comprehensive aims and po ·cies 
•••• Each system ••• is, implicitly, a recommend-
ation of certain type of value as normative in the 
direction of social conduct.10 
This is, on Dewey's contention, bound to be so, for the 
conflict between theanergent new ideas and the old habits 
10
newey, "Philosophy" in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 
New York, Macmillan & Co., 1932-35, 15 vols; Vol. 12, 122. 
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of belief and conduct - what a philosophy is designed to 
resolve - is basically a conflict of values. A philosophic-
al 'plan', viewed in its cultural context, is thus a 
'programme of values' and every philosopher a 'physician of 
culture'. Dewey has this in mind when he suggests that we 
discuss the philosophical formulations of Plato, Aristotle 
and Kant 'as selections from existing culture by means of 
which to articulate forces which the author believed should 
and would dominate the future •••• • He means that their 
philosophies, like every other, are plans or proposals to 
organize conflicting experiences into a coherent pattern 
from the standpoint of certain values and that they believed 
that these proposals would lead, if acted upon, to fruitful 
results . 
It is, however, not always easy to discover that a 
particular philosophy is a plan. The individual philosopher 
may not himself be aware that he is formulating any plan; he 
might be discussing, in highly specialized technique and 
vocabulary, logical, epistemological and metaphysical issues 
which apparently seem to have no bearing on the attitude and 
conduct of personal and social life. Dewey writes, 
The fact that philosophic problems arise because of 
wide- spread and widely felt difficulties in social 
practice is disguised,. because philosophers become 
a specialized class which uses a technical language, 
unlike the vocabulary in which the direct 
difficulties are stated.11 
2? 
But Dewey would say that the philosopher, often unbeknown to 
himself, is discussing the basic beliefs of his time or his 
own life, criticizing or rationalizing the prevalent values, 
finding answers to the problems of his contemporary culture. 
In other words, he is formulating some kind of proposal which, 
on close examination, wi.11 surely reveal a preferential 
attachment to some kind of objects and to some course of 
action. 
Where a philosophical system becomes influential, that 
is, in Dewey's language, •enters into wont and use' and has 
1 for any long period a significant career', its connections 
with social problems and its proposals to overcome them can 
easily be discovered. One convincing way of discovering the 
'life-situations', that is, the problems and proposals 
involved in a philosophical position, Dewey believes, is to 
approach it 'from the side' of education. Education, he 
writes, 
1 1 
offers a vantage ground from which to penetrate to 
the human, as distinct from the technical, 
significance of philosophic discussions •••• When 
philosophic issues are approached from the side of 
the kind of mental -disposition to which they 
Dewey, Democracy and Education, New York, The Macmillan & 
Co., 1948, 383. 
correspond, or the differences in educational 
practice they make when acted upon, the 
life-situations which they formulate can never 
be far from view.12 
He believes that unless a philosophy is 'artificial' or 
'verbal' or 'a sentimental indulgence for a few', the 
programme of values it formulates must take effect in 
individual and social conduct. But philosophy 'has no 
Aladdin's lamp to summon into immediate existence the 
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values it intellectually constructs 1 • 13 Since education is 
the medium for the projection and cultivation of the 
accepted values in a society, the 'proposals' of an accepted 
philosophy find application in the theory and practice of 
education. In other words, the educational point of view 
enables one to see how the acceptance or rejection of a 
philosophy makes a difference to the value-system and to 
educational practice. 
But the contention that philosophies can be recognized 
as 'plans' when approached from the side of education should 
not, again, be taken to imply that Dewey has actually 
analyzed the educational implications of the systems of all 
his predecessors and has found that to be the case, and that 
12Ibid . , 383. Also, 'Education is the laboratory in which 
philosophic distinctions become concrete and are tested'. 
Ibid., 384. 
13Ibid., 384. 
his contention is no more than the surmning up of the results 
of historical analyses and sociological investigations. 
Dewey would not, however, deny the utility of this kind of 
analysis and investigation; in fact, the 'genetic' approach, 
namely, inquiry into the origin, development and consequences 
of ideas or systems of ideas, is an integral component of 
his own instrumental method. But the point he is trying to 
make about the connection of philosophical ideas with social 
and educational aims and procedures is argued mainly on 
logical grounds. It is based on what he believes to be the 
general nature of thought and on his conception of the 
practical and social character of all our ideas. His 
argument, accordingly, is not that philosophy is a plan 
because it is used to furnish the basis of social and 
educational ends and procedures, but on the contrary, that 
because philosophical ideas and systems are plans they 
usually take effect in education, and therefore, when 
approached from the side of education it is easier to 
recognize them as such. 
If philosophy grows to resolve conflicts, to adjust new 
ideas and ideals irrelevant to or logically incompatible 
with the older traditions, what then, we may ask, are the 
onrushing new ideas or ideals in our time that disturb the 
equilibrium and demand adjustment? Dewey's answer is: 
science, a phenomenon of our modern culture. Science, Dewey 
maintains, is itself a cultural phenomenon, a product of 
cultural change and historical growth. It is an extraordin-
ary successful technique in dealing with many of our 
problems and is accepted as the best our modern culture, 
14 through stages of development, has constructed. It has 
rapidly grown into an institutionalized habit of thinking and 
acting. By its techniques and through results obtained by 
the application of these techniques, it has, in a 
comparatively short period, revolutionized society. It has 
removed many of our old difficulties, dissolved many of our 
old problems. But it has also proved itself to be 
incompatible with the older pattern of life. The incompat-
ibility, basically concerning the patterns of thought and 
belief, became increasingly wider and sharper as the older 
patterns of political relations, legal methods, economic 
arrangements, etc. were found lagging more and more behind 
the very fast and far reaching external modifications 
brought in by science and scientific techniques. The central 
conflict of our time is, Dewey writes, 'between institutions 
and habits originating in the pre-scientific and pre-
technological age and the new forces generated by science and 
14 
Dewey, Essays in Ex~erimental Logic, Chicago, The University 
of Chicago Press, 191 , 88-90. 
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technology 1 • 15 And there is no single sphere of our life and 
experience - economic, political, religious, moral and so on 
- which is not deeply and directly affected by this basic 
conflict, this 'profound cleavage' of our time. The 
opportu.nity open to philosophy in such circumstances, Dewey 
believes, is as great as the need for it. 
It is one of those curious coincidences in history that 
John Dewey was born in Vermont in 1859, the year Henry 
Bergson was born in France and Samuel Alexander in then 
remote Australia_, the same year Darwin published his Origin 
of Species and Marx his Critique of Political Economy. 
Early in life, under the influence and guidance of Professor 
H.A.P. Torrey, Dr W.T. Harris, and Professor G.S. Morris, 
Dewey became a sort of a Hegelian following the thought of 
Thomas Hill Green. There were, however, stronger 'subjective' 
reasons as well for the appeal that Hegel's thought made to 
young Dewey. In Dewey's own words, 
The sense of divisions and seperation that were, I 
suppose, borne in upon me as a consequence of a 
heritage of New England culture, divisions by way 
of isolation of self from the world, of soul from 
body, of nature from God, brought a painful 
oppression - or, rather, they were an inward lacer-
ation •••• Hegel's synthesis of subject and object, 
matter and spirit, _the divine and the human, was, 
however, no mere intellectual formula; it operated 
15 Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, New York, G.P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1935, 75. 
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i 1 l .b t· 16 as an mmense re ease, a i era ion. 
This demand for unification that drew Dewey to Hegel came to 
his mind not 'by interest in religious experience'. It came, 
on the other hand, from the impact of Darwin's theory of 
evolution and from the growing biological and social 
sciences. He folllld in Hegelian idealism a suitable philo-
sophical framework for the ideas of evolution and organic 
growth, attitudes of history and biology, and a deep and far 
reaching integration of experience that could provide the 
kind of synthesis he was looking for. For a period Dewey 
even tried to defend Hegelianism with arguments from 
Darwinism. 17 Arolllld this period William James published his 
Principles of Psychology (1890). In working out the 
psychology of 'natural science', James intended, first of all, 
to be thoroughly empirical. He consciously avoided philo-
sophical problems, though the problems were firmly lodged in 
his own mind, from the 'science of mind'. In the Principles, 
James explained the physiological mechanisms of 'mental 
activity' and proceeded as adequately as he could to explain 
16 
Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism", Contemporary 
American Philosophy, Lonqon, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
1930, Vol. II, 19. 
17 See, Jane M. Dewey, (ed.) , "Biography of John Dewey", in 
P.A. Schilpp, (ed.), The Philosophy of John DeweyA New York, 
Tudor Publsihing Company, 2nd edition, 1951, 17-1~. 
mental activity including emotions as mechanisms of 
adaptation and weapons of survival. His account of the 
habits and the overwhelming part they play in human exper-
ience, his theories of memory, of interest and attention, of 
emotions, all emphasize the ways in which human organism 
adjusts itself to its environment and adapts the environment 
to its needs. This 'biological conception of the psyche', 
Dewey has acknowledged, gave his thinking 'a new direction 
and quality'. It made Hegelianism unnecessary. It seemed 
to him that human behaviour could now be explained 
biologically, the evolution of human organism could be 
accounted for without appealing to anything beyond nature. 
Dewey was also influenced by James' metaphysical theories -
his 'radical empiricism', and the logical theories of Peirce. 
James sought to establish the notion of continuity in the 
metaphysics of 'pure experience', by expanding the psycho-
logical doctrine of continuity in consciousness into a 
metaphysical theory of continuity in being between things and 
thoughts. Peirce, on the other hand, formulated the central 
thesis of pragmatism, e.g., that concepts or general ideas 
have meanings related to their functions ('the actualization 
of thought which without action remains unthought'); and he 
found in the habit of belief and the resulting habit of 
action the 'functional' fulfilment of a concept or idea. 
2 9 
This functional approach to the nature of concepts gave 
Dewey the clue to seek continuity between scientific and 
ethical judgments, thought and action, philosophy and social 
reform. 
These are, then the main strains of thought that 
influenced Dewey. Broadly speaking, under the influence of 
Hegel and Darwin he was concerned with the question: how 
things come to be as we experience them to be; under the 
influence of James and Peirce he became concerned with the 
pragmatic problem: what we can do to direct things to ends 
that are desirable. He combined these two ways of looking 
at problems. In formulating the central themes of his 
philosophical position, he combined the biological or 
naturalistic account of the origin of human consciousness with 
the Hegelian conception of synthetic organic growth, the 
method and result of the natural sciences with moralism, the 
urge to serve human weal and welfare with the nature and 
structure of ideas. 
Dewey, therefore, conceives of philosophy as a means of 
better survival, and as always functional. Philosophy arises, 
he tells us, as an intellectual reaction to the environment 
when some need is felt for the resolution of conflicts in the 
environment. Philosophy works towards the formulation of 
certain ideas which unify the conflicting factors into a 
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harmonious whole, and resolve on being acted upon the 
existential imbalances that were obstructing growth in the 
desired directions. The conflicts, in his time, between the 
traditional attitudes and the scientific departures in many 
spheres of experience create in his mind the need for a 
synthesis of the old and new, of the pre-scientific and the 
scientific, ideas and attitudes. Dewey develops his 
philosophy obviously in response to this need. 
He attempts, as we shall see, to under-cut the dualism 
of scientific and pre-scientific, and all resulting dualism 
by accepting the scientific method of investigation and sub-
jecting all the traditional habits of belief and conduct to 
rigorous examination. He argues that the empirical method 
of science is not exclusively a procedure of natural 
sciences; it is not always and necessarily a 'laboratory 
method'. It can very well be used as a method of investiga-
tion in dealing with social phenomena - in analyzing and 
working through the complex of social heritage of accustomed 
ways of believing and acting and adjusting them to newer needs. 
Now, how and how far the adoption of the scientific 
method enables philosophy - and Dewey's philosophy in 
particular - to resolve the cultural conflicts of our time 
are matters we shall examine later. The point we want to 
mention is that Dewey wants philosophy to play a role in our 
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contemporary culture which he believes to be its historical 
role, that is, to function as an instrument of cultural 
reconstruction. His proposal is that philosophers should 
directly confront the basic cultural problems of the present 
day society; they should survey the new forces; examine 
prevalent beliefs and values, analyze and locate conflicts, 
and furnish wherever possible, intelligent grounds of action 
in meeting the situations in life. He believes, 
Philosophy has a work to do •••• It may turn to the 
projection of large generous hypotheses which, if 
used as plans of action, will give intelligent 
direction it> men in search of ways to make the world 
more of worth and significance.i~ 
This is an eloquent plea to bring philosophy to the service 
of men in the struggle for a better world, and we may not, 
whatever may eventually be found out to be the merits of his 
philosophical position, doubt for a moment the sincerity of 
Dewey's aspirations. 
II 
Dewey has explained on many occasions the reasons for 
his preference of the empirical method over the non-empirical 
18 
Dewey, Problems of Men, New York, Philosophical Library, 
1940, 20. 
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method of investigation. 19 We shall not dwell on them,for 
most of these arguments would appear commonplaces today. We 
shall, instead, try to determine the difference which he 
believes the adoption of the scientific method makes in 
philosophical activity. We shall ask: what, according to 
Dewey, should be the nature and procedure of philosophical 
activity? 
The acceptance of science and scientific method of 
investigation necessitates a thorough reconsideration of 
traditional philosophy and traditional philosophical methods. 
For these traditional methods of doing philosophy, like any 
other method of doing things, are products of cultural 
heritage and are as much loaded with obsolete and useless 
traditions as any other form of human institution. The 
initial task is, 'therefore, one of I reconstructing I philo-
sophy itself, of making philosophy and the method of philo-
sophical inquiry relevant to science and to present condi t -ions. 
It is a two-fold task. It requires, firstly, a 'systematic 
rejection' of the outworn ways of thinking useless and 
obstructive in the present context. If we believe that 
'experimentation ••• scientific facts and principles serve as 
19 
Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, 75-102; Experience and 
Nature, Ch. 1, 1 Experience and Philosophic Method'; The Quest 
for Certaint~, London, Geroge Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1930, 
Ch. IX, 'Supremacy of Method'. 
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tests of the values which tradition transmits and of those 
which emotion suggests•, then, Dewey writes, 'Whatever is 
not compatible with them must be eliminated in any sincere 
philosophizing•. 20 
This is the work [he writes elsewhere] of getting rid, 
by means of thinking as exact and as critical as 
possible, of perpetuations of those out-worn attitudes 
which prevent those engaged in philosophic reflection 
from seizing the opportunities now open. This is the 
critical or if one please~ the negative aspect of the 
task to be undertaken •••• ~1 
This means that the 'standpoints and methods that had obtained 
for centuries' are to be subjected to critical examination 
and 'purged' if found to lack scientific confirmation. 
The task of reconstruction requires, secondly the 
formulation of a method of scientific knowing based on 
•systematic observation of the natural, the biological and 
social conditions by means of which knowledge actually goes 
on•. 22 Dewey says, 
20 
•••• An important aspect of the reconstruction that 
now needs to be carried out concerns the theory of 
knowledge. In it a radical change is demanded as to 
the subject matter upon which that theory must be 
based; the new theory will consider how knowing (that is, inquiry that is competent) is carried on, 
instead of supposing that it must be made to conform 
Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, 10. 
21 
Dewey, Problems of Men, 16. 
22 
Dewey, Ibid., 17. 
to views independently formed regarding faculties 
of organs . 23 
In other words, the theory of knowing or inquiry ('Knowledge 
is related to inquiry as a product to the operations by 
which it is produced') will be constructed not on the basis 
of any pre-formed beliefs about the nature of soul, 
cognition or sense-perception, but on careful observation of 
what goes on in the conduct of successful scientific inquiry. 
Such a theory will provide a pattern or model of sciBntific 
inquiry. This is the work, Dewey says, 'of developing, of 
forming, of producing ••• the intellectual instrumentalities' 
that will direct philosophical inquiry into the basic 
problems of human life . 
Dewey ' s writings abound in criticisms of what he 
considers to be pre-scientific attitudes and methods and the 
beliefs and habits, values and institutions that follow from 
and are associated with them. We do not intend to go into 
them. The Theory of Inquirx, on the other hand, is of vital 
importance, for it provides the most important clue to 
interpret Dewey's philosophical position. We shall,according-
ly, deal with the themes of nature, experience and 
'ntell ence which appear as fundamental notions in his 
philosophy and describe the natural backgrounds in whi ch 
23 
Dewey 1 Reconstruction in Philosophy, Boston, The Beacon Press, \enlarged edition), 1948, X. 
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inquiries are found to take place, in the following chapter. 
The theory of inquiry (which is also the basis of Dewey's 
logical theory, for the canons of inquiry with which logic 
.is concerned emerge, according to him, from successful habits 
of inquiry, when these habits are formulated) will be 
discussed in some detail in Chapter IV. 
We now return to our point . When the preliminary 
reconstructions, namely, the rejection of the unscientific 
attitudes and the formulation of the scientific method of 
inquiry, are carried out, Dewey believes, philosophy can 
become the method or critical 'organ• for dealing with 
social, moral and other kinds of cultural problems. These 
reconstructions are necessary to make philosophy 'adequate' 
and 'competent' as a method of clarifying, evaluating and 
reconstructing the conflicting situations. The primary 
significance of philosophy is that of a method and it is 
only by fulfilling its function as a method that philosophy 
can hope to give inte1i1gent direction to further action. 
To philosophy, conceived as such a method, Dewey has 
given the name criticism. To distinguish philosophical 
activity from other modes of criticism, he has also 
described philosophy as criticism of criticism and criticism 
of the methods of criticism.· To understand what these 
phrases mean, it is necessary to analyse carefully Dewey's 
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conception of the nature of philosophy. We shall, accord-
ingly, seek answers to the following three questions: what 
is the subject-matter of philosophy or philosophical 
criticism? how does it proceed? and, how does philosophical 
criticism differ from other types of criticism? 
Philosophy starts, according to Dewey, 
from actual situations of belief, conduct, and 
appreciative perception which are characterized 
by immediate qualities of good and bad, and from 
the mode of critical judgment current at any 
given time in all the regions of 4value
: these 
are its data, its subjectmatter.2 
We have already noted that the need for philosophizing 
arises, according to Dewey, when beliefs, values or methods 
of evaluation come into conflict with one another; in other 
words, when the harmonious adjustment of various interests is 
seriousay disturbed. Where the interests are superficial or 
not sufficiently organized and can easily glide into one 
another, the conflict will be of little real consequence and 
the need for a philosophical integration may not be 
perceptible . 
24 
But when the scientific interest conflicts with, 
say, the religious, or the economic with the 
scientific or aesthetic, or when the conservative 
concern for order is at odds with the progressive 
interest in freedom, or when institutionalism 
clashes with individuality, there is a stimulus 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 403-4. 
-
to discover some more comprehensive point of 
view from which the divergencies may be brought 
together, and consistency or continuity of 
experience recovered.2? 
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These divergencies may occur in any limited area in the life 
of any individual and what Dewey calls 'homespun philosophies' 
may often provide some kind of rough reconciliation for the 
individual concerned. But such 'rough accommodations' worked 
out by an individual for himself do not result in what we may 
call systems of philosophy. The latter 'arise when the 
discrepant claims of different ideals of conduct affect the 
community as a whole, and the need for readjustment is 
general 1 • 26 
How does the method of criticism proceed? It proceeds 
by the clarification, discrimination and unification of 
meanings. Meanings are, according to Dewey, both ideational, 
i.e., functions of thought and existenial, i.e., functions 
of things in the environment. 27 Human beings by creation of 
25 
Dewey, Democracy and Education, 381. 
26 
Ibid., 381. Also, 'Philosophic thinking has for its 
differentia the fact that the uncertainties with which it 
deals are found in widespread social conditions and aims, 
consisting in a conflict of organized interests and 
institutional claims'. Ibid., 387. 
27 
See, Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, New York, Henry 
Holt and Co., 1938, Ch. III;· also Paul Wienpahl, 11 Dewey' s 
Theory of Language and Meaning", Sidney Hook (ed.), John 
Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom, New York, The 
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symbols have the power of retaining past experiences in 
thought which would otherwise be washed away by new ex-
periences. Almost anything can serve as such a symbol: 
gestures, art objects, words of language, fulfil this 
function. These symbols make ideas and emotions possible, 
because by being originally associated with overt responses, 
they permit the later occurrence of what Dewey calls 
'implicit responses', i.e., responses in the absence of 
existential objects which originally produced the overt 
responses. Our experiences are, according to Dewey, filled 
up with these symbols. Art, religion, science, etc., are 
full of symbolism. The coloured surface of a painting me.ans 
something, religious ceremonies have meanings to the 
initiated, a mathematician's scribble on a sheet of paper is 
meaningful to one who uhderstands it. 
Meanings are found not only in symbols but also in 
things. The word 'book' is a symbol, but the concrete 'book' 
I have before me at the moment is not a symbol in the 
Dial Press, 1950, 271-288. 
e cannot possibly stop here to discuss the problems 
connected with the defence and even the full exposition of 
this view of meanings. We shall have to be content with a 
brief explanation of Dewey's notion of meanings to see how 
its clarification, discrimination and unification constitute 
what he believes to be philosophical activity or criticism. 
Some of the problems connected with this notion of meaning 
will, however, become clear as we proceed to discuss Dewey's 
metaphysical, logical and ethical theories. 
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ordinary sense of the word. Yet this 1 book' is to me the 
representative of a class of things or a type of work. It 
has for me a meaning which it would not have for an African 
bushman or an illiterate person. And the meaning this 1 book 1 
has for me is, according to Dewey, not a subjective thought 
in my mind but immanent in the object, i.e~ the 'book 1 • 
Now, all meanings are, according to Dewey, intimately 
connected with our active life. The chair I am sitting on, 
the table in front of me, the pen I am writing with - I am 
cognizant of the meanings and purposes of all these. Similar-
ly, the house we live in, the street we walk on, the place of 
our work, are all full of things, all connected with our 
life of action. All these things proclaim their import to us 
when we perceive them. But the point to note is that the 
meanings of things do not always determine our actions 
uniformly and with directness and immediacy. For ex~~ple, 
the dark cloud in the sky above means rain; but it also means 
other things: the farmer hurries up getting his hay-harvest 
to the barn; the walker turns back to his home; the housewife 
collects the clothes from the washing line; people close the 
windows and so forth. To perceive the meaning of a thing or 
event is to be aware of its possible consequences -
consequences to be promoted or averted as far as it is in our 
power to control things or events. 
4o 
Similar considerations apply to symbol meanings. By 
uttering the symbol ' cloud' (i.e., the word cloud as a sub-
stitute for what is existentially indicated) we can have an 
implicit response of cloud . The response to this symbol 
(i . e . , cloud) will be another implicit response (i.e., rain). 
This, too, is not experienced as subjective contribution 
superadded to reality, but as objective. It is only when~ 
change our opinion of something that a meaning which was 
formerly objective is transformed into subjective illustion. 
And the~ is important, for subjectivity does not pertain to 
the 'I ' only, but also to the 'we'. Thinking is a social 
process, thoughts and ideas are social possessions - as 
evident from religion, art, science and in general where 
common inquiry is carried out . Moreover, thinking, i.e., 
having ideas, inferring, making predictions, etc., is 
dependent on linguistic media and language is a social posses-
sion. Now, what we were saying was that in the case of symbol 
meaning one implicit response (symbol 1 cloud') would give 
rise to another implicit response (symbol 'rain'). In such 
cases of symbol meaning the advantage is that the thinking 
organism can explore possible consequences of the situation 
without at the same time participating actively in those con-
sequences . This means that the organism can think of cloud 
(when cloud is existentially absent), of rain as its 
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consequence, of other possible consequences and find out the 
ways and means to promote or avert such consequences as far 
as possible. This is possible in symbol-behaviour, for it 
can be carried on in the absence of overt responses. In 
case of such symbol- behaviour, the organism is thinking: it 
is analyzing a situation by applying conceptual instruments, 
exploring the possible consequences that can flow from the 
situation and trying to find out a way to gain control over 
it . By means of thinking, we conceptually analzye a 
situation and, taking account of possible consequences, draw 
the plan of action to meet the situation. 
Dewey maintains that clafification of meaning, except 
in simple cases where one thing or symbol readily suggests 
and leads us to expect the other, involves critical inquiry 
into the context, conditions and possible consequences of 
situations . The situation demanding such inquiry may be an 
object or event encountered or a belief or a value-object 
challenged in course of some new experience. Every particular 
element or aspect in a situation has a meaning, and in a 
problematic .situation the meanings of the various elements or 
aspects are often conflicting. Criticism proceeds by the 
analysis of the confused situation and the discrimination of 
its various partial meanings. It aims at suggesting a 
possible relevent solution as a means of resolving the 
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problematic situation. In other words, it attempts to 
unify the conflicting partial meanings of a confused 
situation into a new synthesis. The proposed new synthesis 
is the new plan of action, which is expected, when tested in 
action - in experiment and in living - to lead to foreseen 
desired results. 
The analysis of the Dewyan method of criticism given so 
far raises the third question suggested earlier, namely, how 
does philosophical criticism differ from other types of 
criticism? We can ask: are not sciences themselves concerned 
with the clarification, discrimination and unification of 
meanings in their respective fields? And since the subject-
matters of philosophical criticism are supplied by the 
existential situations in life, can they be not properly 
investigated from the standpoint of special sciences? In 
other words, how does philosophical criticism differ from 
scientific criticism, and why is philosophical criticism 
necessary at all? 
Dewey's answer is that philosophical criticism differs 
from other forms of criticism in its generalitx. He defines 
philosophy as 'a generalized theory of criticism' - 1having 
its distinctive position among various sciences of criticism 
in its generality: a criticism of criticism•. 28 This implies, 
28 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, xi, 398. 
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firstly, that philosophical criticism is an integrating 
medium that connects the departmental 'criticisms' restricted 
to their respective professional or specialized fields. 
Division of interest or departmental specialization is an 
inevitable condition of scientific progress and this creates 
the need for 
a generalized mediwn of intercommunication, of mutual 
criticism through all- around translation from one 
separated region of experience into another. Thus 
philosophy as a critical organ becomes in effect a 
messenger, a liaison officer, making reciprocally 
intelligible voices speaking provincial tongues and 
thereby enlarging as well as rectifying the meanings 
with which they are charged.29 
This means that philosophy is a critical organ (not a 
separate super-science) that enlarges and unifies the 
meanings of different sciences and integrates them into the 
entire field of human experience. It is the 'generalized 
medi'Wll 1 that relates qualitatively differentiated activities 
and brings meanings together from functionally distinct 
spheres of experience . Secondly, in enlarging and rectifying 
the meanings of special sciences, philosophical criticism 
not only takes into account the results obtained in the 
specialized fields of criticism but consciously evaluates 
the methods and standards. of criticism employed in obtaining 
these results . Scientific investigations as a rule proceed 
29 Ibid . , 410 . 
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on the basis of certain assumptions: assumptions about 
methods, criteria of validity and the like; so also an act 
of conduct is judged on the basis of some code or custom; a 
work of art by certain standard set by habit or fashion. 
Philosophical criticism takes upon itself the task of 
criticizing all such asswnptions. It investigates the 
methods of investigation, contrasts and evaluates the 
standards of evaluation . It often raises such questions as: 
why should we prefer this particular method than the other? 
what grounds can we offer for choosing such and such 
procedure? why should we believe in this and not in any 
other standard? and so on and so forth. Philosophical 
criticism is thus, as Dewey often describes it, a 'criticism 
of the methods of criticism' or 1 the critical method of 
developing methods of criticism'.30 
Philosophy as criticism is not marked by its generality 
alone; it differs from other criticisms in its objective as 
well . While explaining his conception of philosophy as 
inherently criticism, Dewey writes, 
30 
Criticism is discriminating judgment, careful 
appraisal, and judgment is appropriately termed 
criticism wherever the subject-matter of dis-
crimination concerns · goods or values. Possession 
and enjoyment of goods passes •.• inevitably into 
Ibid . , 437 . 
appraisal •••• A brief course of experience 
enforces reflection; it requires but brief time 
to teach that some things sweet in the having 
are bitter in after - taste and in what they lead 
to . Primitive innocence does not last. Enjoy-
ment ceases to be a datum and becomes a problem. 
As a problem, it implies intelligent inquiry 
into the conditions and consequences of a value-
object; that is criticism. 31 
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What Dewey wants to say is that the basic problem of life, 
which •enforces reflection • , arises from the fact that what 
is often directly experienced as good turns out eventually 
not to be dependably good . A thing or an object that 
immediat ely pleases us may lead to effects that show up its 
goodness as deceptive . Similarly, anything suggested to our 
belief may prove unsatisfactory when the consequences of 
adopting it are revealed . Now, the function of philosophical 
criticism, he maintains , is to discover dependable goods as 
distinct from what is trivial and the conditions under which 
what is dependably good can be secured and enhanced in human 
enjoyment . To fulfil this objective, philosophy accepts and 
utilizes 1 the best available knowledge of its own time and 
place 1 and criticizes the ' beliefs, institutions, customs, 
policies with respect to their bearing upon the good, as 
something itself attained and formulated in philosophy 1 • 32 
31 
Ibid ., 398- 9. 
32 
Ibid., 408 . 
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The best available knowledge of our time is scientifi c 
knowledge and Dewey wants philosophical criticism to use 
this knowledge in evaluating the traditions and also to 
interpret this varied body of scientific knowledge with 
respect to its bearing upon the conduct of life. Philosophy 
can, he hopes, 'render goods more coherent, more secure and 
more significant' by accepting what sciences discover about 
our natural existence and by interpreting the scientific 
results with respect to their consequences for our belief 
about the purposes or values in all phases of life. Dewey 
writes, 
The meaning of science in terms of science, in 
terms of knowledge of the actual, may well be left 
to science itself. Its meaning in terms of the 
great human uses to which it may be put, its 
meaning in the service of possibilities of secure 
value, offers a field of exploration which cries 
out from very emptiness •••• The search for values 
to be secured and shared by all ••• is a qu~s.t in 
which philosophy would have no rivals •••• j3 
Though it might be possible for any particular science, 
say, biology or chemistry, to attain a synthesis, at least 
for a time, within its own restricted field, the results of 
the special sciences, with respect to each other and their 
bearing upon the conduct of life, are scattered and 
33 Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 295. We shall see at a 
later stage that Dewey cannot consistently describe science as 
'knowledge of the actual'. The contrast between philosophy 
and science on this ground will be seen almost pointless. 
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unorganized. A complete integration of these results is 
almost impossible to attain, for new discoveries, new 
points of view, inherent in the progress of knowledge, will 
always create fresh difficulties. The increase in special-
ized knowledge itself will never 'work the miracle of 
producing an intellectual whole'. The need for integration 
is not a need that special sciences themselves feel. The 
demand for integration, which philosophy as 'a generalized 
medium of intercommunication' tries to fulfil, arises from 
practical human need , the need to understand what these 
results mean in terms of life. That philosophical criticism 
works as an integrating medium and tries to connect the 
scientific criticisms is due to philosophy's concern for the 
practical goods in life . The most distinctive characteristic 
of philosophical criticism is thus its orientation towards 
goods or values . 
Dewey tries to bring out thi~ point,namely, the practical 
objective of philosophical criticism, in full relief by analyz-
ing the distinction between philosophy and metaphysics. ' I f 
we follow classical terminology', he writes, 'philosophy is 
love of wisdom, while metaphysics is cognizance of the generi c 
traits of existence 1 • 34 Metaphysical analysis aims to arr i ve 
34 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 51. 
at a structural catalogue of the universe, whereas, 
philosophy , as love of wisdom ' is concerned with finding 
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its implications for the conduct of life, in devotion to 
what is good' . 35 It is necessary to note that metaphysics, 
according to Dewey~ is not an attempt to offer any synthetic 
interpretation of things by selecting any one feature or 
aspect as clue to the unity of the whole. Metaphysics 
means - and Dewey objects to metaphysics taken in any other 
sense - the delineation of the general and pervasive traits 
exhibited by anything that exists. These pervasive traits 
or structures disclosed by metaphysical analysis are, again, 
not to be set off as belonging to a timeless realm more real 
than the world of contingency and change. Dewey maintains 
that the structure of the universe, the generic traits of 
existence, are themselves involved in change and that man is 
related to the changing structures in a practical and vital 
way . And this vital relation between the generic traits of 
the universe on the one hand and the issues of life and 
death faced by those who live in it on the other, raises the 
'most far reaching question of all criticism'. 
An essential fact about Dewey's empirical (in the sense 
of non- transcendental) metaphysics is that 
35 
Ibid. 
this human situation falls wholly within nature. 
It reflects the traits of nature, it gives in-
disputable evidence that in nature itself 
qualities and relations, individualities and 
uniformities, finalities and efficacies, con-
tingencies and n$cessities are inextricably 
bound together . 36 
Experience, according to him, is continuous with nature; 
49 
the pervasive traits of human experience are also the traits 
of nature . Metaphysics disclose these traits of nature and 
thereby give a general understanding of the character of the 
world within which man lives . It is thus necessary to have 
a metaphysics; for it reveals the traits and characters of 
natural existence that are the sources of 'both values and 
their precariousness ; both of immediate possession which is 
casual and of reflection which is a precondition of secure 
attainment • ••• ,37 It provides us with what Dewey describes 
in the same context as 'a ground map of the province of 
criticism' • 
But simply to have a metaphysics is not enough. To 
live and to improve the conditions of living in a precarious 
world man needs, what Dewey calls the wisdom that is philo-
sophy . Metaphysics may define the traits of nature, but 
36 
Ibid . , 421 . 
ful, an awful 
I Ibid . , 42 . 
37 
Ibid . , 413 . 
Also, 'Man fears because he exists in a fear-
world. The world is precarious and perilous•. 
5o 
simply to 'detect and define' these traits is not wi sdom. 
As Dewey explains, 'Barely to note and register that con-
tingency is a trait of natural events has nothing to do with 
wisdom ' . But to note contingency 'in connection with 
concrete situations of life', situations in which men choose 
and act, live and die, 'is that fear of the Lord which is at 
least the beginning of wisdom 1 .38 
The primary concern of philosophical criticism, as 
Dewey understands it, is then to direct the conduct of life. 
Philosophy arises from the awareness of widespread conflicts 
in life and a felt need for intelligent direction towards the 
realization and actua l attainment of dependable goods. This 
view of philosophy has, on the whole, a kind of responsiveness 
to human problems and a sense of responsibility - 'making the 
world a better place to live in' - which no one probably can 
or wishes to dispute . But such a view of philosophy clearly 
raises many issues and problems which we have not as yet 
touched upon . The following discussion will therefore be, 
in a way, an examination of this conception of philosophy: we 
shall try to understand and assess Dewey 1 s philosophical 
formulations and his specific recommendations in their 
relation to what he tells us to be the ideal and commitment 
of philosophy . 
38 Ibid., 433 . 
CH.APTER III 
THE METAPHYSIC.AL PERSPECTIVE 
Nature, Experience, and Intelligence 
'Nature' is an old word in philosophical discussions 
and as such is loaded with different, often conflicting, 
affiliations and associations. So is •experience'. The 
association of these two words as the title of one of his 
important philosophical works - Experience and Nature -
Dewey writes, •to many ••• will seem like talking of a round 
square'. For, he continues to draw the usual sharp 
dichotomy between his own views and of those whom he 
considers his opponents, 
Experience, they say, is important for those 
beings who have it, but is too casual and 
sporadic in its occurrence to carry with it any 
important implications regarding the nature of 
Nature. Nature, on the other hand, is said to 
be complete apart from experience. Indeed, 
according to some thinkers the case is even in 
worse plight: Experience to them is not only 
something extraneous which is occasionally 
superimposed upon nature, but it forms a veil 
or screen which shuts us off from nature, 
unless in some way it can be ntranscended". 
So something non-natural by way of reason or 
intuition is introduced, something supra-
empirical. According to an opposite school 
experience fares as badly, nature being thought 
51 
to signify something wholly material and 
mechanistic; to frame a theory of experience in 
naturalistic terms is, accordingly to degrade 
and deny the noble and ideal values that 
characterize experience . 1 
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Dewey states in the same context that he will endeavour, as 
the title of the volume Experience and Nature 1 is intended 
to signify', to formulate a philosophy that 'may be termed 
either empirical naturalism or naturalistic empiricism or 
taking nexperience" in its usual signification, naturalistic 
humanism. ' 
Now, whether or not ' "experience" in its usual signif-
ication ' implies 'humanism' (and what 'humanism' stands for ) , 
we shall not bother ourselves to touch upon at this stage. 
We shall mainly try to explain what Dewey intends to denote 
by the terms 'nature', 'experience' and 'intelligence' and 
set the stage for the subsequent discussion of his theory of 
inquiry (called by him the method of experience and also 
scientific method) . The task seemingly modest is not 
altogether an easy one . For it will be evident as we proceed 
that the terms 1 nature 1 and 'experience', as Dewey uses them, 
stand for what can be described as the metaphysical perspec-
tive of his philosophical position and as such,have fundament -
al and significant status in his system. The meanings Dewey 
1 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 1a. 
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attaches to them are claimed to be original meanings, 
different from 'the significations previously attached to 
them 1 • 2 It is unfortunate that Dewey uses these hopelessly 
infected words to signify original meanings instead of 
coining, as Whitehead did, his own expressions for such 
meanings . Late in life,at the age of ninety, he came to 
realize that 'the words used were most unfortunate• and 
wrote about •experience' that 'historically so many differ-
ent interpretations have been put on the word by philosophers 
that it is now too late to rescue it from ambiguity 1 • 3 But 
it is not the historically different interpretations alone 
that has caused the ambiguity . Added to this unfortunate 
selection of words is the difficulty of interpreting Dewey's 
own writings . His own expressions are not always clear and 
do not seem to be free from ambiguity. Anyway, as these 
words have original meanings and fundamental status in 
Dewey 1 s system, it is necessary, even in a disquisition 
concerned mainly with his social and educational thought, to 
give a brief account of what he intends to denote by them. 
According to Dewey, nature is an affair of beginnings 
and endings, or in other words, processes having 
2 
Ibid,, 2a. 
3 Dewey, "Experience and Existence:A Comment", in Philosophy: 
and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 9 (1948-49), 712. 
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starting- points and finishing-points in time. 'Nature', he 
writes , ' is an affair of affairs, wherein each one, no 
matter how linked up it may be with others, has its .Q!fil 
quality •. 4 This means that every natural thing or event has 
its own quality and its own history of starting and ending 
as shaped by and within the interactive continuum of all 
natural things . There is, however, nothing permanent or 
f ixed about the quality or history of a natural thing; it 
changes with their changing links with other natural things. 
One thing in nature may interlock and unite with any other 
thing in nature and as a result they may have a continuity 
established between them and a common history . But this 
continuity may sometime break off bringing to an end their 
common history . The things, bearing marks of their former 
relations, may begin new relations and connections with 
other things in nature . Every thing, however marked by 
change it may be, has its own quality, its beginnings and · 
endings and its own history . It is an affair in nature. 
When things get interlocked in a way that the interlocked 
affairs acquire some sort of stable, continuous equilibrium 
and a unique character, it (i . e . , the interlocked aff air) 
may have its ovm quality, beginnings and endings, and its 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 97. 
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separate history. It is an affair of affairs. Thus, any 
situation in nature consisting of a number of interlocked 
things or events, the reign of a king, the span of a man's 
life, the passage of a season, the flight of a bird, may 
have its own quality, beginnings and endings, i.e., its own 
history. Thus, nature in the inclusive sense is the vast 
setting or panorama of the on-going history of all these 
on-going histories. Dr Ratner explains Dewey's meaning of 
the term nature in the following way: 'Nature is an inclusive 
history of multitudinous ongoing histories, the comprehensive 
interactive continuum consequent upon the interactivities of 
an indefinite number of general kinds 1 .5 This implies that 
there is interaction as well as continuity in nature. When 
two events interact, say, as cause-effect, the connection 
between them is an exemplification of the continuity between 
them. And this connection of continuity is nothing but the 
ongoing history of their interaction. There are beginnings 
and endings in the interactions, continuity and end of common 
history of particular things and events, but the process, i.e., 
nature, goes on. The 'close of one history', Dewey writes, 
5 
Ratner, Intelli5ence in the Modern World, New York, Modern 
Library, 1939, 1J2. The following pages contain an analysis 
of Dewey's conception of nature. 
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'is always the beginning of another•. 6 
'Experience' is in nature. It denotes the interactions 
of a living organism with its environment. An organism is 
always in a process of interaction with the environment, for 
'life denotes a function ••• in which organism and environment 
are included . 17 As a result, 'experience occurs continuous-
ly, because the interaction of live creature and environing 
conditions is involved in the very process of living•. 8 By 
experience is then meant the whole complex series of trans-
actions which occur between the live creature and its 
environment . Everything the live creature undergoes and 
everything it does is exper ience . To the critic who rises to . 
enquire , 'Whose experience?', Dewey's answer is that the 
question implies that 
experience by its very nature is owned by some one; 
and that ovmership is such in kind that everything 
about experience is affected by a private and 
exclusive quality . The implication is as absurd as 
it would be to infer from the fact that houses are 
usually owned , • •• that possessive reference so per-
meates the properties of being a house that nothing 
intelligible can be said about the latter 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 100. 
7 
Ibid . , 9. 
8 
Dewey, Art as Experience, New York, Minton, Balch & Co., 
1934, 35. In his later writings, Dewey uses the term 'trans-
action' to emphasise the point that the boundary between an 
organism and its environment is factitious. See, "Conduct 
and Experience" in Philosophy and Civilization, 252. 
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without reference to ownership. 9 Experience, like a house, 
1 can be described without reference to a self ••• irrespective 
of whom it belongs to 1 • 1° For Dewey, experience is the 
formal recognition of what he considers to be a patent fact 
in nature, namely, the continuous transactions between 
organisms and their environments. It is to be taken as a 
context, rather than a content of mind or consciousness. It 
is a natural affair . As Dewey writes, 'Experience, a serial 
course of affairs with their own characteristic properties 
and relationships, occurs, happens, and is what it 1s 1 • 11 It 
is an on- going process in nature with its dimensions, 
histories, beginnings and endings. 
There is, however , another aspect of the term experience. 
Experience is not only the claim that there is this continuous 
transaction between organisms and their environments, but it 
is also 'experience' that makes this claim. 
9 
"Experience", (pewey tells u§], is what James called 
a double - barrelled word. Like its congeners, life 
and history, it includes what men do and suffer, 
what they strive for, love, believe and endure, and 
also how men act and are acted upon, the ways in 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 231-2. 
10 
Ibid . , 232 
1 1 
Ibid • • 
which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, see, 
believe, imagine - in short, processes of 
experiencing.12 
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It includes, as he says in the same context, not only the 
planted field, the sowed seeds, the sun and rain, but also 
the one who plants and reaps, his plans, hopes and fears. 
Experience then, includes experiencing, the way of getting 
at experience. Now, this distinction between experience as 
a natural phenomenon that covers all transactions at the 
organism-environment level and experience as experiencing, 
responsive 'taking', i.e., taking account of what happens, 
has important methodological import. We can put it this 
way: experience provides the subject-matter, while 
experiencing is the way of getting at that subject-matter. 
Experiencing is itself a fact of experience, 'a selected 
phase of it'. For 
12 
Experiencing has no existence apart from subject-
ma~r experienced; we perceive objects ••• not 
percepts, we remember events and not memories; we 
think topics and subjects, not thoughts; we love 
persons, not loves; and so on •••• Experiencing 
is not itself an immediate subject-matter; it is 
not experienced as a complete and self-sufficient 
event. But everything experienced is in part 
made what it is because there enters into it a 
way of experiencing something; not a way of ex-
periencing it, which would be self-contradictory, 
but a way of experiencing something other than 
itself. No complete account of what is experienced, 
Ibid., 8. 
then, can be gi1~n until we know how it is experienced •••• 
What Dewey wants to say is that there cannot be any 
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experiencing without or apart from the experiential context 
(i.e., experience in the sense of 'what it is') and that we 
cannot give a proper account of what is experienced (say, a 
tree .€h§. experienced) without analyzing the structure and 
mechanism of the mode of experiencing it. 14 Experiencing 
itself can therefore be a subject-matter of critical study 
and investigation. In formulating his method (called the 
method of experience) Dewey has, as we shall see, made a 
significant contribution to this field. But the point we 
want to make out of this distinction is that _experience, as 
an on-going natural process, is in nature; and as experiencing, 
is of nature. As Dewey writes, 
13 
It is not experience which is experienced, but 
nature - stones, plants, animals, diseases, 
health, temperature, electricity, and so on. 
Things interacting in certain ways .fil:.§. experi.e.nce; 
they are what is experienced. Linked in certain 
other ways with another natural object - the 
human organism - they are how things are 
experienced as well. Experience thus reaches 
down into nature •••• 15 
Dewey, "Experience and Conduct", in Philosophy and 
Civilization, 261. 
14 
Ibid . , 266. 
15 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 4a. 
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Several points emerge from the foregoing brief 
exposition. When Dewey speaks of natural processes having 
startings and endings in time, he obviously overrules the 
suggestion that they take place for the 'sake of an end 1 • 
He is equally opposed to 
the view held - or implied - by some "mechanists", 
which treats an initial term as if it had an 
inherent generative force which it somehow emits 
and bestows upon its successors, is all of a 
piece with the view held by teleologists which 
implies that the end brings about its own ante-
cedents. Both isolate an event from the history 
in which it/belongs and in which it has its 
character.1° 
Dewey rejects both spiritualistic and mechanistic explanations 
of nature because their conceptions of causality split in 
two what, according to him, is a single continuous process. 
'The notion of causal explanation involved in both concep-
tions', he writes, 'implies a breach in the continuity of 
historic process; the gulf created has then to be bridged by 
an emission or transfer of force 1 • 17 Dewey is opposed to 
dualisms - all sorts of dualism - and he uses frequently the 
notion of continuity, one of the most effective weapons in 
his armoury, against such diverse theories as psycho-physical 
1o 
Ibid., 99-100. 
17 
Ibid., 273 
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or mind-body dualism, 18 'pan-objectivism' of neo-realism, 19 
'spectator' theories of knowledge, 20 traditional ('two 
world') metaphysical and ( 1 divorce of the ideal from the 
natural') ethical theories of various kinds. But inspite of 
his frequent appeal to the principle of continuity, Dewey 
has nowhere (at least, to the present writer's knowledge) 
given a clear account of what he precisely means by contin-
uity. The status of the principle of continuity or its 
meaning is never quite clear. At times he writes as if the 
principle of continuity is a postulate of logical theory, 21 
'the postulate of moral science' , 22 one 'which cannot be 
denied without self-contradiction•, 23 and at other times as 
if it is a scientific conclusion. 24 Now, Dewey cannot very 
consistently speak of continuity as a logical principle whose 
18 
Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, 87. 
19 
Ibid., 72-3. 
20 
Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 230. 
21 
Dewey, Logic:The Theory of Inquiry, 23. 
22 
Dewey, "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of 
Morality", in Problems of Men, 244. 
23 
Dewey, "The Inclusive Philosophic Idea", in Philosophy and 
Civilization, 81. 
24 
Dewey, "Half-Hearted Naturalism", Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. XXIV , 58. 
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denial would involve self-contradiction and then employ it 
as an existential category, for this, as Morris Cohen points 
out, would 'hardly fit into his own distinction between the 
logical and the existential 1 • 25 Nor can the principle of 
continuity, despite all the progress that has been made by 
science, be empirically established as a conclusion. It is 
not, and Dewey does not show it to be, either a necessary 
pre-supposition of science and scientific procedure. 
But let us suppose for the moment that Dewey has 
successfully argued that there is continuity in nature. The 
important ~uestion is: How does Dewey apply the notion of 
continuity in explaining nature? While speaking of cause 
and effect as 'on the same level' in existence, as 'portions 
of one and the same historic process', Dewey claims, 
It is as much a part of the real being of atoms 
that they give rise in time, under increasing com-
plications of relationships, to qualities of 
bitter and sweet, pain and beauty, as that they 
have at a ctoss section of time extension, mass 
or weight.26 
Now, if it is assumed that atoms have in time given rise to 
human tastes, human sense of beauty and so on, this homo-
geneity of nature, this qualitative identity of all natural 
25 
Morris R. Cohen, Studies in Philosophy and Science, New 
York, Henry Holt & Co., 1949, 145. 
26 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 109-110; see, Morris R. Cohen, 
Studies in Philosophy and Science, 139-175-
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objects is very much a characteristic of the doctrine of 
physical determinism. But Dewey cannot accept a strict 
determinism. The principle of physical determinism claims 
a universal necessity that cannot be conclusively verified 
and as a result cannot be fitted into Dewey's empirical 
metaphysics. More importantly, nature, in his view, must be 
undetermined and incomplete to leave scope for human 
activities to change and improve it. 
At other times, Dewey seems to talk of continuity in 
a different way. Thus, while arguing that everything human 
is natural he often seems to drift to the converse view that 
everything natural or existential can be meaningfully 
described and explained in terms of human experience. 27 He 
writes, for example, 
27 
28 
A naturalistic metaphysics is bound to consider 
reflection as itself a natural event occurring 
within nature because of traits of the latter •••• 
Traits of reflection are as truly indicative or 
evidential of the traits of other things as are 
the traits of these events •••• The world must 
actually be such as to generate ignorance and in-
quiry, doubt and hypothesis, trial and temporal 
conclusions •••• The ultimate evidence of genuine 
hazard, contingency, irregularity and indeter-
minateness in nature is thus found in the 
occurrence of thinking.2~ 
See, Dewey, Experience and Nature, 64, 68-9, 253, 351, 413. 
Ibid., 68-9. 
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The use of such categories as hazard and need, uncertai nty 
and precariousness, and the like, to explain the whole of 
nature or existence seems to be an attempt to read back into 
the entire nature what is peculiarly human. As an exempli-
fication of continuity this can have meaning only in a 
t hor ough- going animism or pan- psychism or in doctrines that 
believe in teleology. 
Arthur O. Lovejoy has pointed out that the principle 
of continuity can be applied to causal sequences in one of 
the two different ways . One way is reductive, which seeks 
to describe the later events by categories that are applic-
able to the description of earlier events . The other way is 
retr otensive, which reads back in earlier events the 
characters of the later phases. 29 It is obvious that 
allegiance to one or the other way of treating continuity 
will make basic differences in metaphysics. Dewey seems to 
be trying to reap the benefits of both these points of view 
without any effort to show that the inconsistency involved 
is avoidable . And this has compelled him, as we shall see 
when dealing with his conception of intelligence, to give 
fundamentally different and incongruous solutions to 
important issues . 
29 
Arthur O. Lovejoy, "The Meanings of Emergence and I ts 
Modes", in Journal of Philosophical Studies, II, 167 ff. 
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One of the reasons why Dewey makes the notion of 
•experience' - which literally includes everything man has 
'transactions' with - a fundamental one in his philosophy is, 
again, for the sake of continuity. He believes that 'the 
reference to experience seems ••• to be the easiest way of 
realizaing the continuities among subject-matters that are 
always getting split up into dualisms'.30 Experience, as we 
have briefly stated earlier, is used to denote the complex 
system of transactions that occur between the live creature 
and other natural objects, those which happen to constitute 
its environment. Experience is in nature; it is continuous 
with and a part of other natural transactions. But it is a 
minute and transient part of natural transactions; that is 
to say, the range of natural transactions is much more 
extensive · than that of experience. 
We have also stated earlier that metaphysics, according 
to Dewey, 'is cognizance of the generic traits of existence'. 
Now, 'existence' in this context is much wider than exper-
ience; it includes all natural transactions. If experience 
is the only way to get at nature, how do we then get at the 
traits of existence which are 'beyond' experience? Dewey's 
answer is that we know nature or existence through experience; 
30 
Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, 71. See also, 7. 
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from sampling, as it were, of our environing objects we 
obtain the conception of nature . The movement from the 
characteristics of experiential transactions to the 
characteristics of natural (where 'natural' means the 
totality of natural transactions) transactions is legitimate, 
for experience is continuous with the rest of nature. This 
is, in short, the basis of Dewey's naturalistic, empirical 
metaphysics . But is this basis sound? Let us labour the 
point a little further . 
One of the generic traits of existence, according to 
Dewey, is ' quality' or what he also calls 'immediacy'. Now, 
his conception of quality differs in a nwnber of ways from 
what is traditionally understood by the term quality. 
Qualities, according to Dewey, are not objects of knowledge, 
they are not directly known, though they can be directly had 
or experienced . This introduces an important distinction, 
that between knowing and having; we directly experience 
qualities, but our knowledge claim about what we experience 
is always mediate - the result of inquiry. The qualities as 
they are experienced belong, according to Dewey, to a 
'situation' or 'context' - they are neither physical nor 
mental . Mental or physical are not independent realms; these 
distinctions are introduced 'for specific purposes of control' 
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within an inclusive situation. 31 Nor are qualities limited 
only to sense qualities, but there are 'pervasive' or what 
Santayana calls ' tertiary' qualities, which are directly 
exper ienced or felt . In every situation there is a 
pervaisve quality, say, indeterminateness or frightfulness, 
which conditions and is conditioned by, all the constituent 
aspects of the si t uation. When one refers to a situation 
as ' frightful', it does not mean an exclusive reference to 
certain subjective feeling . The specific pervasive quality 
of experience is the one ending of a transaction between the 
organism and its environment . It is the pervasive quality 
that suffuses an entire experience, binds the constituents 
of a situation and gives it unity and distinctive character. 
Without these pervasive qualities our experience would lack 
formal unity of significance and would dissolve into a hotch-
potch of discrete perceptions and feelings. 
The gist of the matter is that, CPewey write~, the 
immediate existence of quality, and of dominant and 
pervasive quality, is the background, the point of 
departure~ and the regulative principle of all 
thinking.-'2 
To take an example, the pervasive quality of 'indeterminateness 
31 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 259. 
32 
Dewey , "Qualitative Thought",in Philosophy and Civilization, 
116 . 
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of a problematic situation provides the background and point 
of departure for inquiry. And it is the process of inquiry 
that transforms this pervasive quality. 
Now, what Dewey claims is that the possession of quality 
is not only a characteristic of experience, but that all 
natural existences have quality (or immediacy). As he 
writes, 'Everything which is experienced has immediacy, and 
••• every natural existence, in its own unique and brutal 
t . 1 ·t f . t 1 h . d' , 33 Wh t par 1cu ari yo exis ence, a so _a§. imme iacy.... a 
could Dewey possibly mean by quality or immediacy of natural 
existences which are not directly experienced? How can we 
know that there is such quality in a natural existence which 
is beyond the range of direct experience except in a 
relational way, i.e., by inferring from its relation to other 
things?34 But 'intrinsic' qualities, Dewey maintains, cannot 
be known in a relational way, they can only be directly 
experienced. So what Dewey does seems to be simply this: 
On the assumption that experience is continuous with the rest 
of nature he claims that what experiential transactions 
reveal of a limited sphere of nature is equally true of the 
33 
Dewey, "Half-Hearted Naturalismn, loc. cit., 60-1. 
34 
See, Arthur E. Murphy, "Dewey's Epistemology and Meta-
physics", in P.A. Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of John De,vey, 
223. 
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whole of nature. But the problem remains. Since the qualities 
can only be directly experienced, it is not at all clear what 
Dewey precisely means when he says that 'every natural 
existence ••• also has immediacy 1 .35 
The motivation of Dewey 1 s insistence that there are 
intrinsic qualities in natural things or events which can 
only be directly experienced is understandable. For he wants 
to keep clear of the view that knowledge, which is mediate 
knowledge of the relations of any thing in nature, can give a 
full account of any natural existence. Referring to qualities, 
he writes, 'Knowledge has no conern with them. For knowledge 
is a memorandum of conditions of their appearance , concerned, 
that is, with sequences, coexistences, relations 1 • 36 Here 
Dewey seems to be fighting against the idealistic notion of 
internal relations - that a thing can be fully comprehended 
through its relations and when all the relations of a thing 
are known there is nothing left over to know about it. It 
has always loomed large in Dewey's mind throughout his 
wrestlings with the 'traditional' philosophi es that man in 
3? . . . 
In a recent article ("John Dewey's Metaphysics of Experience" 
in The cI.Q.urnal of PhilQso..PJly, Vol. LVIII, 1) Professor R.J. 
Bernstein says Dewey seems to be "talking about something 
mystical". Prof. Gail Kennedy in a reply, taking clue from 
some of Dewey's writings, suggests that intrinsic qualities 
are potentialities. 
36 
Dewey ExRer~enc~ a_~d Nature, 86. 
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his purely cognitive capacity seems to affirm the existence 
of a world from which all disorder, all sufferings, all 
colour and poignancy have been purged - a world so different 
from what is directly experienced. Hence his insistence that 
there are intrinsic qualities in natural existences that can 
only be directly experienced ('felt' or 1had 1 ) but cannot be 
known . Incidentally , is Dewey thereby creating a chasm 
between two realms of existence, one d~r~ctly_ ex__perien~q and 
the other m~_c!,i~?- t~ly kQQ.vfil? On his o,vn presumptions, not. 
For knowledge, according to Dewey, is not an instrument for 
revealing reality, it is a practical aid to survival. And 
since knowledge does not reveal any characteristic of nature, 
for him there is no problem of reconciling the objects of 
knowledge with those of direct experience. 
Whatever philosophical reason Dewey might have for 
insisting on the existence of intrinsic qualities and for 
constructing a metaphysics that can do full justice to them, 
he could not meet and clear away all the difficulties that 
are involved in such a position . We shall not discuss the 
various types of arguments37 Dewey has advanced in favour of 
his contention that natural existences have intrinsic 
qualities . These arguments at best show that there are 
37 
Ibid . , 85 ff, 96 ff, et al. 
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experiential qualities, but do not prove that all natural 
existences have intrinsic qualities. What we can, on the 
other hand, attempt to show is that while Dewey is speaking 
of intrinsic or inherent qualities in natural existences, he 
is, in fact, speaking of a different kind of qualities from 
those, which enter into experiential transactions. And that 
is a crack in continuity. 
While speaking of experiential qualities Dewey very 
forcibly makes the point that these qualities are active, 
that they provide 1the background, the point of departure 
and the regulative principle of all thinking' (quoted 
earlier). Not only this. These qualities can be enriched, 
'funded with meaning', mediated and transformed. The 
pervasive quality of 'frightfulness' in a frightful situation, 
for example, can be mediated and transformed. But when Dewey 
comes to speak about the intrinsic qualities of natural 
existences - which do not necessarily enter into experience 
- he uses such expressions as 'those irreducible, infinitely 
plural, undefinable and indescribable qualities which a thing 
must have in order to be ••• something obdurate, self-sufficient, 
wholly immediate 138 or the 'phase of brute and unconditioned 
"isness", of just being what they irreducibly are 1 .39 Dewey 
38 
39 
Ibid., 85. 
Ibid., 86. See also, 96. 
seems to be talking of two different kinds of qualities. 
The difference is not simply terminological; the two kinds 
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of qualities are two different kinds of 'existents•. The one 
is the resultant of the organism-environment transaction, 
while the other, meta-experiential and unconditioned. One is 
capable of being mediated and transformed, the other 
irreducible and just what it is unmediated. Dewey's language 
reveals the difference but he does not recognize the problem. 
He glibly passes from experienced qualities to 'intrinsic' 
qualities in natural existences, in fact, from limited 
experience to the totality of nature. 
The upshot of the foregoing analysis is that Dewey 
cannot speak of 'intrinsic qualities' in natural existences 
or of 1a natural world that exists independently of 
organism 1 40 without creating inadvertently a chasm between 
nature and experience. But as he does not clearly recognize 
the unbridged gap in his position and instead speaks 
emphatically of the continuity of experience and nature, he 
lends credence to the charge, brought forward by a number of 
critics, of identifying nature with or of reducing it to 
experience. Thus, according to Santayana, Dewey regards 
40 
Dewey, Logj._c:The The~u of Ina~ir_x, 33. 
nature 
as a landscape that paints itself; but it is still 
something phenomenal, all above board. Immediacy, 
which was an epistemological category, has become 
a physical one: natural events are conceived to be 
compounded of such qualities as appear to human 
observers •••• Nature is accordingly simply 
experience d~ployed ••• nature here is not a world 
but a story. 4i 
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Santayana calls this 'half-hearted and broken-winded' 
naturalism, nature being dominated and determined by what he 
calls the 1foreground 1 • The foreground is 'experience'. 
Morris Cohen similarly complains that Dewey 1 s naturalism 
'offers no vistas of nature beyond the human scene• and 
accordingly characterises it as 1anthropocentr ic 1 • 42 
Dewey hardly ever missed a chance to reply to his 
important critics and both Santayana and Cohen were 
answered.43 Since Dewey 1 s reply to Cohen is more recent and 
comparatively clear (the reason being that Santayana's 
criticism reflects his own philosophy and Dewey's reply is 
also a critique of what he calls Santayana 's 'broken-backed' 
naturalism), we shall have a look at it to see whether Dewey 
has anything new or important to say in self-defence. In his 
41 
Santayana, "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics", in Schilpp, 
~~d.), The _Philoso_Qhy o_f'._ JohIJ. _Dewe_x, 253. 
Cohen, loc. cit, 140. 
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See, Dewey, "Half-Hearted Naturalism" in loc~ .cit., and 
"Nature in Experience" in Problems of Men, 193-207. 
reply Dewey recognizes the 'issue' raised by Cohen as 
'fundamental' - 1 a problem ••• which every empirical philo-
sophy must meet•. But, as usual, in defending his own 
position he first carries the fight straight into his 
opponent's home-ground. He says, 
It would seem then as if the philosophy which 
denies that it is possible for experienced things 
and processes to form a road into the natural 
world must be controlled by an underlying postu-
late that there is a breach of continuity between 
natur~ and~ and hence between nature and human 
experience. 
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But this statement, when analysed, does not seem to be any-
thing more than a denial of the denial of continuity; it 
does not positively justify the postulate that there is 
continuity. In another line of argument Dewey throws the 
blame squarely on the critic's shoulders. He says, 
Affirmation of the continuity of experience with 
nature has its difficulties. But they are not 
grasped nor the theory refuted by translating 
what it says into terms of a theory which assumes 
that the presence of the human factor in experience 
precludes ge~ting from experience to the non- human 
or physica1.~5 
Here Dewey seems to be complaining that his conception of 
experience has been misinterpreted, it has been 'translated' 
into the terms of subjectivist notions of experience. Dewey 
~ 
Dewey, Problems of Men, 196· 
45 
Ibid., 198. 
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would say that experience, even though it includes the 
human factor, is not subjective. For experience is not just 
subjective states of immediacy centered in an organism: 
experience is transaction. Subjectivity is the abstraction 
of only one side of the two-sided transaction, namely, the 
immediately felt quality and making it self-enclosed reality 
cut off from the interconnections an organism has with its 
environment. Dewey would thus claim that the nature as 
revealed in and through experience is not anthropocentric, 
or in other words, experience does not subjectify nature. 
And to add force, he will, at this stage, bring in the whole 
array of arguments against what he calls the great 
epistemological pseudo-problem - the problem of connecting 
'subjective experience' with the 'objective antecedent-to-
experience reality 1 • 
What does Dewey precisely mean by 'experience'? And 
how to get at the heart of his 'original meaning' of this 
ambiguous term? Dewey 1 s 1 experience 1 , it see~s, can go on 
in nature without being the experience of a mind or some 
minds or an Absolute Mind. It is neither mental or physical 
in the traditional sense; it is impersonal, a natural affair, 
a context. It covers a minute part of nature but it is 
continuous with the rest of nature. It is, again, experience 
that makes the claim that there occur in nature these 
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transactions. In fact, it seems to claim more; for it does 
not admit that there is a vast residue of nature or natural 
transactions inaccessible to human experience and which, as 
it is in itself, is unkno\m or unknowable. It does not either 
seem to agree that what experience reveals are only experien-
tial transactions and it is useless to argue whether there is 
anything else. 'Experience' thus seems to be more than a 
mere descriptive term; it has a deeper and wider sweep than 
what is simply implied by the fact of its continuity with the 
rest of nature. It is claimed to reveal a 'natural 1 nature 
- not a nature that is 'experience deployed' and though it 
covers a minute portion of the whole, it is supposed to be 
capable of revealing or uncovering the whole of nature. 
Dewey's 'experience' thus seems to have what Santayana calls, 
1 a transcendental sense ••• something romantically absolute and 
practically coercive•. 46 Is Dewey then, as some of his 
perplexed critics contend, 'an absolute idealist who no longer 
believes in the Absolute 1 ?47 
In the first stage of his thought Dewey was a Hegelian 
and 'experience', then, was for him the succession of states 
Santayana, "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics 11 , in lac.cit., 
253. 
47 
W.K. Wright, A History of Modern Philosophy, New York, 
Macmillan & Co., 1947, 557. 
· d · ·1 ·t· 48 of consciousness an primari y cogni ive. He expounded 
his Hegelianism on what he called 1 the objective method in 
psychology' and the method consisted in this: 
Nothing shall be admitted into philosophy which does 
not show itself in experience, and its nature, that 
is its place in experience, shall be fixed by an 
account of the process of knowledge, by Psychology.49 
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Afterwards from his readings of James' Psychology Dewey 
derived a significantly different notion of experience. 
Though James apparently held all experience to be subjective, 
Dewey contended that there was another strain in James, which 
is objective, having its roots in a return to the 
earlier biological conception of the psyche, but 
a return possessed of a new force and value due 
to the immense progress made by biology since the 
time of Aristotle.JO 
Experience is now defined in biological terms, as the inter-
action of an organism with its environment. Consciousness is 
no longer a necessary part of it; and knowledge is nothing 
more than a mere biological function. Dewey writes, 'Con- . 
sciousness ••• is only a very small and shifting portion of 
experience. 1u the experience ••• are all physical features of 
48 
Dewey, "The Psychological Standpoint" in Mind, January 1886, 
Vo 1. XI , 1 -1 9. 
49 
Ibid., 3. For Dewey's earlier views on this point see also, 
"Psychology as Philosophic Methodn in Mind, April 1886, Vol. 
XI, 1J3-173; Psychology (1887), 11-12. 50 
De~ey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism11 in Contemporar1: 
American Philosophy, Vol. II, 24. 
the environment ••• and the habits and interests ••• of the 
organism 1 • 51 Or, as elsewhere, 
Experience ••• is the entire organic agent-patient in 
all its interaction with the environment, natural 
and social •••• Experiencing is just certain modes 
of interaction, of correlation of natural objects 
among which the organism happens, so to say, to be 
one. It follows with equal force that experience 
means primarilz not knowledge, but ways of doing 
and suffering.?2 
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This experience, Dewey goes on to say in another context, is 
not private - 'It is not exact or relevant to say n1 exper-
ience" or 1I think" . urt 11 experiences or is experienced, "it" 
thinks or is thought, is a juster phrase'.53 So far, we may 
say, it is clear; what Dewey wants to say is that experience 
is a natural affair. 
Let us now see how Dewey derives from this conception of 
experience his new philosophic method, the empirical method 
or, as he sometimes calls it, the method of experience. In 
other words, how, according to him, experience makes its 
claims about experience and nature? In the first chapter -
entitled 'Experience and Philosophic Method' - of his 
Experience and Nature, Dewey writes, experience 'is 
51 
Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, 6. 
52 
Dewey, Creative Intelligence, 36-7. See also, The Influence 
of Darwin on Philosophy, New York, Peter Smith, 1951, 157 and 
242-270. 
53 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 232. 
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11 double-barrelled 11 in that it recognizes in its primary 
integrity no division between act and material, subject and 
object, but contains them both in an unanalyzed unity•.54 
This is immediately followed by a distinction between 
empirical and non-empirical methods. He writes, 
Empirical method is the only method which can do justice to this integrity of "experiencen. It alone 
takes this integrated unity as the starting-point 
for philosophic thought. Other methods begin with 
the results of a reflection that has already torn 
in two the subject-matter experienced and the oper-
ations and states of experiencing. The problem is 
then to get together again what has been sundered 
•••• For empirical method the problem is nothing so 
impossible of solution. Its problem is to note how 
and why the whole is distinguished into subject and 
object, nature and mental operations. Having done 
this, it is in a position to see to what effect the 
distinction is made: how the distinguished factors 
function in the further control and enrichment of 
the subject-matters of crude but total experience. 
Non-empirical method starts with a reflective 
product as if it were
55
primary, as if it were the 
originally n given' 1 • 
After locating how dualis:ms arise out of the non-empirical 
approach, Dewey comments, 'it is the inevitable result ••• of 
the abandoning of acknowledgement of the primacy and ultimacy 
of gross experience - primacy as it is given in an uncontroll -
ed form, ultimate as it is given in a more regulated and 
significant form 1 .56 
54 
Ibid., 8. 
55 
56 I
bid., 9. 
Ibid., 15. 
80 
No more direct quotations are necessary. Suffice it to 
say that references to 'primary integrity', 'integrated 
unity', •primacy and ultimacy' in the sense of what is given 
in gross experience, 'originally given' and the like, occur 
repeatedly in the chapter and throughout the volume. Now, 
what can Dewey possibly mean by these expressions? It is not 
difficult to see that he is lauding undiscriminated totality, 
but what is or, rather what does he mean by 'prtmacy and 
ultimacy', the 'originally given'? Can 1 givenness' - when 
consciousness, according to him, is not - be an essential and 
indispensable characteristic of •experience'? What can we 
make out of such expressions as, 'experience recognizes ••• no 
division', or 'empirical method can do justic to this 
integrity', or 'takes this integrated unity as the starting-
point'? Dewey has never analyzed clearly what 'primary 
experience'.§:.§. experiencing or 'integrated unity'~ 
experienced is like. When he says that facts of experience 
simply~ or had or felt, it is not at all clear what he 
precisely means. The vagueness leaves scope for doubt that 
Dewey has never completely freed himself - in spite of his 
disavowals - from the conception of experience as conscious. 
In fact, his strong bias for the originally given, for the 
data of primary or immediate experience and also the 
relegation of reflective thought for its alleged sundering 
of an 1 integrated unity' irresistably remind of Bradley's 
'Absolute Experience'. Santayana characterises this as 
'mystical'. Because, he writes, 
in this direct possession of being there is no 
division of subject and object, but rapt ident-
ification of some term, intuition of some essence. 
Such is sheer pleasure or pain, when no source or 
object is assigned to it; such is esthetic contem-
plation; such is pure thinking, the flash of 
intellectual light. This mystical paradise is 
indefinitely extensible ••• it is5there only that the innocent spirit is at home. 7 
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Dewey is likely to find this interpretation irksome, and in 
view of what he says about direct experience or enjoyment 
ceasing to be a datum and becoming a problem to be reflected 
upon and resolved, it seems somewhat tenuous. But, on the 
whole, the precise meaning of Dewey 1 s •experience' is far 
from clear. 
Apart from this, the position Dewey avowedly holds gives 
rise to a number of important issues. One crucial issue is 
the status of reflective thought: mathematics, logic, science, 
evaluation. Reflective thought or inquiry is, according to 
Dewey, relational and instrumental. Natural events in their 
'immediacy' are 'ends' both in nature and for knowledge. 
Reflective thought is the conceptual means used for 
establishing connections between natural events for the 
57 
Santayana, "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics" in loc. cit., 
256. 
purposes of control or furthering of experience. He says, 
Immediately, every perceptual awareness may be 
termed indifferently emotion, sensation, thought, 
desire; not that it is immediately any one of these 
things, or all of them combined, but that when it 
is taken in some reference, to conditions, or to 
consequences or to both, it has, in contextual 
reference, the distinctive proDerties of emotion, 
sensation, thought, or desire . ~8 
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This means that the immediately experienced qualities have 
no meanings in and of themselves; they must be connected 'to 
conditions, or to consequences or to both', i.e., with other 
events to become meaningful. Reflective thought does this: 
it gives meaning to directly experienced data. Thus, in 
direct experience we have natural existences in their 
immediacy, where as in thought we know them in a relational 
and instrumental way, i . e . , as reconstructed by thought. 
Since thought is practical or operationa1,59 it will be 
a mistake to think that its objects are existential natural 
objects . Accordingly, the objects of science are not 
existential objects, they are, on the other hand, abstractions 
constructed to promote control and enjoyment of non-cognitive 
experience . In Dewey's opinion, 
58 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 304. 
59 
Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 114 ff. We shall consider 
this point in the following chapter. 
When this standardized constant (the physical 
object), the result of series of operations and 
expressing an indefinite multitude of possible 
relations among concrete things, is treated as 
the reality of nature, an instrument made for a 
purpose is hypostatized into a sug5tance complete and self-sufficient in isolation. 
83 
From this it follows that science is instrumental - made for 
human purposes, desires and needs . 61 Dewey has, however, at 
times, spoken of science in a somewhat different way that may 
be taken to imply that the objects of science need not always 
be defined with respect to human purposes and uses. Take, 
for example, the following passage: 
Many critics take an ninstrumental11 theory of 
knowledge to signify that the value of knowing is 
instrumental to the knower. This is a matter which 
as it may in particular cases; but certainly in 
many cases the pursuit of science is sport, carried 
on like other sports, for its own satisfaction. 
But 'instrumentalism" is a theory not about personal 
disposition or satisfaction in knowing, but about the 
proper object of science, what is "proper" being 
defined in terms of physics.62 
Butihe moment we try to find out what Dewey has in mind as 
the 1 proper 1 object of physics, the purport of the passage 
seems to vanish. For, he says that the objects of physics 
61 
Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, 308. See also, Exper-
ience and Nature, Ch. I; Democracy and Education, 172. For an 
inclusive criticism of Dewey 1 s views on science, see, Morris 
R. Cohen, Studies in Philosophy and Science, 139-175. 
62 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 151. 
are not natural existential objects. 
The procedure of physics itself, not any 
metaphysical or epistemological theory, discloses 
that physical objects cannot be individual, 
existential objects. In consequence, it is absurd 
to put them in opposition to the qualitatively 
individual objects of concrete experience.63 
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What then are they? Dewey's answer is that 'The objects of 
science ••• are an order of relations which serve as tools to 
ff ~ · d" t h · db· • 64 e ec  imme ia e avings an eings. To emphasize that 
knowing is not ' direct grasp and envisagement', he says, 'the 
proper objects of science are nature in its instrumental 
characters 1 • 65 Thus, when Dewey says that the pursuit of 
science may be like a sport carried out for its own satis-
faction, he does not mean that scientific objects may be, in 
some cases, not related to practice, purpose and need. What 
he means is that, 
63 
Making and using tools may be intrinsically delight-
ful • • esthetically satisfying. This fact does not 
however define them -9& utensils; it does not confer 
upon them their characteristic property. In like 
manner, the pursuit of knowledge is often an immed-
iately delightful event; its attained products 
possess esthetic qualities •••• But these qualities 
do not mark off or define the characteristic and 
Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 241. 64 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 136. 65 
Ibid . , 137 . 
and appropriate objects of science. The character
66 of the object is like that of a tool, say a lever. 
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Thus, Dewey's position is that scientific objects are solely 
instrumental to human needs and uses and in contrast to 
existential natural objects of direct experience, i.e., 
metaphysically, almost 1 fictional 1 in character. 'Science 
thus conceived', Dewey admits, 'is not the final thing. The 
final thing is appreciation and use of things of direct 
experience • . 67 
Now, this description of science is probably not incon-
sistent with Dewey's conception of 1 empirical method' and 
what he says repeatedly on the importance of science. For 
science is instrumental to the appreciation and use of the 
things of direct experience. But is this a correct appraisal 
of the nature of science? 
It cannot be too strongly emphasized, &rites Cohe~ 
that relatively few branches of science have had 
practical applications; and of many realms, such as 
the theory of prime numbers or the proof of theorems 
such as Fermat's, it is6hard to imagine how they can possibly ever have any. e 
Besides, what science tells us about its objects or, in 
other words, scientific information, is not in itself, i.e., 
66 
Ibid . , 151 - 2. 
67 
Dewey , The Quest for Certainty, 212. 68 
Cohen, loc . cit . , 160. 
by its own nature, instrumental. It is true that we use 
that information, where possible, for the satisfaction of 
our needs; and it is only so far as we can use it for our 
purposes that science is instrumental. 
But to suppose that the whole meaning of what 
science tells us about the physical environment 
is reducible to this instrumental function is to 
treat one context in which things come to us as 
ultimate for metaphysics, and this is an irrep-
arable mistake.69 
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Dewey, we have seen earlier, criticises the non-
empirical methods for sundering the integrated unity of 
experiential data. But the way he draws the line between 
direct experience and relational knowing, between the exist-
ential ('concreteness') and the reflective ('abstractness 1 ), 
there is, nonetheless, a similar problem for him. How does 
he connect up the immediate with the mediate, non-cognitive 
(or pre-cognitive) with the cognitive, valuing with 
valuationZO direct primary experience with science? The 
problem can be clearly stated as follows: Dewey's position 
69 
Murphy, "Dewey's Epistemology and Metaphysics", in P.A. 
Schilpp, (ed.), The Philosophy of John Dewey, 223. 
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In moral theory Dewey draws a similar line of distinction 
between 'valuing' and •valuation'. Valuing is directly en-joying a value (immediate), valuation is rationally recon-
structing a value (mediate). See Dewey, "Theory of Valuation", 
in International Encyclopedia ·of Unified Science, Vol. II, 4, (1939), 20. Also Experience and Nature, Ch. X. Dewey's theory 
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is that the direct experience of nature gives rise to 
problematic situations and hence, inquiry. Inquiry, in its 
turn, resolves the problematic situation, i.e., comes back 
to experience. In terms of moral theory, direct enjoyment 
of good or •valuing' is the stimulus to inquiry or mediation, 
• I 1 t· I i.e., va ua ion. And valuing ('unsettled or dubious state 
qua value') becomes a 'real 1 or •secured' value after being 
reflectively mediated upon. In Dewey's own words: 'Without 
intervention of thought, enjoyments are not values but 
problematic goods, becoming values when they re-issue in a 
changed form from intelligent behavior•. 71 Dewey's empirical 
method then involves the movement from primary experience to 
inquiry and secondly, the movement of inquiry back into 
primary experience. 72 There is then the need to explain the 
two junctures in the procedure, namely (1) where direct or 
primary experience emerges into inquiry or reflective thought, 
and (2) where inquiry comes back to primary experience. 
Dewey's explanation, in brief, is that rational thought 
itself is a kind of 'experience•. Primary experience and 
reflective thought, he will say, do not represent two fixed 
separate 'realms' of nature. 
71 
Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 246. 
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Dewey, Experience and Nature, 36. 
Instead of there being a fixed difference between 
it (experience) and ••• rational thought - there is 
a difference between two kinds of experience; one 
which is occupied with uncontrolled change and 
one concerned with directed and regulated change. 
And this difference, while fundamentally 73 important, does not mark a fixed division, 
88 
The purport of the passage seems to be that while there is 
a difference between primary experience and reflective 
thought that does not mean that their operational spheres 
are fixed and exclusive to each other. One mode of 
experience, Dewey would say, is interconnected with other 
modes of experience and as such, the mode of primary 
v 
experience can give rise to other modes of experience and 
reflective thought can also fall back to primary experience 
in order to regulate and direct the latter. Dewey's point 
is that there is a difference, but no division, between 
experience and inquiry - and here again, Dewey is relying on 
the notion of continuity, in this case continuity among the 
different modes of experience. In one explicit statement 
on this point, Dewey maintains, 'Since human life is contin-
uous, the possibility of using any one mode of experience to 
assist in the formation of any other is the ultimate postulate 
of all science - non-ethical and ethical alike 1 .74 Now, this 
73 
Dewey, The Wuest for Certainty, 82. Italics not in original. 
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Dewey, Problems of Men, 245. 
being obviously a piece of circular reasoning, it cannot 
offer us any new clue as to what Dewey means by the 
principle of continuity itself . But the passage, if 
analyzed, will reveal - what we have been suggesting earlier 
- that Dewey is not certain as to what to designate by the 
term I experj_ence '. Let us put it this way: if continuity of 
the different modes of experience rests on the continuity of 
human life, is not experience then primarily a human affair? 
And to press our point a little further: what does Dewey 
mean by the continuity of human life? In what sense is human 
life continuous? In a recent paper on Dewey's philosophy, 
S . Morris Eames argues that 
the continuity of the organism involves a continuity 
of feeling, and feeling pervades all the experiences 
of the human organism, symbolic and non-symbolic, 
immediate and mediate alike ••• • So the principle of 
feeling is always present as is the5principle of continuity wherever there is life.7 
The meaning of the word 'involves' in this passage is not 
clear; it may mean that continuity of feeling follows from 
the continuity of the human organism, or if, on the other 
hand, emphasis is laid on the expression 'feeling pervades 
all experiences of the hwnan organism 1 , it may be taken to 
75 
s. vr . Eames, "The Cognitive and the Non-Cognitive in 
Dewey's Theory of Valuation", in The Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol LVIII, No 7,194. 
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suggest that the continuity of human organism rests on the 
continuity of pervading feeling. But whatever may be the 
proper implication as to the relation between the principle 
of feeling and the principle of continuity, it seems equally 
hopeless either to explain or to establish the continuity of 
human organism by alluding to continuity of feeling. Feeling 
is subjective. If it is not so, what does it mean in this 
context? The kind of 'feeling' Bradley speaks of while 
describing his 'immediate experience'? 
Anyway, the passage we have been attacking is not 
Dewey's own. Dewey would object to introducing the dualism 
of the physical and the psychological in the continuous life 
of the organism or to any attempt to explain its continuity 
by alluding to the continuity of consciousness or feeling. 
Assuming that he does object to this kind of explanation, he 
does not clearly state either in what other way he can 
explain the continuity of the human organism. On the other 
hand, his strong emphasis on the continuity of human 
organism without explaining it and the attempt to settle the 
interconnection and continuity of the different modes of 
experience on that score leave us guessing whether here, than 
anywhere else, we should look for the 'permanent deposit' 
Dewey's acquaintance with Hegel has admittedly left in his 
thinking. 
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Intelligence, according to Dewey, is an operative 
factor within nature; it is active and effective in transform-
ing and modifying the world. Dewey consistently favours 
William James' view that the world is in the making, 'unfinished 
growing, in all sorts of places, especial ly in the places where 
thinking beings are at work 1 .76 Dewey feels strongly against 
Absolutism for, according to him practical intelligence cannot 
function in the 'block universe• of the Absolutist. He says, 
1A theory which ends by declaring that everything is, really 
and eternally, thoroughly ideal and rational, cuts the nerve 
of the specific demand and work of intelligence 1 .77 For 
intelligence to function effectively the world must be 
genuinely plastic, that is to say, there must be real uncertain-
ty and indeterminacy, conflict and precariousness, in nature. 
In Dewey's conception, nature is such a wide-open world; con-
flict and indeterminacy are its genuine traits. As he says, 
'The great difference between the conception proposed and the 
76 
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Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, 22. Dewey's arguments 
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Nature, 61), ethical (The Influence of Darwin on Philoso h, 
24, 223-4) and practical ttThe Need for a Recovery of Philo-
sophy11, in Creative Intelligence, 27-8). These arguments occur 
in different contexts throughout Dewey's philosophical 
writings . We shall not, however, discuss them. 
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traditional theory consists in recognition of the objective 
character of indeterminateness; it is a real property of some 
natural existences 1 .78 For Dewey the world is a temporal 
process, where everything is changing in time. All existents 
are in a constant •passage', in other words, 'every existent 
is an event 1 . 79 There is no once and for all beginning nor a 
fixed final end or goal for the things in nature. Nature is 
not the unfolding of a predetermined plan, 'nature has no 
preference for good things over bad things, its mills turn out 
any kind of grist indifferently 1 • 8° From this it follows that 
man in course of his selective adjustment to the environment 
can exercise genuine choice between alternative ways of 
resolving the indeterminacy inherent in any encountered 
situation. This means that the goal of intelligence is not 
predetermined by certain fixed ends. As against absolutist 
metaphysics , which according to him implies a spectator 
theory of knowledge and fixed ends, Dewey further holds that 
knowing 1 enters into the ,construction of the objects known'. 
The act of knowing necessarily involves a transformation or 
reorganization of the data of direct experience. 'What is 
78 
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known is seen to be a product in which the act of observation 
plays a necessary role. Knowing is seen to be a participant 
in what is finally known 1 • 81 But knowing, as we have hinted 
earlier, is not simply a psychic state or act. In knowing, 
1it is not the "mental" phase of observation that makes the 
difference 1 .82 As Dewey says, 'Knowing is, for philosophical 
theory, a case of specially directed activity instead of 
something isolated from practice 1 • 83 Knowing or thinking is 
literally something that we do to transform or modify the 
environment. Thus, it is in a temporal,plastic and precarious 
world, where knowing or thinking makes a difference in our 
relation to the environment, Dewey believes that intelligence 
can actually 'get things done 1 .84 He says, 'Problems are 
solved only where they arise - namely in action, in the 
adjustment of behavior. But for good or for evil, they can 
be solved only with method; and ultimately method is 
81 
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Dewey distinguishes 'between knowledge as the outcome of 
special inquiries (undertaken because of the presence of 
problems) and intelligence as the product and expression of 
cumulative funding of meanings ·reached in t hese special cases'. 
- "Experience, Knowledge and Value", in P.A. Schilpp, (ed.), 
The Philosophy of John Dewey, 521. 
intelligence, and intelligence is method 1 • 85 Dewey is an 
C 
optimist and his optimism is based on his faith in the 
efficacy of intelligence. He fervently believes that 'Man 
is capable, if he will but exercise the required courage, 
intelligence, and effort, of shaping his own fate 1 • 86 
Now, what is this 'intelligence'? In his earlier 
descriptions of intelligence Dewey seems to follow closely 
the Darwinian formula that 
every distinct organ, structure or formation, every 
grouping of cells or elements, is to be treated as 
an instrument of adjustment or adaptation to a 
particular environing situation. Its meaning, its 
character, its force, is known when, and only when, 
it is considered as an arrangement for meeting the 
conditions involved in some specific siutation.~7 
Intelligence, on this account, is an instrument of 
biological adaptation and Dewey clearly says so. 
The progress of biology has accustomed our minds 
to the notion that intelligence is not an outside 
power presiding supremely but statically over the 
desires and efforts of man, but is a method of 
adjustment of capacities and conditions within 
specific situations.e~ 
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But in his subsequent writings, Dewey does not seem to 
stick strictly to this description. For he develops, side 
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by side with the conception of intelligence as a method of 
adjustment, the other thesis that intelligence is a novelty 
and it brings other novelties in the world. He writes, 
As a matter of fact, the pragmatic theory of 
intelligence means that the function of mind is 
to project new and more complex ends - to free ex-
perience from routine and from c...aprice. Not the 
use of thought to accomplish purposes already 
given either in the mechanism of the body or in 
that of the existent state of society, but the use 
of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action 
is the pragmatic lesson.~9 
And he now goes on to draw a contrast with what looks almost 
like his own earlier view of intelligence; he says, 1 A 
pragmatic intelligence is a creative intelligence, not a 
routine mechanic 1 • 90 It is creative, for it involves the 
'imaginative forecast of the future ••• imaginative recovery 
of the bygone•. 91 In its creative function, intelligence, 
itself a novelty, also brings in new ends of its own in the 
world. 1 To catch mind in its connection with the entrance 
of the novel into the course of the world is to be on the 
road to see that intelligence is itself the most promising 
of all novelties•.92 
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The notion of intelligence as 'creative' becomes 
clearly dominating whenever Dewey talks about the aim and 
purpose of philosophy, about the intellectual, moral and 
social reconstructions needed to change the world for the 
better . In Human Nature and Conduct, while speakingabout the 
necessity of guiding desires and impulses by intelligence, 
he says, 
Thought is not a slave of impulse to do its biddings. 
Impulse does not know what it is after •••• It 
rushes blindly •••• It is indiscriminate •••• What 
intelligence has to do in the service of impulse is 
to act not as its obedient servant but as its 
clarifier and liberator • •• • Intelligence converts 
desires into plans . (p.254- 5). 
Similarly, in Reconstruction in Philosonhy, he says, 
To • •• suggestions used in constructive fashion for 
new ends the name intelligence is given •••• It 
liberates man from the bondage of the past •••• It 
projects a better future and assists man in its 
realization. (p.96). 
Also in The Quest for Certainty with a little more clarity: 
Interactions go on anyway and produce changes. 
Apart from intelligence, these changes are not 
directed •••• When an interaction intervenes which 
directs the course of change, the scene of natural 
interaction has a new quality and dimension. This 
added type of interaction is intelligence •••• 
Intelligel).ce means liberation and expansion. (p. 205). 
This is followed by a significant acknowledgment: 
The exercise of intelligence makes possible a new 
way of dealing with them (experienced objects), 
and thus eventually creates a new kind of 
experienced objects. (p.210). 
It is now clear that Dewey has two separate theses on 
intelligence . The notion of intelligence as •a method of 
adjustment of capacities and conditions within specific 
situations' is logically distinct from the notion of 
intelligence as a ' creative novelty• . Dewey does not, 
., 
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however , treat them as distinct and separate notions; he 
does not seem to recognize that they may have different, 
even conflicting, metaphysical implications. The reason is 
that Dewey, as we have seen earlier, employs both the 
reductive and retrotensive methods in explaining the s~me 
natural phenomenon. Following the reductive point of view, 
he traces intelligence back to its humble beginnings and 
characterizes it as a mere biological function. Following 
the retrotensive point of view, he discovers in intelligence 
'imagination, reflection and vision' and characterizes it as 
•creative novelty' . 
How does Dewey attempt to reconcile 'creative noveltyt 
and the resulting 1 new ends' with continuity in nature? 
What is exactly his naturalistic view of evolution? In 
Chapter VII - entitled 11 Nature, Life, and Body-Mind" - of 
Experience and Nature, Dewey works out at great length a 
serial order of natural events marked by 'three plateaus' or 
levels . 
The first, the scene of narrower and more external 
interactions, while qualitatively diversified in 
itself, is physical •••• The second level is that 
of life. Qualitative differences, like those of 
plant and animal, lower and higher animal forms, 
are here even more conspicuous; but in spite of 
their variety they have qualities in common which 
define the psycho-physical. The third plateau is 
that of association_, communication, participation. 
This is still further diversified, consisting of 
individualities. It is marked throughout its 
diversities, however, by common properties, which 
define mind as intellect; possession and response 
to meanings. Each of one of these levels having 
its own charact~ristic empirical traits has its 
own categories.~3 
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Now, all this looks like the theory of emergent evol-
ution in a popular ('theory of levels') form and Dewey him-
self agrees that 1 it may be conceived as an attempt to 
contribute to what has come to be called an °emergentn theory 
of mind. 94 To this, however, he puts a 'but' - 'But every 
word that we can use, organism, feeling, psycho-physical, 
sensation and sense, "emergence" itself, is infected by the 
associations of old theories, whose import is opposite to 
that here stated•. 95 In a comparatively recent reply to one 
of his critics he similarly states that he would call the 
increasingly complex levels - 'emergents' - 'were it not for 
ambiguities in the notion of 11 emergence"'. 96 Tbis in fact 
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means a lot of un-saying. For Dewey, who is never tired of 
digging up the vagaries of past philosophical traditions, is 
surprisingly silent about the exact nature of 'ambiguities' 
involved in 'what has come to be called an "emergent" theory 
of mind'. He simply remarks. in passing that the import of 
the old theories is •opposite' to that of his own. He does 
not explain what these imports are, how his own theory 
differs from the old ones or what new notion of emergence he 
has in mind. 
In recapitulating his position, Dewey writes, 
While there is no isolated occurrence in nature, 
yet interconnection and connection are not wholesale 
and homogeneous. Interacting events have tighter 
and looser ties, which qualify them with certain 
beginnings and endings, and which mark them off 
from other fields of interaction. Such relatively 
closed fields come into conjunction at times so as 
to interact with each other, and a critical 
alteration is effected. A new larger field is 
formed, in which new energies are released, and to 
which new qualities appertain.97 
What does this passage mean? How are we to understand 
the 'critical alteration', the release of 'new energies', 
the 'new qualities' Dewey speaks of? He rejects the notion 
of emergence, at least the usual significance of it and in 
the pages immediately following the one from which this 
passage is quoted, he attacks both the teleological and 
97 
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mechanical conceptions of evolution for creating •a breach 
in the continuity of historic process'. It is unfortrmate 
that Dewey always keeps his eyes fixed on one or the other 
of the rival theories, goes on telling us at unnecessary 
length what his theory is not and thereby makes his own 
position more and more elusive. For he talks of 'levels', 
of their distinct 'categories• - rejects all previous explan-
ations of them - but does not explain what, in his own 
theory, preserves the continuity among them. We are not 
given any clear clue as to how the notion of intelligence 
as a •creative novelty' can be fitted in with the persistent 
demand for continuity in nature. With the entrance of 
intelligence into the natural scene he brings in 'possession 
and response to meanings 1 , that is, meanings and ends, but 
we are never sure whether these are new types of behaviour 
(function) or new types of entities (existents). We do not 
clearly know what they exactly are or where they can be 
definitely located. Dewey's position, thus, in some of its 
important and essential features, remains blurred and 
confusing. 
The foregoing analysis, on the whole, reveals some of 
the difficulties involved in Dewey's conceptions of nature, 
experience and intelligence.· The analysis, if intended, can 
be carried further to show that Dewey's metaphysical position 
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gives rise to a number of problems, logical, ethical and of 
other sorts, which by their very nature need closer 
individual attention. We have seen that Dewey creates a 
problem by making the distinction between directly exper-
ienced existential quality and reflectively known relations, 
i . e . , conditions and consequences, and his solution or 
dis - solution of the problem rests primarily on his uncritical 
reliance on the principle of continuity. A similar problem 
arises in connection with what he calls 'the Darwinian genetic 
and experimental logic 1 • 98 For, here he combines the genetic 
method which is concerned with concrete existence with the 
experimental method which is concerned with abstract 
conditions . He moves 1 back and forth' from concrete existen-
tial situations which according to him are unique to 
conditions and consequences discovered by experimental 
method which, on the other hand, can inquire only into con-
ditions and consequences of types or cJass.es of events. For, 
experimental or scientific method always assigns an object 
or event to a class. It presupposes the possibility of 
recurrent, similar objects or events and in that sense, a 
scientific object is said to be verifiable.99 
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Dewey says that 'everything directly experienced is 
qualitatively unique•. 100 Any object as directly experienced 
is unique, though as a datum of reflective thought or inquiry 
it serves as a sign of recurrent relation. Now, to say that 
a unique quality must and does serve or function as a sign 
is to say that it is invariably associated with what it 
signifies. This introduces another problem: a unique quality 
is not repeatable, whereas a sign, in order to be a sign, 
must be recurrent. How do we then explain the relation between 
them? If qualities are not recurrent, but sign-relations are, 
are we to understand that sign-relations can occur apart from 
the qualities they are made of? Is it possible to speak of 
relations alone apart from signifying and signified 
qualities?101 
According to Dewey, knowledge is instrumental, that is, 
knowledge of means, conditions and consequences. He also 
believes that knowledge can help building a better and 
happier world. But how can knowledge of means control ends? 
We may know the conditions and consequences of a situation, 
but how can this knowledge modify or j_nfluence behaviour in 
100 
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any particular direction? In other words, how can the 
knowledge of possible consequences determine the choice of 
any one consequence out of the possible many? 
We do not intend to deal with these problems immediately. 
We simply mention some of them here, for they clearly arise 
out of Dewey's metaphysical position. We are aware that we 
shall probably have to consider Dewey's treatment of these 
problems as we proceed to deal with his logical and ethical 
theories. But before we conclude this chapter, we will 
raise a question of somewhat fundamental character. 
What is the nature of Dewey's metaphysics? And how 
does Dewey formulate what he calls the 'generic traits of 
existence•? Dewey's metaphysics must be interpreted as a 
series of broad generalizations as to the nature of existence. 
These generalizations are, then, abstractions formulated by 
reflective thinking for purposes of better control, 'to try 
to direct the conduct of life ••• upon the basis of the 
character assigned to the world 1 • 102 Now, what we want to 
say is that the character Dewey assigns to the world and to 
human activities in relation to it are based on certain 
assumptions. One of these assumptions is security. Dewey 
thinks that the world is precarious, human beings do feel 
102 
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insecure and whatever they do is for the sake of attaining 
security. Now, whether the desire for security (as 
' pleasure ' in some theories) is the one and the most funda-
mental drive of human nature, we believe, can be debated. 
Man very often voluntarily endangers his security - which 
means absence of danger , for the sake of positive ends, like, 
freedom and liberty, for the adventure of climbing a mountain 
peak or exploring the bottom of the sea, in dangerous 
experiments, in space flights. Now, if all these are 
included in the supposed category of security, it obviously 
needs redefinition. Another assumption implicit in Dewey's 
thinking is that of progress . He believes that by thinking, 
tool-making, controlling nature more and more for what he 
considers his ends, through scientific advancements, man 
today is more secure in the world than his forefathers. And 
Dewey believes that this progress can continue if man keeps 
faith in the capacity of intellect. This assumption can 
also be challenged. And neither of these assumptions are, 
strictly speaking, empirical in character. Now, whenever 
Dewey speaks of the precariousness of the world and the role 
of human intelligence in it, he bears in mind these two 
related assumptions, that of security and progress. The 
search for security and faith.in progress are, in fact, 
characteristic of Dewey's own time, the late nineteenth 
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century and early twentieth century Western world. There is, 
however, nothing very peculiar about it and Dewey might not 
refuse to admit the influence of widely accepted contemporary 
beliefs on his own thinking. 
But when Dewey goes to formulate his metaphysics or in 
other words, draw his 'ground map of criticism' on the basis 
of these assumptions, he becomes guilty of what he himself 
calls the 'fallacy of selective emphasis'. He accuses 
throughout his writings every important thinker from Plato 
to Russell, for the 'erection of objects of selective 
preference into exclusive realities 1 • 103 Dewey's metaphysics, 
it is true, differs from others in matters of detail; but in 
principle, that is, in the way the so-called traits of 
existence are being selected and formulated, he is equally 
guilty of 'selective preference•. The traits of existence 
he claims to have empirically discovered, the role he assigns 
to human intelligence, are the results of his deep faith in 
and over-emphasis upon certain chosen assumptions. In this 
sense, Dewey's metaphysics, like that of others he 
criticizes, is a set of deductions from non-empirical 
assumptions. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE METHOD OF EXPERIENCE 
The Pattern of Inquiry 
I 
We have suggested earlier that Dewey's conception of 
philosophy as a 'plan' or 1 proposal' is based on his notion 
of reflective thinking (he uses the word 'inquiry' in his 
later writings as a substitute for thinking) as a practical 
aid to survival. We have seen Dewey's proposal for the 
reconstruction of philosophy as involving, first and foremost, 
a formulation of what he calls 'the scientific method of 
knowing' on a 1 systematic observation of the conditions by 
means of which knowledge actually goes on'. For Dewey this 
'scientific method of knowing' is the Logic, as the canons 
of inquiry with which logic is concerned emerge from success-
ful ways or habits of inquiry, when these ways or habits are 
formulated. We have further seen that 'criticism' or 
philosophical activity proceeds, according to Dewey, by the 
clarification, discrimination and unification of partial 
and conflicting meanings of the constituent factors in any 
106 
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situation; and such clarification, discrimination and 
unification can be achieved only by instituting critical 
inquiry into the context, conditions and possible consequences 
of situations. The function of intelligence, which includes 
philosophical activity, is to seek new meanings and 'response 
to meanings', i . e., new ends and plans to secure these ends. 
This is possible through inquiry. Thus intelligence is, as 
Dewey puts it, •a short name for inquiry at work'. 1 Now, in 
re-stating all these points together we can very well see 
the fundamental role inquiry plays in Dewey's philosophy. 
The theory of inquiry is the cement that binds Dewey's ideas 
(and works) together and integrates them into a •system'. 
The theory of inquiry is undoubtedly Dewey's most original 
contribution to philosophy. Professor Sidney Hook claims 
it to be 'the most ambitious attempt ever made to formulate 
the rationale of modern scientific method 1 • 2 
Dewey has given us an explicit formulation of the 
different phases of inquiry, that is, the form or pattern of 
inquiry. In order to analyze and examine the philosophical 
implications of the theory of inquiry, it is necessary to 
trace briefly Dewey's form~lation of this general pattern of 
1 
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inquiry. In How We Think (published in 1910) Dewey first 
formulated 'five logically distinct steps' involved in a 
complete act of reflective thinking (p. 72f). His subse-
quent and more elaborate formulation of this general pattern 
in Logic:The Theory of Inquiry (published in 1938) differs 
from the earlier formulation in some important respects. In 
the following discussion we will rely on Dewey's later 
formulation in Logic:The Theory of Inquiry. 3 
Dewey defines inquiry as 
the controlled or directed transformation of an 
indeterminate situation into one that is so 
determinate in its constituent distinctions and 
relations as to convert the elements of the 
original situation into a unified whole. (p.104-5). 
An indeterminate situation is one where the 'constituents 
do not hang together'. A determinate situation is the 
'outcome of inquiry'. Thus, inquiry in completing its course 
transforms an indeterminate situation into a unified whole 
'in any given case in the degree in which the operations 
involved in it actually do terminate in the establishment of 
an objectively unified existential situation'. (p. 105). In 
this process of 'transition and transformation' of the 
indeterminate situation 'discourse through use of symbols is 
employed as means. In received logical terminology, 
3 
All quotations in this chapter are from Dewey's Logic:The 
Theory of Inquiry, unless otherwise stated. 
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propositions, or terms and the relations between them, are 
intrinsically involved'. (p. 105). 
1 • Indeterminate Situation. The first stage in the 
pattern is not really a step or part of the process of 
inquiry; it refers to the situation antecedent to inquiry, 
'the antecedent condition of inquiry'. It is a situation 
that evokes inquiry. Inquiry does not begin for its ovm 
sake. It begins in the face of a situation which is 
'questionable, uncertain, unsettled, disturbed', a situation 
'uniquely qualified in its very indeterminateness'. Dewey 
writes, 'A variety of names serves to characterize indeter-
minate situations. They are disturbed, troubled, ambiguous, 
confused, full of conflicting tendencies, obscure, etc.' 
(p. 105). Now, according to Dewey, it is the situation 
'that has these traits•. It will be 'a mistake to suppose 
that a situation is doubtful only in a "subjectiven sense'. 
As he says, 
We are doubtful because the situation is inherently 
doubtful. Personal states of doubt that are not 
evoked by and are not relative to some existential 
situation are pathological •••• Situations that are 
disturbed and troubled, confused or obscure, cannot 
be straightened out, cleared up and put in order, 
by manipulations of our personal states of mind. (p.105-6). 
A situation, according to Dewey, can be indeterminate 'with 
respect to its issue•. This means that the final outcome or 
consequences of the situation in question 'cannot be clearly 
made out'. 
If we call it confused, then it is meant that its 
outcome cannot be anticipated. It is called 
obscure when its course of movement permits of 
final consequences that cannot be clearly made 
out. It is called conflicting when it tends to 
evoke discordant responses. (p. 106). 
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A situation can also be 'indeterminate in significance'. 
This means that the interacting organism does not yet know 
what the encountered thing or event means or stands for. It 
is the kind of situation where it is not yet possible to 
determine the significance of certain components within a 
given situation - 'what they import and portend in their 
interaction with the organism'. 
Facing an indeterminate situation the problem that 
concerns the organism is 'what kind of responses' it will 
make 'toward an existential issue•. Transactions, i.e., 
interactions between living organism and environment become 
inquiry 'when existential consequences are anticipated; when 
environing conditions are examined ••• responsive activities 
are selected ••• in a final existential situation'. (p. 107). 
2. Problematic Situation. The indeterminate situation 
'in the very process of being subjected to inquiry' becomes 
problematic situation. An -indeterminate situation, Dewey 
says, 'comes into existence from existential causes •••• 
There is nothing intellectual or cognitive in the existence 
of such situations •.•• . In themselves they are precognitive'. 
1 1 1 
(p. 107). But when such a situation evokes inquiry, it is 
'taken, adjudged, to be problematic'. (p. 107). 
To recognize a situation as problematic is the 'initial 
step in inquiry'. But this recognition alone does not carry 
inquiry far. It must further be recognized 'what the problem 
and problems are which a problematic situation presents to be 
inquired into'. (p. 108). This is the step of 'the institu-
tion of a problem'. For, 'without a problem, there is blind 
groping in the dark'. And the way in which a particular 
problem is conceived will also determine the selection of 
data, relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses and other 
matters on which the success and adequacy of inquiry will 
eventually depend. The problem must 'grow out of an actual 
situation' - not one •self-set' to 'cause subsequent inquiry 
to be irrelevant or to go astray'. (p. 108). 
3. The Determination of a Problem-Situation: Hypotheses. 
Once the 'statement of a problematic situation in terms of a 
problem' is formulated, various possible solutions of the 
formulated problem may be suggested. Dewey says, '3tatement 
of a problematic situation in terms of a problem has no 
meaning save as the problem instituted has, in the very terms 
of its statement, reference to a possible solution'. (p. 108). 
This statement is liable to be misunderstood. Does Dewey mean 
that the very formulation of the problem 'provides' the 
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solution? What does he mean when he quotes with approval 
the familiar saying that 'a problem well put is half-
solved'? (p. 108). 
What Dewey means is that the statement of a problem 
indicates the area or field of investigation, the frame of 
reference and the relevant facts and materials that a 
proposed solution must take into account. In this sense 
the statement of a problem has reference to a possible 
solution. Dewey says in the same context that 'no situation 
which is completely indeterminate can possibly be converted 
into a problem having definite constituents. The first step 
then is to search out the constituents of a given situation 
which, as constituents, are settled'. (p. 108-9). Dewey 
tries to explain this point by referring to an alarm of fire 
in a crowded assembly hall. He says, 
The fire is characterized, however, by some settled 
traits. It is, for example, located somewhere. 
Then the aisles and exits are at fixed places. 
Since they are settled or determinate in existence, 
the first step in institution of a problem is to 
settle them in observation. There are other 
factors which, while they are not as temporally and 
spatially fixed, are yet observable constituents; 
for example, the behavior and movements of other 
members of the audience. All these observed con-
ditions taken together constitute ''the facts of the 
case''· They constitute the terms of the problem, 
because they are conditions that must be reckoned 
with or taken account of _in any relevant solution 
that is proposed. (p. 109). 
What Dewey wants to say is that the specification of a 
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problem - in this case, safe exit from the burning assembly 
hall - determines or controls further inquiry toward a 
possible solution. The determination of the 'settled con-
stituents' or factual conditions relevant to the •terms of 
the problem' leads to the •suggestion' of a possible solution 
of .the problem. Suggestions 'just spring up, flash upon us, 
occur to us'. (p. 110). They are at first vague - •they may 
become stimuli to direct an overt activity but they have as 
yet no logical status 1. (p. 110). They may be in cases even 
misleading. So, each suggestion has to be 'examined with 
reference to its functional fitness; its capacity as a means 
of resolving the given situation'. (p. 110). When a suggest-
ion is thus examined it becomes an idea, a plan of action. 
'Every idea originates as a suggestion, but not every suggest-
ion is an idea'. (p. 110). The examination of a suggestion 
'takes the form of reasoning'. 
4. Reasoning. Ideas are plans of action. The meaning of. 
an idea is the plan to act in a particular way to get out of 
a difficult situation. Ideas or plans of action, we have 
already noted, arise out of suggestions. 1When a suggested 
meaning is immediately accepted, inquiry is cut short 1. 
(p. 111). And in such a case, the conclusion reached, even if 
it happens to be correct, is not grounded. The meaning of a 
suggestion must be examined. 
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Reasoning is ratiocination or rational discourse . It is 
carried through symbols, i.e., propositions. It is in the 
nature of ideas or plans of action that they are concerned 
with future states of affairs which are not present at the 
moment in a given existential situation. Hence, the meanings 
which the syggestions involve 'must be embodied in some 
symbol. Without some kind of symbol no idea; a meaning that 
is completely disembodied cannot be entertained or used'. 
(p. 110). 
Now, how is the meaning examined? 
This examination consists [.Pewey says] in noting what 
the meaning in question implies in relation to other 
meanings in the system of which it is a member; the 
formulated relation constituting a proposition. If 
such and such a relation of meanings is accepted, 
then we are committed to such and such other 
relations of meanings because of their membership in 
the same system. (p. 111 ) • 
The process goes on •through a series of intermediate meanings' 
till we reach a meaning 'which is more clearly relevant to 
the problem in hand'. (p. 111-2). 
'The point made', Dewey claims, 1 can be most readily 
appreciated in connection with scientific reasoning'. A 
hypothesis, he says, is 'developed in relation with other 
conceptual structures' until it reaches the 'form in which it 
can instigate and direct an experiment that will disclose 
precisely those conditions which have the maximum possible 
force in determining whether the hypothesis should be accepted 
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or rejected 1. (p . 112). Or it may happen that the experiment 
will 'indicate what modifications are required in the 
hypothesis so that it may be applicable'. In many familiar 
situations 1the meaning that is most relevant' has been 
•settled' by experiments 'in prior cases' and such a meaning 
'is applicable almost immediately' in these situations. Now, 
what Dewey means is that 'an idea or suggestion' is to be 
developed 'in terms of the constellation of meanings to which 
it belongs' . This 3 relatedness' of a particular meaning to 
a system cf meaning takes prior consideration (in the form of 
'reasoning') to its practical or experimental tests. Judging 
a hypothesis in this manner is of course tentative - a conven-
ient step in practice; the final test of the suitability of a 
hypothesis 1 to interpret and organize the facts' is 
experiment. 
5. The Onerational Character of Facts-Meanings: Experiment. 
In the intermediate stages of inquiry facts and meanings not · 
only function together, but operationally affect each other. 
Facts give rise to suggestions, i.e., possible solutions or 
meanings. A meaning, in its turn, directs observation in 
certain directions and thereby discloses more facts. The new 
facts may suggest a modified hypothesis or altogether a new 
hypothesis, which will again direct fresh observation, and so 
on. The process will go on 'until the existing order is both 
unified and complete'. 
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Facts in the intermediate stages of inquiry are only 
1t r ial 1 facts ; ideas are similarly 'provisional' ideas. They 
are to be tested . Facts are to be 'proved' with respect to 
their •evidential function ' just as much as ideas are to be 
tested 'with reference to their power to exercise the function 
of resolution •. Both facts and ideas 'are finally checked by 
their capacity to work together to introduce a resolved 
unified situation' . (p . 111). This means that a hypothesis 
which has so far been a plan of action is now acted out. It 
is being experimented upon . If an experiment fails to 
resolve the problem, then inquiry goes on. A successful 
inquiry, according to Dewey, works out existential changes 
in the indeterminate problematic situation. As a result, what 
was troubled and unsettled is transformed into a settled 
situation . The •settled outcome of inquiry' is judgment as 
distinct from proposit~QQ which is constituted by symbols. 
'The content of the latter (i . e . , proposition) is intermediate 
and representative and is carried by symbols; while judgment, 
as finally, made, has direct existential import•. (p. 120). 
It is what Dewey calls 'a warranted assertion'. 
6. Common Sense an~Scientific Inquiry. In Logic:Th~, Th~orz 
of Inquiry pewey adds to the five steps of inquiry a sixth 
aspect, namely, 'Common Sense and Scientific Inquiry'. Its 
purpose is to explain that the difference between common 
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sense and science 'resides in their respective subject-matters, 
not in their basic logical forms and relations'. (p. 114). 
This difference in subject-matters is again 'due to the 
difference in the problems respectively involved; and fina~ly, 
that this difference sets up a difference in the ends or 
objective consequences they are concerned to achieve•. (p. 114-5 
Dewey ' s main concern in carrying out the analysis of common 
sense and science is to show that 'this difference in subject-
matters is not incompatible with the existence of a common 
pattern in both types' . (p . 116) . 
It is not difficult to see why Dewey considers this point 
so important as to add it to the pattern of inquiry. For he 
is now explaining the spread of inquiry. He is suggesting 
that the routine of inquiry can apply to any problematic 
situation , in the sphere of common sense as well as in the 
sphere of science . Inquiry being the only method of 
intelligent understanding and control, he is now pointing out 
that the method of inquiry can be fruitfully employed in 
every sphere of human experience including the field of value. 
There are several points which need to be clarified in 
order to avoid misunderstanding . First, Dewey nowhere 
suggests that the steps of "inquiry represent a chronological 
sequence which must be traced in every act of reflective 
thinking . In an act of inquiry several of these steps may in 
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fact be merged in a single step. In a simple case of 
problem-solving all these stages may be merged in one single 
act. In formulating the pattern Dewey is just trying to 
determine what is essential for inquiry as it proceeds from 
pre-reflective to post-reflective. 
Second, Dewey claims to have formulated the pattern -
not as deductions from certain self-evident axioms or g_ priori 
principles - but from a close investigation of the ways in 
which we actually gain reliable knowledge. The pattern of 
inquiry is not a set of deductions, but has emerged from a 
formulation of successful habits of inquiry. This is not a 
vicious circle. For according to Dewey, the pattern in the 
process of formulation can guide inquiry; and fur.ther inquiry 
can in its turn test, modify and refine the pattern or 
principles of inquiry. He writes, 
The theory, in summary form, is that all logical 
forms (with their characteristic properties) arise 
within the operations of inquiry and are concerned 
with control of inquiry so that it may yield 
warranted assertions •••• It means that the forms 
originate in operations of inquiry. To employ a 
convenient expression, it means that while inquiry 
is the causa cognoscendi of logical forms, primary 
inquiry is itself causa essendi of the forms which 
inquiry into inquiry discloses. (p. 3-4). 
Third, it may be argued that Dewey seems to be concerned 
primarily with how we obtain knowledge than with the what, 
that is to say, the character of the knowledge obtained. 
Dewey's answer to this would be that there is no intrinsic 
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certitude in knowledge. The mark of knowledge, according to 
him, is its •warranted assertability 1 and this is established 
in and through inquiry . Inquiry, particularly the 'experiment' 
involved in inquiry, is the method of validating what we 
obtain as knowledge . There is, however, the possibility of 
error even in the most carefully contrived experiment. Dewey 
can admit this without difficulty, for the mark of knowledge 
is not for him any kind of 'absolute certainty', Knowledge 
advances through experiments. Dewey insists that we must be 
ready to submit our knowledge continually to the most 
rigorous kind of tests . 
Fourth, inquiry is an art . As one does not become a good 
chess player simply by learning the rules of the game, 
similarly one cannot conduct successful inquiry simply by 
learning the essentials of inquiry. It is necessary to know 
how to use the rules of inquiry in concrete situations. And 
for this one must possess the sensitiveness to recognize the 
unique character of a situation~ one must patiently formulate 
the problem; one must have the creative imagination to 
envision new possibilities; one must be objective in assessing 
the worth of each new possibility; and above all, one must be 
willing ('open minded') to modify beliefs in the light of new 
experiences . These are the basic requirements one must fulfil 
to employ inguir~ as the method of philosophy. 
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In Dewey's mind the notion of inquiry is closely linked 
with his educational theory and social philosophy. Dewey 
contends, we have seen earlier, that the 1 proposals 1 of a 
serious philosophy usually find application in the theory 
and practice of education. In his own position this 
1application 1 is straightforward: he tries to establish that 
his views on the method and aim of education follow directly 
from his conception of the nature of reflective thinking. 
The foregoing exposition of the pattern of inquiry 
reveals that the experimental method of science or scintific 
method as Dewey understand it to be is, according to him, the 
prototype of all 'competent• reflective thinking. His next 
step is to characterize 'learning' as the practice and culti-
vation of competent reflective thinking. He writes, 
Process [es) of instruction • •• center on the production 
of good habits of thinking. The important thing is 
that thinking is the method of an educative exper-
ience. The essentials of method (of learning) are 
therefore identical with the essentials of 
reflection . 4 
The pattern of inquiry is the formulation of what is essential 
for reflective thinking and it is thus as much a method of 
•thinking• as of 'learning'. This transition from the pat t ern 
of thinking to that of learning (and calling the pattern 
•scientific') is important, for it amounts to the translation 
of a theory of knowing into a •scientific' teaching method. 
I'+newey, Democracy and Education, 192. 
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We hope to see more closely at some later stage how Dewey 
draws all his major theses on the method of education, namely, 
the pupils must face and meet concrete problematic situations 
in the school , they must learn to grasp, grapple with and 
overcome these problems themselves, 'the school must represent 
real life ' so that the continuity of experience of the pupils 
is not suddenly interrupted on leaving the school, and so on, 
from this basic contention . 
In Dewey's mind the theory of inquiry entails not only 
the method of learning but also determines the educational 
and social aims . The similarity between experimental inquiry 
and class- room learning is pushed further to emphasize that 
learning , like scientific inquiry, must be free from authori-
tarian control . There must be freedom for the learner as for 
the scientist . What is to be learnt and to what ends should 
not be arbitrarily predetermined . Since this freedom of 
inquiry and learning - the cultivation and practice of the 
scientific method to deal with concrete problems - is believed 
to be possible only in a democratic society, the concept of 
democracy is then linked up with the concept of scientific 
inquiry . In Dewey's mind these two concepts are inextricably 
bound together . Inquiry, he would say, is a social process. 
On the one hand , inquiry is instituted on problems that arise 
out of the conflicts of values and rules shared in social 
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experience. A free society alone can foster the spirit of 
free inquiry. 'Experimental inquiry and planning for social 
ends' can be carried on through public discussion and free 
communication only in a democratic community which believes 
in and works for social 'reconstruction'. Also on the other 
hand, it is only in and through the intelligent participation 
of the community that values and skills of inquiry become 
reformed, refined and active norms of individual and social 
behaviour. Thus, here we can see another important 
transition, in the present case, from the theory of 
knowledge to social theory, from scientific inquiry to 
democratic ideal. 
In Dewey's position, as he has himself asserted on 
repeated occasions, 'The reconstruction of philosophy, of 
education, and of social ideals and methods go hand in hand'.5 
Dewey has introduced a 1 unity and organization' in his treat-
ment of the diverse philosophical, social and educational 
problems and in spite of his earlier 'disparaging remarks ••• 
about the need for system in philosophy' he eventually admitted 
that he had a 'system': 1 I find that with respect to the 
hanging together of various problems and various hypotheses 
in a perspective determined by a definite point of view, I 
Ibid., 386. 
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have a system 1 . 6 Now, what is this perspective? It is, in 
Dewey ' s own words, 'the view of experj_ence which puts 
experience in connection with nature • •• but which would never-
theless frame its view of experience on the ground of con-
clusions reached in the natural sciences 1 .7 Dewey is 
obviously speaking of his naturalistic metaphysics and 
experimental logic . 
Now , once this 1hanging together of problems in a 
perspective' is clearly admitted, Dewey, the educator and 
social reformer , becomes philosophically committed. He 
recognizes this commitment when in response to Morris R. 
Cohen ' s approval of his ' personal liberalism', he writes, 
I must add not only that this liberalism is 
definitely rooted in the very philosophy to which 
he ~ohenl takes exception, but that any theory 
of activity in social and moral matters, liberal 
or otherwise, which is not grounded in a compre-
hensive philosophy seems to me to be on1y8
a pro-
jection of arbitrary personal preference. 
As a philosopher Dewey's main burden is then to show that 
what he believes to be the aim of education, the best form 
of social organization , the human good and social ideal are 
all 'rooted' in his •very philosophy'. How far he succeeds 
Dewey , Problems of Men , 193 
7 
Ibid . , 194. 
8 
Ibid . , 203 . 
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in showing that 'growth' as aim and 'activity' as method of 
education follow directly from his theory of experience 
(includes the notion of inquiry) - so also the honorific 
concepts of democracy and liberalism - is the burden of the 
present thesis to explore and examine. This also explains 
why in a disquisition on Dewey's educational philosophy we 
need to pay such close attention to his metaphysics and 
theory of knowledge. 
II 
Dewey's theory of inquiry raises a large variety of 
problems. There is the problem of determining the precise 
meaning of the term method. Scientists sometimes discuss 
the specific methods and devices they employ to deal with 
their problems. These methods are not, however, divorced 
from the subject-matters they deal with. But what is 'the 
-
scientific method'? Scientific methods are, again, 
primarily methods of verification, not methods of discovery. 
'Science knows of methods of verification but there are no 
methods of discovery. If there were such, all we need would 
be discovered, and we would not have to wait for rare men of 
genius•. 9 What is Dewey's method of inquiry? 
9Morris R. Cohen, "Some Difficulties in John Dewey's Anthropo-
centric Naturalism", in Studies in Philosophy and Science, 149. 
1?5 
It is commonly held that one central interest of 
science is in the •explanation• of natural phenemena. But 
in Dewey's view scientific experiments are not the artificial 
and controlled reproductions of ' pre-existent• natural 
existences nor can there be any scientific 'knowledge' of 
objective •concrete existences• and their laws and inter-
connections. Dewey maintains that the 'laws' formulated by 
science, which are •supposed to govern phenomena• are really 
•a way of transacting business effectively with concrete 
existences, a mode of regulation of our relations with them 1 • 10 
Thus, it is not that science •explains• natural existences 
and some of its findings we can and do apply in practice~ 
Dewey insists that science does not y!eld any knowledge of 
the objective world 1which has being prior to and independent 
of the operations of knowing' . The method of inquiry is con-
cerned with the •results' tobe achieved, the 1fruits 1 of 
directed action, and 'these fruits', Dewey says, •are the 
abiding advance of knowledge•. 11 We shall return to this 
point before long. 
Dewey claims that the pattern of inquiry emerges from 
the successful habits of inquiry, when these habits are 
10 
Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 199. 
1 1 
Ibid., 184. 
formulated. What does he precisely mean by successful? 
What are the criteria to determine whether an inquiry is 
successful or not? He says, 
We know that some methods of inquiry are better 
than others in just the same way in which we 
know that some methods of surgery, farming, 
road-making, navigating or what-not are better 
than others . (p. 104). 
126 
The ' better' methods are those,he continues, 1which exper-
ience up to the present time shows to be the best methods 
available for achieving certain results•. Is the achievement 
of •certain results ' then the sole criterion to settle which 
of the many try- outs is the method of competent inquiry? In 
many practical affairs of life as well as in some scientific 
matters men occasionally arrive at desired and hence, 
successful conclusions by faulty reasonings. How can we 
separate these cases? If the pattern of inquiry is selected 
by •a sort of survival of the fittest', how do we know that 
these successful habits of inquiry are also logically the 
best?12 
There are then many specific issues. Dewey says that 
suggestions 1 just spring up, flash upon us, occur to us'. 
These suggestions are the concepts (or !ideas', which work 
towards the transformation of the situation. What is the 
12 
See, Morris R. Cohen, loc. cit., 139 f. 
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source of these suggestions 9 Why do they work in practice? 
Dewey does not say much on these matters. There are then 
problems connected with Dewey's views on proposition and 
judgment, experiment and warranted assertability, common 
sense and science. 
Now, instead of dealing piecemeal with too many of 
these problems, we must confine our attention to a few issues 
that have direct bearings on our discussion as a whole. We 
have seen in the preceding chapter that two junctures in 
Dewey 1 s empirical procedure, namely, where direct experience 
emerges into inquiry, and where inquiry comes back into 
direct experience, need logical support and confirmation. 
The theory of inquiry is proposed to furnish a logical basis 
to the procedure. We will then try to determine what Dewey 
precisely means by an 'indeterminate situation' as the 
condition that gives rise to inquiry and the 'transformation 
of an indeterminate situation• as the outcome of inquiry. We 
will thus confine our attention primarily to the initial and 
terminal phases of inquiry. The analysis of these two phases 
of inquiry will be followed by a brief examination of the 
general philosophical import of the theory of inquiry. 
An actual situation necessarily includes an experiencing 
organism. Dewey writes, 'In actual experience, there is 
never ••• isolated singular object or event; .fil! object or event 
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is always a special part, phase, or aspect, of an environing 
experienced world - a situation1 • (p. 67). This implies 
that a situation is not constituted by isolated object or 
event; to be an 'environing experienced world 1 , an experienc-
ing organism is at least implicitly required. When an 
experiencing organism faces or rather gets involved in a 
situation of imbalance with no easy and smooth interactions 
between the organism and the environing conditions any 
longer possible, we have an indeterminate situation. 'The 
original indeterminate situation', Dewey writes, 'is not 
only 11 open11 to inquiry, but it is open in the sense that its 
constituents do not hang together'. (p. 105) . He further 
says, 'It is the very nature of the indeterminate situation ••• 
to be questionable ••• to be uncertain, unsettled, disturbed'. 
(p. 105). And it is the situation that has all these traits. 
'We are doubtful because the situation is inherently 
doubtful'. (p. 105-6). 
It can be readily seen that Dewey is using two sets of 
words belonging to two different reference systems in 
describing an indeterminate situation. Expressions like 
'uncertain', 'disturbed', 1 obscure', 'ambiguous' can have 
meaning only by having reference to living beings. On the 
other hand, expressions such as, 'do not hang together•, 
'unsettled', 'imbalance' and the like can have meaning only 
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in reference to some criteria of physical or quantitative 
measurement . It will be meaningful, for example, to say 
•we are uncertain because the situation is unsettled'. But 
to say •we are uncertain because the situation is uncertain 1 
is a confusion in language . Now, even if this linguistic 
confusion is removed by rearranging the expressions in their 
respective reference systems, confusion in meaning is not 
cleared up . For what does Dewey mean by 1 do not hang 
together ' ? He does not suggest any criteria to determine 
whether the constituent factors in a situation do 1 hang 
together' or not . His use of such synonyms as 'imbalance' 
and •unsettled ' do not help either. 
In a paper entitled 'What Does Mr Dewey Mean by an 
"Indeterminate Situation11 ? 1 , 13 D.S. Mackay raises questions 
regarding the use of the term 1 doubtful 1 as synonymous to an 
' indeterminate situation• . In reply Dewey admits, 
I was guilty of a loose use of language of a kind 
that readily leads to misunderstanding • ••• I 
used the term "doubtful" in connection with the 
pre- inquiry situation. Doubting is obviously 
correlative with inquiring. 1~ 
But Dewey does not admit that 1 misuse in this particular 
case ••• bear at all upon the particular issue'. To Mackay 1 s 
13 
The Journal of Philosophv, Vol. XXXIV, 1942, 141-8. 
14 
Dewey, Problems of Men, 327. 
130 
suggestion that the 'use of a number of words as synonyms of 
•indeterminate 0 ••• increases rather than lessens the vague-
ness of that term', Dewey replies, 
As for myself, I wish that I had enough poetic or 
dramatic capacity to multiply the words used 
still further. For no word can describe or convey 
a quality. The statement is, of course, as true 
of the quality indeterminate as it is of the 
qualities red, hard, tragic, or amusing. The 
words used can at best only serve to produce in 
hearer or reader an experience in which the 
quality mentioned is directly had or experienced 
•••• I spoke of some situations (those which evoke 
and direct inquiry) as perplexed, troubled, 
unsettled, open, imbalanced, in the hope that some 
adjectives might induce readers to call up for 
themselves the kind of situation to which the word 
"indeterminate" is applied in connection with 
inquiry. 15 
It may be disappointing that the 'antecedent condition 
of inquiry 3 cannot be conveyed clearly in words. But this 
need not distract our attention from the main issue. When 
Dewey says, 1 We are perplexed because the situation is 
inherently perplexed' (we now take the word 'perplexed' as 
an adjective to induce readers to call up for themselves a 
directly experienced quality), what he means is that the 
situation is to be understood as possessing the quality. In 
the passage quoted above, Dewey says that what is true of 
the quality indeterminate is true of such qualities as red 
and hard. This obviously suggests that as a situation can 
15 
Ibid., 328-9. 
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have the pervasive quality indeterminate, so there can be 
situations with pervasive qualities red and hard. Following 
Dewey's notion of situation, we then shall have to say I we 
see red because the situation is inherently red' and •we 
feel hard because we are in an inherently hard situation'. 
But this is meaningless. And this meaninglessness is due 
not to the linguistic confusion or the confessed difficulty 
in conveying a quality but primarily to a peculiarly 
holistic notion of situation. 
Inquiry may begin in an organism-environment interaction, 
and this whole context may be described as a situation. But 
it is not the situation which •sees', 'feels' or is 1 perplex-
ed1. H.S. Thayer tells of an actual experiment conducted in 
Chicago. 
We place a child in a maze. The child and the 
various conditions imposed by the maze make up the 
situation. The child may wander a bit, his 
behavior may be observed to be perplexed and con-
fused. At some point he grasps the trouble. He 
locates the problem and inquiring (in this case the 
active planning of how to get out of the maze) may 
be said to begin. But let us consider the stage 
antecedent to inquiry. This is an indeterminate 
situation. But if it is described as troubled, 
confused, perplexed, to what constituents of the 
situation do these terms meaningfully apply? Can 
we say the conditions imposed by the maze have these 
characteristics? Only · in one clear sense: we 
observe that the child exhibits these characteris-
tics and with respect to his relation to the maze, 
he is troubled, confused, ·perplexed, etc. 16 
16H.S. Thayer, The Logic of Pragmatism, London, Routledge & 
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But Dewey would say, 1 The child is troubled etc. because the 
situation is inherently troubled etc.•. For in his notion 
of situation, there is, to quote an expression from 
Santayana, 'no division of subject and object, but rapt 
identification of some term1 • 17 
While speaking of the indeterminate situation Dewey 
says, We call it confused' because 'its outcome cannot be 
anticipated ••• obscure when final consequences ••• cannot be 
clearly made out. Conflicting when it tends to evoke dis-
cordant responses' (quoted earlier). 'The immediate locus 
of the problem concerns', he says in explanation, 'what kind 
of responses the organism shall make. It concerns the inter-
action of organic responses and environing conditions ••• 1 
(p. 107). In all this Dewey seems to recognize quite 
explicitly that there are two constituent factors in what he 
calls a situation, and at least implicitly the distinction 
between them. But this important distinction within any 
given situation is soon overshadowed by his metaphysical 
commitments and he goes on to ascribe the character (or 
quality) of the initial response or reaction of the sentient 
Kegan Paul, 1952, 83. This -discussion is greatly indebted to 
Thayer's treatment of Dewey 1 s logic. 
17 
Santayana, t1Dewey 1 s Naturalistic Metaphysics 11 in P.A. 
Schilpp,(ed.), The Philosophy of John Dewey, 256. 
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being to an encountered environing condition to the 'whole 
complex of interactions' or 'the whole situation'. Let us 
take, for example, the following situation. Looking into 
the map of the subway system in New York one may feel con-
fused and perplexed, and unable for some time or without 
help to determine the route to follow to reach a certain 
destination. Now, if we call this situation 'indeterminate', 
what can we meaningfully imply by the term? Wherein does the 
indeterminacy lie? Is the map or the subway system it 
represents 'confused' and 'perplexed' and therefore 
'indeterminate' in any conceivable sense? Surely not. To 
say, as Dewey does, that 'one is confused because the 
situation is confused' is to extend a characteristic of 
human response to the environing conditions and to the whole 
situation. 
Dewey 1 s notion of situation harbours a deep metaphysical 
confusion. We have already seen that Dewey, while claiming 
that everything human is natural, often drifts to the con-
verse view that everything natural or existential can be 
meaningfully characterized in terms of human experience. 
Thus, while claiming that thinking is 'continuous with 
extra-organic events•, he not only implies that thinking as 
a response is aroused by a specific extra-organic stimulus 
but also that the stimulus is to be understood as possessing 
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the ' quality ' of the response . But this kind of extension, 
we ha~e also noted before , can have meaning only in a 
t horough- going animism or pan- psychism. 
Dewey ' s basic theory is that 'inquiry effects 
existential transformation and reconstruction of the material 
with which it deals' . (p . 159) . An act of inquiry takes 
place within one and the same situation. 1 The original 
indeterminate situation and the eventual resolved one are 
precisely initial and terminal phases of one and the same 
existential situation•. 18 The process of inquiry transforms 
the situation by re - shaping the antecedent existential 
materials . This does not take place in some cases of inquiry, 
but in all cases; nor this existential transformation occurs 
ordinarily or generally , but necessarily. Dewey writes, 
All controlled inquiry and all institution of grounded 
assertion necessarily contain a practical factor; 
an activity of doing and making which reshapes 
antecedent existential ~aterial which set the 
problem of inquiry. (p . 160). 
Now, what Dewey precisely means by the expression 'all 
inquiry necessarily contain' is not at all clear. If this 
universal necessity follows from the definition of inquiry 
('by definition'), it is then not an empirical statement, but 
a deduction from an assumption. Without denying for a moment 
18 
Dewey , Problems of Men, 324. 
the value of 1definition 1 for purposes of discussion and 
communication, we can still maintain that a position 
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adopted in reliance upon a definition or as a logical conse-
quence of a definition is not an empirical position. (Dewey 
himself criticises Aristotelian logic for its reliance upon 
'essence' and definition). If, however, Dewey is not rely-
ing on a new version of a priori 'logical truths', but on 
some kind of 'empirical necessity' that is not very clear 
either. In the light of what Dewey repeatedly says about 
the provisional character of knowledge, can we really con-
ceive anything like an •empirical necessity'? How and on 
what evidence can any such necessity be established? 
Dewey says inquiry transforms a situation because the 
process of inquiry 'effects existential transformation of 
the material with which it deals 1 or 'reshapes antecedent 
existential material which set the problem of inquiry'. 
What does he mean by these expressions? H.S. Thayer in his 
Logic of Pragmatism explores and examines the situation of 
the child in a maze. The child may in course of inquiry 
have 'marked the walls, left them with scratched surfaces, 
he may have bruised his hands and scuffled the dirt on the 
floors, etc. 1 • (p. 177). Some time must have also passed. 
When the child comes out of the maze the spatial relation 
between the child and the maze has also altered. But is it 
these trivial and commonplace facts Dewey is trying to 
emphasize by claiming that inquiry effects existential 
changes and reshapes the antecedent material that set the 
problem of inquiry? 
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It can, however, be said that a situation includes the 
child as well as the conditions imposed by the maze; and 
the indeterminate problematic situation child-in-the-maze is 
different from the resolved s ituation child-outside-of-the-
maze . And this change in the situation is brought about by 
inquir y . But what does really change in the indeterminate 
situation to make it a determinate one? What sort of 
existential changes are brought about by inquiry? When the 
child comes out of the maze, the maze and the conditions 
imposed by the maze remain the same . The maze does not 
change into something else nor does the child . What really 
changes is the child's relation or response to the maze. 
Though Dewey speaks of thinking in terms of I stimulus' and 
'response' he does not explain the changed (or 'trans~ormed') 
situation in the simple way suggested. Instead he talks of 
inquiry reshaping 'antecedent existential material which set 
the problem of inquiry 1 Q In the case of the child in a maze, 
it is the conditions imposed by the maze that •set the 
problem of inquiry' • . But are these antecedent 'existential 
material• reshaped as a result of inquiry? Let us take 
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another example. A man is trying to escape from a burning 
building. He is running along the corridors looking for a 
safe exit through a door or a window. In this active process 
of inquiry is he in any intelligible sense 1 reshaping 1 the 
antecedent existential material that set the problem? What 
he is trying to achieve is to change his relation to the 
burning building. The same is true of a man-lost-in-a-wood 
situation. In coming out of the forest as a result of 
reflection and physical effort he does not 'reshape' the 
forest. 
In any of these cited instances of inquiry what Dewey 
can probably meaningfully assert is that the problem is 
solved. This can mean, say, in the case of the man lost in 
the forest that the man, once he finds the way out, will 
have a different ·response to the forest. There will no 
longer be a problem to be solved and consequently, his 
behaviour in relation to the forest will be transformed. And 
in this sense, the new situation will be different from the 
problematic one. But Dewey will not just stop at that; he 
will call this 'subjectivism'. To steer clear of what seems 
to him to be the path of subjectivism, he carries on an 
absurd •extension'. Because the problem is settled, he will 
sa~, the situation is now settled. A situation includes 
existential conditions; so when a situation is changed or 
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transformed, the existential conditions (in this case, the 
forest) must be 1 reshaped 1 • And the act of inquiry as a 
continuous (logical as well as existential) process is 
supposed to 1 effect 1 all these changes. 
The instances of inquiry we have cited so far are all 
cases of deliberations that are accompanied, due to the 
necessity of circumstances, by overt physical actions. 
Dewey's inquiry, by definition, includes the stages of 
deliberation, action, consequences and satisfaction as 
phases in one and the same process. If one deliberates on a 
problem but does not act on any one of the 'suggestions• or 
1 ideas•, that will not be, according to Dewey, a complete 
act of reflective thinking or inquiry. But even in a 
complete act of inquiry, as in the above cases where all the 
phases are clearly present, it is extremely difficult to 
determine what Dewey has in mind when he talks of the 
•transformation of a situation' and the reshaping of 
'existential material'. It is painfully clear that Dewey's 
language lacks precision and some of his crucially important 
expressions are extremely vague. And this verbal obscurity 
and ambiguity of his long expositions are indicative of 
deeper confusions. 
Dewey says that inquiry arises from 1 certainl:ru..te 
existences' which are •existentially transformed' by the act 
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of inquiry. Now, Dewey maintains that 'brute existences' 
are not things to be known by inquiry, they can only be had. 
What are known are 'objects of knowledge• which tell us what 
to do to get out of an indeterminate situation. This seems 
to imply that inquiry manufactures out of 'antecedent' 
situations •existentially indeterminate' a new kind of 
determinate objects - 'objects of knowledge' - which did not 
exist before . They are said to be •constructions' made for 
the sake of practice and are the means or instrwnentalities 
for the enriching of human life and the control of environ-
ment and nature . Their worth is to be tested by practice; 
but such practical tests will not seek their correspondence 
with •natural existences' for they have no relation or 
reference to any antecedent existence or 'archetypal reality'. 
Well, how does then inquiry, which does not inquire into the 
nature of ' brute existences' nor whose outcome can have any 
direct reference to such existence, effect existential 
changes in these 1 antecedent 1 material? In other words, is 
there in Dewey's position any logical connection between the 
result of inquiry (i . e., knowledge) and 'brute existence' or 
between the maiking and doing in the process of inquiry and 
' antecedent• existenail material which set the problem of 
inquiry and which are believed · to be 'reshaped' by inquiry? 
Let us examine the point briefly. 
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Dewey formulates the pattern of inquiry as one piece of 
activity (and logical process) moving from the initial stage 
of 1 having 1 to the terminal stage of 'knowing' and in the 
process transforming the initial indeterminate 1 having' into 
a determinate ' having' (by 'reshaping the antecedent existen-
tial material ' ) . Inquiry, thus, presupposes antecedent 
existential objects . To account for these objects, Dewey 
speaks of natural existences and their 'intrinsic' qualities. 
These objects, however, cannot be defined, ecplained or even 
accurately conveyed in terms of knowledge. (We can always 
ask : What is then Dewey's metaphysics?) But at the same 
time, knowledge, the very need of knowledge, is intelligible 
only in terms of these real 'precarious' natural existences. 
The object of inquiry, we are told, is to transform, reshape 
and settle the 'precarious' existential material that evoke 
inquiry . But knowledge which is the result of inquiry, so 
Dewey repeatedly says, 'has no concern' with natural existences 
and intrinsic qualities . 19 Knowledge is prescriptive and 
predictive; it denies antecedent existence. 'The true 
object of knowledge', he says, 'resides in the consequences 
of directed action 1 • 20 (Dewey is never tired of criticizing 
19 
Dewey, Experience and Nature; 86. 
20 
Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 188; also, 25, 72, 93, 100, 
101, 140, et al . . 
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•traditional' theories of knowledge for assuming an antecedent 
reality which knowledge tries to disclose, conform or copy). 
Thus, knowledge in its own terms does not admit of the exist-
ence of antecedent reality. But knowledge is the result of 
inquiry. Does it then mean that the outcome of inquiry 'has 
no concern' with the object of inquiry? Does it further 
mean that the human creatures, in the instances of inquiry 
cited above, wander along mazes, burning buildings, forests, 
and underground railway systems which have no •antecedent 
reality' in relation to the outcome of their inquiries? The 
position seems to be exactly this; for knowledge in its own 
terms cannot account for the object of inquiry. What is 
known as a result of inquiry is not the 'originally given'; 
what is given is never known. Knowledge, it seems, cannot 
tell why inquiries are instituted at all. It cannot tell 
what, as a result of its mediation, the final settled 
1 having I is going to be. In short, the gulf between 'having,· 
and 'knowing', between the initial and the terminal phases of 
inquiry remains wide open. 
Now, Dewey talks of knowledge as 1 making 1 and 'doing' 
and accordingly introduces 'experiment' as an active phase 
in the pattern of inquiry. It is not, however, difficult to 
see that what, in his view, 1 experiment' experiments with is 
not the existential environing condition (or the situation), 
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for it is not concerned with the discovery of any connection 
or correspondence between the 1:idea 1 and existence. 
Experiment, on the other hand, tries to find out the 
correspondence between a need and its fulfilment, a problem 
and its rolution. In other words, •experiment' determines 
the object of predictive knowledge; the 'true and valid' 
object of experimental knowledge is not the natural object 
as it is 'originally given' and directly experienced. 
A number of issues can be raised. It can be pointed out 
that even such a view of experimental 'making' and 'doing' 
(and when Dewey speaks so emphatically of experiments effect-
ing 'existential changes' in •antecedent material') appears 
to involve the important assumption that there is some 
harmony between knowledge andex:istence, some kind of direct 
connectionrntween experimental evidence that we can gather 
(about the conditions or means under which a certain existen-
tial transformation or 'expected result' occurs) and 
existential material as they 'intrinsically' are. Dewey, we 
have seen, talks vaguely about the continuiti of different 
'modes of experience' and of one enriching the other. If 
the pattern of inguiry was intended to serve as an exempli-
fication of continuity between direct having and knowing, 
between nature andecperience, we have also seen it to be vague 
and unintelligible in important places . This need not, 
therefore, detain us any more. 
Dewey parades the theory of' inquiry as 'the scientific 
method ' and also makes this 'naturalistic' account of think-
ing the corner - stone of commendable social ideals like 
democracy and liber alism. As we proceed we shall find Dewey 
persistently stressing on 1 the scientific approach' to 
moral , educational and social problems . It is therefore 
important to determine what , on Dewey's view of thinking and 
knowing , could be the ' office and function' of science. 
Thinking is, according to Dewey, a 'delayed but more 
adequate response • to a ' specific stimulus', and so is 
science ' a mode of practice ' , ' a highly specialized industry', 
so specialized 1 that it does not appear to be a mode of 
practice at all 1 • 21 The results of science are simply 
indicative of •acts to be performed ' in response to specific 
practical problems . Science is not just concerned with 
formulating generalizations and it is not therefore possible 
to separate ' pure' science, i . e., those concerned with 
generalizations, from 'applied ' science, i . e . , those concerned 
with particular practical ends. 22 In Dewey's view then all 
scientific statements about sizes and shapes, motions and 
relative distances of natural objects are not descriptive of 
21 
Dewey , Essays in Experimental· Logic, ~1~; also, 436. 
22 
Dewey , Logic : The Theory of Inguiry, Ch. XXI, 437 f. 
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natural existences but only (experimentally determined) 
rules for prescribing actions and predicting experience. 
This means that when the astronomers talk about the size, 
shape, relative distance and motion of the planets in our 
solar system, they are not trying to describe objective 
natural objects in space but instead telling of their 'con-
structions ' made for the purpose of predicting the passage 
of day and night , seasons, and the like. And this, if not 
untrue and absurd, is a hopelessly limited conception of 
science. 
Having analyzed the source of this peculiarly limited 
conception of science we are now in a better position to 
understand why Dewey cannot subscribe to the view that one 
of the important objectives of science is to determine the 
constitution and laws of motion and behaviour of natural 
things and processes in order to be able to understand, and 
where possible , to control and use these things and process-
es; and that therefore the main theoretical purpose of 
science is to explain the universe in which we live, move 
and have our beings. It is not at all difficult to cite a 
large number of instances to illustrate the explanatory 
power of scientific theories and the kind of knowledge 
provided by these explanations . Modern atomic theory is an 
outstanding example of one such explanatory hypothesis in 
145 
relation to many natural phenomena. Moreover, many of the 
scientific theories do not seem to have any immediate 
practical application (it took more than fifty years to 
realize the full practical significance of atomic fission) 
and many explanatory theories (for example, the theories 
about the origin of solar systems) do not seem to arise from 
felt practical needs. It may, however, be true that the 
development of science is conditioned by various felt needs 
and many problems of practice, but it is obviously not true 
that science has grown, and can continue to grow, simply by 
way of a series of solutions of specific practical problems. 
In recapitulation we can see that Dewey's difficulty 
lies in the laudable but unsuccessful attempt to cut across 
two rival contemporary philosophical positions. According to 
Idealism, philosophy is the analysis of experience. Accord-
ing to Naturalism, philosophy is the description of existence. 
Dewey's aim seems to avoid the dilemma of treating philosophy 
either as a 'theory of knowledge' or as a 'theory of 
existence'. He accordingly works out a metaphysics in 
naturalistic terms, which describes the generic traits of 
existence. He speaks of 'experience' as natural context, an 
affair in nature. But the 'view of experience', as he says, 
must be formulated •on the ground of conclusions reached in 
the natural sciences'. Dewey the:ra'ore needs science ('the 
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best available knowledge at the time 1 ) and scientific method 
('the best so far developed'). The theory of inquiry (also 
described as 1 the scientific method', 'the method of exper-
ience' and 'experimental method') is formulated to connect 
existence, experience and scientific method. But it is, as 
we have seen, unintelligible in places. It fails, on the 
one hand, to provide the connecting links and thereby 
creates 'a serious and quite gratuitous difficulty' for his 
naturalistic metaphysics. 23 On the other hand, it makes 
science 'fictional' in character and hopelessly narrow in 
outlook. As we now proceed to examine some of the 'fruits' 
of Dewey's scientific approach to moral, social and 
educational problems, it will be worth while to keep clearly 
in mind that for him, science is after all a limited 'enter-
prise' of 'transacting business 1 and how best to transact it. 
23 
See, Arthur E. Murphy, "Dewey's Epistemology and Meta-
physics, in P.A. Schilpp, (ed.), The Philosophy of John 
Dewey, 225. 
CHAPTER V 
INQUIRY AND VALUES 
1 The Construction of Good' 
I 
What Dewey calls the generic traits of existence, that 
is to say, his metaphysical categories of stability and in-
stability, security and insecurity, precariousness and sat-
isfaction etc., apply as much to the field of value as to 
any other sphere of human experience. So does the distinction 
he draws between the two phases ofex:perience, immediate and 
mediate, valuing and valuation. The problem of value can be 
stated after Dewey in the following way: in the precarious 
world the qualitative immediacy of things prized and enjoyed, 
that is to say, 'valued' becomes disrupted; and this brings 
about mediation. Values in their immediacy are not plentiful; 
they are as 'unstable as the forms of clouds'. If immediately 
acquired values were numerous and stable there would not be 
any serious need for mediation. Since they are not plentiful 
and stable, it is necessary for thought to intervene and 
mediate to obtain and secure them. 
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Dewey uses numerous synonyms for the directly 1 felt 1 or 
1had 1 good, or valuing. Valuing, he says, is •verbally em-
ployed to designate' prizing, in the sense of holding 
precious, holding dear, honouring, regarding highly, esteem-
ing. 1 In another work he writes, 
Since many varieties of things furnish grounds for 
various kinds of carings-for, we find, as might be 
expected, that carings-for, valuings, take many 
forms. In consequence, the word breaks up into a 
set of words including such behaviors as "Prizing, 
holding-dear, cherishing, esteeming, admiring, 
honoring, approving, reverencing, supporting, 
standing-up-for and/or by; being faithful, loyal 
devoted to; concerned, occupied, with.2 
Now, the 'original prizing experience' whichever one of the 
above words is used) is what Dewey calls 'qualitative 
immediacy', the bare occurrence of a value, 1 a dumb formless 
experience of a thing as good 1 • 3 Such experience is 
. t. 4 precogni ive. 
Direct 'possession and enjoyment of goods', Dewey 
claims in one passage, 'passes insensibly and inevitably into 
1 
Dewey, Theory of Valuation (International Encyclopedia of 
Unified Science), The University of Chicago Press, 1939, 
Vol. II, No. IV, 5. 
2 
D-ewey, 11 The Field of Value" in Ray Lepley, (ed.), Value, A 
Cooperative Inquiry, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1949, 68. 
3 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 401. 
4 
See Dewey , Logic:The Theory of Inquiry, 106. 
appraisal 1 . 5 But this is obviously an over-simplified 
statement . For direct possession of good or valuing does 
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not pass insensibly into inquiry or valuation. The situation 
must become problematic; there must be a definite shock or 
felt difficulty in the enjoyment of directly experienced good. 
Nor is it true that all directly experienced good must pass 
inevitably over into mediation. Directly felt disruption or 
difficulty in enjoyment may bring about mediation; there is, 
however, no guarantee that this will be the case. 6 In 
another passage Dewey says, 'After the first dumb, formless 
experience of a thing as good, subsequent perception of the 
good contains at least a germ of critical reflection .7 
What does he mean by 1 subsequent perception'? If it is the 
continuation of direct experience, how can it contain any 
1 germ of critical reflection'? 
We need not, however, trouble ourselves with these 
loose expressions. For we have known that reflective think- · 
ing or any kind of evaluative process can occur, according to 
Dewey, only in the face of a problematic situation • . Dewey 
himself describes at various places how directly felt good 
-5---------
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 398. 
6 
See Dewey, Art as Exnerience , 60. 
7 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 401. 
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becomes problematic, how difficulties and imbalances take 
place and the need for necessary adjustments arise. He 
writes , for example , that cases of imbalance may take place 
due to 'changes in ourselves', which is not limited to the 
exhaustion of the organs of enjoyment. There may also be 
changes in the goods enjoyed. Or, it may be that 'a thing 
8 enjoyed at one time may lead to disturbing consequences'. 
In all such cases, ' enjoyment ceases to be a datum and 
becomes a problem'. So, 'enjoyments maz become problematic, 
thus arousing reflective inquiry•. 9 A value-situation is not 
therefore basically different from any other kind of problem-
atic situation. (For Dewey all problems are in a way 
value - problems) . The locus of the problem in a value-situation, 
as in any other problematic situation, consists in the 
instability of the organism-environment interaction. Facing 
such a situation theproblem that concerns the organism is 
what kind of response it will make to do away with the trouble. 
Dewey writes, 
8 
Valuation takes place only when there is something 
the matter; when there is some trouble to be done 
away with, some need, lack or privation to be made 
good, some conflict of tendencies to be resolved 
by means of changing existing conditions. This 
Ibid., 399, 398 . Also, The Quest for Certaintl, 248. 
9 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 398, Italics not in original. 
fact in turn proves that there is present an 
intellectual factor - a factor of inquiry -
whenever there is valuation , for the end-in-view 
is formed and projected as that which, if acted 
upon , will supply the existing need or lack and 
resolve the existing conflict.10 
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The other important point is that valuation judgments 
are not, according to Dewey, marked off methodologically 
from other kinds of scientific judgments . Claiming that, 
the problem of "the relation of value to fact" is 
wholly fictitious [Dewey writes] there is nothing 
whatever that methodologically (qua judgment) marks 
off "value- judgments" from conclusions reached in 
astronomical , chemical, or biological inquiries.11 
He maintains that valuation is a 'special case' of his 
•general ' theory of inquiry. He adds, 
And in calling my theory on this matter a special 
case of my general theorz , I intend to call atten-
tion to the fact that I have denied that as judge-
ments , or in respect to method 6f inquiry, test, 
and verification, value - judgements have any 
peculiar or unique feature . 12 
That valuation judgments 'may rest upon scientifically 
warranted empirical propositions and are themselves capable 
of being tested by observation of results' is also the main 
thesis of his Theory of Valuation, a contribution towards 
10 
Dewey , Theory of Valuation, 34 
1 1 
Dewey , "The Field of 1Value 1 ", l,Q,£ . cit., 77. 
12 
Dewey , "Valuation Judgment and Immediate Quality", 
Journal of Philoso5hy, Vol . XL, 1943, 315; reprinted 
Problems of Men , 2 0- 260 . 
in The 
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the "Foundations of the Unity of Science 11 in the Internation-
al Encyclopedia of Unified Science. 
The problem for Dewey is not to 'find' the good, but to 
1 construct 1 it. The goods that are experienced directly are 
•unsettled and dubious' . But ' thought goes beyond immediate 
existence 1 and thinking alone can settle and secure directly 
enjoyed goods as valuational objectives. 'Without interven-
tion of thought ', Dewey writes, 'enooyments are not values 
but problematic goods, becoming values when they re-issue in 
a changed form from intelligent behaviour 1 • 13 To explain 
clearly how values are constructed by the intervention of 
thought, it is necessary to introduce the distinction Dewey 
makes in this context between direct experience and knowledge, 
what he calls the difference between the enjoyed and the 
enjoyable, the desired and the desirable, the satisfying and 
the satisfactory. He points out that to say something is 
enjoyed, desired or satisfying is to 'make a statement about 
a fact, something already in existence'. Such a statement is 
not different from one which says something is sweet or sour, 
red or black. As a statement of fact, 'it is just correct or 
incorrect and that is the end of the matter' • But to assert 
that a thing is enjoyable or desirable or satisfactory is 
13 
Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 246. 
to define it in its connections and interactions 
•••• To declare something satisfactory is to 
assert that it meets specifiable conditions. It 
is, in effect, a judgment that the thing "will do". 
It involves a prediction; it contemplates a future 
in which the thing will continue to serve; it will 
do. It asserts a consequence the thing will 
actively institute; it will do. That it is 
satisfying is the content of a proposition of 
fact; that it is satisfactory is a judgment, an 
estimate, an appraisal. It denotes an attitude 
to be taken, that of striving to perpetuate and 
to make secure.14 
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After analyzing the 'recognition in ordinary speech' of this 
distinction - in the cases of endings 'able', 1 worthy1 and 
'full'; such as, noted and notable, noteworthy, remarked and 
remarkable, advised and advisable and so on - the position 
is reiterated two pages later: 
Propositions about what is or has been likaiare of 
instrumental value in reaching judgments of value, 
so far as the conditions and consequences of the 
thing liked are thought about. In themselves th?Y 
make no claims; they put forth no demand upon sub-
sequent attitudes and acts; they profess no 
authority to direct •••• A judgment about what is 
to be desired and enjoyed is, on the other hand, a 
claim on future action; it possesses de jure and not 
merely de facto quality.15 
In the Theory of Valuation Dewey uses Charles Lamb's 
story of the origin of roast pork to illustrate a number of 
points in his theory. The story is that roast pork was first 
•enjoyed' when a house in which pigs were kept was 
14 
Ibid., 267-8. 
15 
Ibid., 250. 
accidentally burned down. The owners, while searching in 
the ruins, touched the roasted pigs and scorched their 
fingers. Putting their scorched fingers impulsively to 
their mouths in order to cool them they experienced a new 
taste and they liked it. Henceforth they set on building 
houses, inclosing pigs in them and then burning these houses 
down. Thus 
the first time roast pig was enjoyed, it was not 
an end-value, since by description it was not the 
result of desire, foresight and intent. Upon sub-
sequent occasions it was, by description, the 
outcome of prior foresight, desire, and effort, 6 and hence occupied the position of end-in-view.1 
As gradually the persons realized that 'they have paid too 
high a price' for enjoying roast pork there arose a 
L 
value-question. One point Dewey makes from the story is 
that of 1 the continuum of ends-means•, that is to say, 
values as ends are never separated from the means to attain 
them. He therefore writes, 'If ends-in-view are what they 
are entirely apart from means, and have their value 
independently of valuation of means, there is nothing absurd, 
nothing ridiculous in this procedure' of burning entire 
pig-houses to secure roast pork. It is 'only when the end 
attained is estimated in terms of the means employed ••• is 
there anything absurd or unreasonable about the method 
16 
Dewey, Theory of Valuation, 41. 
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employed'. 17 Now, inquiry instituted to determine the 
value of roast pork would reveal that pork could be more 
easily obtained. Such inquiry would also reveal a few more 
facts, such as, pork is easily digestable, pork has elements 
necessary to human nutrition, and so on. Having obtained 
these factual judgments, one could then make the judgment 
that roast pork is desirable or valuable. The point is that 
value judgments, in Dewey's view, are not separable from 
factual judgments, but are rather reducible to them. To say 
roast pork is desirable or valuable is then to say - as a 
result of inquiry - that it is easily obtainable, digestable, 
nutritious, and the like. Dewey says, 
The "desirable", or the object which should be 
desired (valued), does not descend out of the~ 
priori blue or descend as an imperative from a 
moral Mount Sinai •••• The ndesirable 0 as distinct 
from the 11 desired 0 does not ••• designate something 
at large or 2 priori. It points to the difference between the operation and consequences of 
unexamined impulses and those of desires and 
interests that are the product of investigation of 
conditions and consequences.1e 
It will be seen that Dewey, like John Stuart Mill, 
tries to define 1 desirable 1 in a way that will demonstrate 
the empirical character of the judgments of desirability. 
Dewey, however, seems to avoid one error of Mill; for he 
17 
Ibid., 40-41. 
18 
Ibid., 32. 
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does not say that whatever is desired is desirable. Instead 
he insists that inquiry into the conditions under which some-
thing is desired and the consequences of desiring it must be 
held in order to determine whether any desired object is 
really desirable. This means that the desirability of an 
object cannot be established by reference to desire alone; 
it can only be established by thoroughly inquring into the 
causes and consequences of what Dewey variously describes as 
the 1 act of desire' and the •experienced object'. And it is 
this very idea of applying inquiry or scientific method to 
establish judgments of value that seems to many partisans of 
Deweyan persuasion as 'the beginning of a new Copernican 
revolution in science'. 19 
Morton G. White in his Social Thought in America has 
I 
made a few points in criticism of Dewey 's views on ethics. 20 
19 
See George R. Geiger, John Dewe~ in Perspective, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1958, 1?. 
20 
The reason for considering Morton White's criticism of Dewey, 
apart from its cogency, is that it cannot be labelled as a 
destructive attack of an anti-naturalist, a 'viewer-with alarm' 
who exhibits a protective attitude toward traditional cults 
and cultures. White is more an ' insider' and as he himself 
admits that he criticizes 1 not in the spirit of dismissal, 
but rather in the spirit of· doubt'. In the epilogue 
("Epilogue for 1957") of the Beacon Press Paperback edition 
(1957) of his Social Thought in America White has in fact 
defended Dewey against the attacks of Niebuhr and Lippmann, 
though his own criticism was allowed to remain unchanged. 
·1 
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White writes, 
Dewey wants to show that the relation between being 
desired and being desirable is identical with the 
relation between appearing red and being objectively 
red. Except for one difference. To say that some-
thing is desirable, i.e., desired under test 
conditions, is to make what he calls a de facto 
statement which is at the same time de jure. It not 
only tells us that something is true of human beings 
but it also imposes an obligation on them. This 
distinguishes it from the statement that something is 
desired now, from the statement that something looks 
red now, and most important, from the statement that 
something is objectively red. None of these last 
three statements has a "de ,jureu quality for Dewey; 
none of them states a claim. They are all merely de 
facto, whereas the judgment that something is desir-
able is both de facto and de jur.e. Here the cake is 
had and eaten! Here we have generated a normative or 
de jure proposition by performing a suitable opera-
tion on merely de facto propositions. But if the 
operation will generate a norm in this case it 
should generate one in all cases. In other words, if 
"desirable" is synonymous with "desired under test 
conditions 11 just as "objectively red 11 is synonymous 
with "appears red under test conditions", why 
shouldn't judgments about things being objectively 
red be "de juren? But obviously they aren't. Saying 
that something is objectively red does not impose an 
obligation on anyone, but it should if Dewey is right 
in his analysis. The relation between "is objective-
ly red" and "appears red" is precisely the same as 
the relation between "is desirable" and "is desired", 
for him. But since "desirable" means 11 ought to be 
desired", 11 objectively red" should mean 11 ought to 
appear red 11 , which is absurd.21 
The above arguement against Dewey proceeds by the method of 
reductio ad absurdum. White pursues the argument by asking 
21 
Morton G. White, Social Thought in America, The Viking 
Press, New York, 1949, 214. 
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us to consider what Dewey's position amounts to - 1 that all 
objectively true statements are normative in character'. If 
all statements of science are held to be normative, this will 
not only destroy a •useful distinction• but 'will have wiped 
out the very distinction which~ as a reformer, he (Dewey) 
wants to preserve, the distinction between what is and what 
ought to be 1 • 22 
White also criticizes 'the version ••• which seems to turn 
up in his (Dewey's) writings' that a desired object becomes 
desirable 'just in case' we know what causes the desire and 
what consequences would follow from the fact that we desire 
it. 
22 
Suppose we desire a smoke of opium and that we know 
the complicated causes of our desire. Would Dewey 
have us conclude that we ought to smoke the opium 
on that account? Would Dewey conclude that this 
smoke of opium ought to be desired? Is the 
medically educated addict obliged to smoke? To 
this Dewey might reply that ••• we must know the 
consequences as well as the causes of our desire 
before an obligation is created. But what kind of 
knowledge of consequences must we have? I suspect 
that although Dewey urges us to know the conse-
quences of our desiring to smoke opiu~ what he 
really wants us to know are the consequences of 
smoking it. But what kind of knowledge must this 
be? Presumably that this smoke will have certain 
effects on our system. So let us suppose ••• that 
we have found out that the effects are effects 
which we don 1 t desire.· What about the obligation? 
Is this smoke of opium, about whose causes and con-
sequences we have the mos~ gruesome information, 
Ibid., 216. 
something we ought to desire? I suspect that 
Dewey's words read literally would lead us to say 
yes for him, but I think he wants us to conclude 
when we find out the effects of smoking opium, 
not that smoking opium is desirable, but rather 
that it is undesirable. In other words, something 
is desirable just in case we know why we desire 
it and that the consequences of desring it will 
be •••• But what shall we put where the dots are? 
Desirable? But in that case our definition is 
not very successful, for we wanted to define 
ndesirableu and here we use it in the definition. 
"Desiredn? But then Dewey is in another fix, for 
he is anxious to rest obligations on more than 
what is desired. And yet after all these efforts 
to get to a rock that is more substantial than 
mere desire he has to appeal to it in the end.23 
How can Dewey be defended against this attack? In a 
159 
recent paper R.W. Sleeper has attempted to show that 'White's 
reductio ad absurdum is misdirected'. Sleeper's contention 
is that 'White chooses to interpret Chapter X of Quest for 
Certainty as if it were a piece of linguistic analysis rather 
th t h • 1 . • I 2 4 S 1 • t • th t an a me ap ysica inquiry. eeper main ains a 
23 
Ibid., 217. C.L. Stevenson is equally sceptical 'of accept-
ing direct empirical confirmation of ethical judgements'. 
Stevenson advances similar arguments 1 with regard to the 
precise role of empirical methods' in establishiI\g value judg-
ments. See, Ethics and Language, New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1948, 262 f. Stevenson further shows that when Dewey 
uses such expressions as 'Xis to be prized' or 'to be desired' 
to indicate 2 X is desirable', he does not distinguish betueen 
the predictive and imperative meanings. (p. 256-7). However, 
Stevenson does not agree with Dewey that ethical judgments 
are always predictive. (p. 261). 
24 . 
R.W. Sleeper, 'Dewey's Metaphysical Perspective: A Note on 
White, Geiger, and the Problem of Obligation", The Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. LVII, 1960, 103-114. 
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Dewey is concerned 'with certain existential problems• and 
his discussion of de facto and de jure propositions 'in this 
context• should be understood as •referring to concrete 
situations of 11having" and 'knowing" rather than abstract 
linguistic relationships'. In the second place, Sleeper 
contends that 'White has misunderstood Dewey's theory of 
knowledge' in assuming that 'science as such could "impose 
an obligation"'· Sleeper thinks that in Dewey's view 
Obligation does not derive from knowledge alone; 
rather it exists in situations where there is a 
felt need or desire capable of satisfaction through 
means known to be effective and to produce conse-
quences, conceived in the widest possible way, that 
are anticipated as to be desired •••• Knowledge 
without any specific siutation in which that 25 knowledge is needed does not produce obligation. 
He thinks that White interprets Dewey 1 s views 'apart from its 
metaphysical foundations and can therefore not see how value 
judgments are empirical'. Sleeper then goes on to quote 
Dewey where the latter speaks of 'genuine hazard, contingency, 
irregularity and indeterminacy in nature ••• found in the 
occurrence of thinking', and also of inquiry terminating 'when 
freer, richer and more secure objects of belief are institut-
ed as goods of immediate experience'. Sleeper advises that 
we need to bear in mind Dewey's meta.physical perspective and 
'from this perspective the role of inquiry is viewed as the 
25 
Ibid. , 105-6. 
transformation of indeterminate situations, and de facto 
immediate values are either replaced by, or, changed into 
de jure values through that transformation•. 26 
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Now, Sleeper seems to accept too uncritically whatever 
Dewey has said about the objectivity of hazard, contingency, 
indeterminacy, etc., in nature and the transformation of all 
these as a result of inquiry. Moreover, Sleeper does not 
seem to realize that his claim that obligation •exists in 
situations where there is a felt need or desire capable of 
satisfaction through means knovm to be effective and to 
produce consequences• begs the issue, i.e., the question of 
value. What about the medically educated or for that matter 
any ordinary opium addict? He is in a - let us put it -
1
situation 1 , where he feels the need for a smoke of opium 
which is capable of satisfaction, knows the effective means 
that produce consequences. Does he derive the obligation to 
smoke opium from the 'situation•? 
Sleeper is, however, not alone among contemporary 
writers on John Dewey's philosophy to plead for this kind of 
metaphysical approach to Dewey's theory of valuation. 27 Such 
26 
Ibid., 107. 
27 
See George R. Geiger, John Dewey in Perspective, Ch. III; 
Gail Kennedy, "The Hidden Link in Dewey's Theory of Evalua-
tion", in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LII, 1955, 85-94, 
and his ncomments 0 in the same Journal, Vol. LVII, 1960, 
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an approach, it is contended, can not only make the trans-
forming role of inquiry readily intelligible, but can also 
facilitate what may be described as a 'metaphysical 
deduction' of obligation. But on our part, we have found 
Dewey ' s metaphysics, the stuff we are advised to rely upon 
to understand his ethical theory, extremely vague and confus-
ing . We need not, therefore, take up the suggestion of a 
I 
metaphysical open-sesame seriously. 
We can, however, incidentally point out a metaphysical 
difficulty of which Dewey in his later writings seems to 
have become aware. We have already seen in the preceding 
chapters how due to Dewey's sharp distinction between direct 
experience and knowledge these two spheres of experience tend 
to remain disconnected. There is a similar problem in 
valuation. If real value is 1 constructed 1 by inquiry out of 
an immediate value object, how is the constructed value object 
related to the antecedently given value object? In other 
words, what is the relation between the 'given' good and the 
'reflective' good, the ' now-apparent' good and the 'eventual' 
436-442; S. Morris Eames, "The Cognitive and the Non-Cognitive 
in Dewey ' s Theory of Valuation11 in the same Journal, Vol. 
LVIII, 1961, 194; Richard J~ Bernstein, (ed.), John Dewey: 
Qn Exuerience, Nature ~nd Freedom, New York, The Library of 
Liberal Arts, 1960, Introduction, xxxv; Sidney Hook 1 "The Desirable and Emotive in Dewey 1 s Ethics 11 , in Hook, ~ed.), 
Joh D we :Philosooher of Science and Freedom, New York, The 
Dial Press, 19 o, 19 -21 • 
good, the 1 immediate value-object• and the 'ulterior 
value-object'? In his paper on "Some Questions about 
Value" Dewey raised the problem: 'Whether the undeniable 
difference between direct valuing and the indirectness of 
evaluation is a matter of separation or of emphasis' . 28 He 
did not, however, answer the question in this paper, but 
later in his essay on "The Field of 'Value•" he stated in a 
footnote: 
The answer to the question I raised in my original 
list of "Questions 11 as to whether the distinction 
between direct valuings and evaluations as judg-
ments is one of separate kinds or one of emphasis 
is, accordingly, answered in the later sense. I 
am the more bound to make this statement because 
in some still earlier writings I tended to go too 
far in the direction of separation.~9 
This short footnote does not, unfortunately, settle the 
point. The point, so far as we can see, is not argued in the 
text. It is not clear what Dewey precisely means by the 
distinction of 'separate kinds 1 and •emphasis'. What, again_, 
can he possible mean when he settles dovm to the view that 
the distinction between gross qualitative experience of good 
and the possession of 'eventual' good is one of 'emphasis'? 
It is, however, clear that though in his writings the 
28 
Dewey, "Some Questions about Valuen, in The Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. XLI~ 1944, 453. Reprinted in Lepley, (ed.), 
Value:A Cooperative Inquiry, 4-12. 
29 
Dewey, '1The Field of _IValue 1 n, loc. cit., 75 f.n. 
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distinction between the immediate and the mediate is 
admittedly quite sharp, Dewey is now rejecting the position 
that they are discrete and separate existences. He seems to 
be trying to avoid dualism by dissolving the problem, that 
is to say, by rejecting the notion that gross value and 
eventual value are of two different kinds. But if Dewey's 
theory of valuation is taken in its own terms, there is 
clearly a problem here. Valuations or value-inquiries are 
thought - processes; and thought - processes do not apply to 
immediately experienced values. The 1 eventual 1 value, even 
though it is extrapolated from directly experienced existen-
tial value, is a thought - construction, and is admittedly 
different from the value of the existential type. Now, if 
they are not really of different kinds, much of what Dewey 
says about the ' supremacy of method' in the matter of con-
structing real values seems to be irrelevant. And again, if 
they are different only in emphasis or degree, the position 
entails certain consequences which Dewey does not discuss. 
The vagueness of his theory at this point makes it possible 
to interpret his position in different directions. Dewey 
raises this problem when all his major works on valuation 
were already written. In some of these earlier works he 
seems to stress the trnmediacy of all aspects of the 
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value-situation;30 in some others, upon the element of 
mediation in value-construction. By placing reliance on one 
version, his position can now be interpreted as a sort of 
subjective idealism in which all values can be shown to 
collapse into immediacy; or, by emphasizing the other version, 
as another kind of idealism in which cognition exhausts the 
world of values. Dewey cannot accept either of these interpre-
tations, but we are not sure what he precisely means by the 
difference of 'emphasis' and how he would clarify the 
possible implications. The vagueness at this point, we 
believe, serves to illustrate a fundamental difficulty we 
have analyzed in preceding chapters, the difficulty in 
relating thought-constructions developed in inquiry to ante-
cedent existenial materials. 
Dewey is clear in insisting that the value-problem is 
not merely the problem of what is but rather that of what 
should be. Now, how to determine what should be? Dewey's 
answer, as we have seen, is that it should be determined by 
'intelligent method' (which is another name for the 
scientific method or the method of inquiry). He states 
30 
See Dewey, "Further as to Valuation as Judgmentn, in The 
Journal of Philoso~hy, Vol. XL, 1943, 545. Reprinted in 
Problems of Men, 21-272. Also', S.M. Eames, "The Cognitive 
and Non-Cognitive in Dewey's Theory of Valuation", The 
Journal of Philosoohi, Vol. LVIII, 1961, 186-7. 
clearly in the concluding sentence of his Theory of 
Valuation that '3cience ••• is the supreme means for the 
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valid determination of all valuations in all aspects of human 
and social life 1 . 31 What he then means is that the 'should' 
should objectively be determined. This requires us, in his 
view, to 1 know the conditions under which the act of liking, 
of desire and enjoyment, takes place' and also 'to know what 
are the consequences of that act 1 .32 This knowledge, the 
scientific objective assessment of conditions and consequences, 
can be acquired through competent inquiry . Thus, in Chapter 
X entitled 11 The Construction of Good 11 of The Quest for 
Certainty, Dewey states in italics his 'main position' in 
the following manner : ' Judgments about values are judgments 
about the conditions and results of experienced objects; 
judgments about that which should regulate the formation of 
our desire, affections and enjoyments'.33 
Now, what does Dewey really want us to inquire into? 
In one of the two short passages quoted above he speaks of 
inquiring into the conditions and consequences of tthe act 
of liking, of desire', whereas in the other, he speaks of 
value- judgments as judgments about the conditions and 
31 
Dewey, Theory of Valuation, 66. 
32 
Dewey , The Quest for Certainty, 253. 
33Ibid., 252. 
results of 'experienced objects'. An act of desire and an 
experienced or desired object are clearly two different 
things; and an analysis of the former does not appear to be 
relevant in determining whether a particular experienced 
object is desirable or not. We have noticed earlier that 
Morton White takes Dewey to mean that we know the consequences, 
not of the desire of smoking opium, but of smoking opium. 
But Dewey nowhere makes the distinction sufficiently clear, 
and we can possibly see the reason by turning to our earlier 
analysis of his notion of situation. A desire, like every-
thing else, is for Dewey a transaction; it is not a subjective 
state in the organism but is also connected with the 
environing conditions outside. To speak of a transaction 
(which in the present case is 'desire') as an act of liking 
centered in the living organism or as experienced objects 
existing outside would be, according to him, abstracting 
only one side of a two-sided experience. In Dewey's view, 
what is desired is obviously not any 'object' but the 
situation (or, its immediately felt pervasive quality) and 
what needs to be shown desirable as a result of inquiry is 
again, not the subjective feeling centered in the organism 
nor the objective entity conceived in isolation, but the 
holistic situation. -It is therefore difficult to understand 
what Dewey precisely has in mind when he speaks alternately of 
I 
'1 
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acts of desire and desired objects, or more vaguely of the 
•conditions that determine the valuings 1 .34 This is a 
lingering confusion which renders all the talk about 'condi-
tions and consequencesm as vague as his notion of situation. 
Having noted the source of these confusing statements 
as to what is to be inquired into, we can now touch upon the 
main issue. The problem is: how does Dewey, in the earlier 
quoted passage on his 1 main position', pass from one side of 
the semicolon to the other, from 'judgements about conditions 
and results' to 'judgements about that which should regulate' 
our impulses and enjoyments? How does the knowledge of con-
ditions and consequences decide the formation of desires and 
enjoyments? We may know and know quite accurately that 
certain experienced 'situations' have such and such (and just 
these) conditions and consequences. But how can this 
knowledge produce the conviction that we should regulate our 
desires, affections and enjoyments in one particular way 
rather than another? Why should our desires be determined in 
one particular way among a number of possible alternative ways? 
Again, to be precise, Dewey does not say that scientific 
knowledge can function, as it obviously does, in moral 
decisions. He is not concerned in analysing and elucidating 
34 
Dewey, nThe Field of Value", loc. cit., 76. 
the precise manner in which scientific knowledge, say, about 
the effects of radiation can function in the process of 
decision about the production and use of nuclear weapons. 
His point is that value judgments are just scientific judg-
ments about the 1conditions and results of experienced 
• 
objects• . If this means that to have all scientific inform-
ation about the conditions and consequences of the use of 
nuclear weapons is equivalent to having a moral decision 
about their use, this is sheer nonsense . Toavail of the 
metaphysical perspective if we take •experienced objects' as 
implying the whole situation and the situation, due to inter-
connections, as embracing the whole universe (something like 
Bradley ' s view that every judgment qualifies reality as a 
whole) we cannot even then arrive at any decision in an issue 
like this without weighing the possible consequences in a 
measuring system of accepted values . Let us look at this 
point more closely . 
1The good', Dewey says, 1is that which satisfies want, 
craving ••• ' · But he adds, 
Experience shows •• • that not every satisfaction of 
appetite and craving turns out to be a good •••• 
The task of moral theory is thus to frame a theory 
of good as the end or -objective of desire, and also 
to frame a theor5y of t
he true, as distinct from the 
specious good.3 
35 Dewey (with J . H. Tufts), Ethics, New York, Henry Holt & Co., 
1949, 204- 5. See in this com1ection, "Criticisms by Garnett", 
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Now , this means that anything that satisfies a desire is 
prima facie a good, but it can turn out to be not a 1 good'. 
(What does the difference of ' emphasis' mean in such cases?) 
In order to be a good it must effectively resolve a problem-
atic situation, that is to say, it must be instrumental in 
' changing existing conditions 1 • In other words, something is 
good or a value when it has certain effect upon us, upon the 
transactions between us as living organisms and our 
environing conditions . By inquiring into causes and conse-
quences of a thing we can know these effects . But what sort 
of effect must a thing have upon us in order to be judged a 
good and desirable? Can we answer this question simply by an 
objective assessment of the effects a thing might have upon 
us? Can we answer it at a.11 unless we already know or 
believe certain phases of life to be good and desirable? 
Speaking about 'serious social troubles' Dewey recog-
nizes that 'the situations themselves are profoundly moral 
in their causes and consequences, in the genuine sense of 
moral 1 • But to fulfil the 'logical conditions of scientific 
method', he urges that it is necessary to formulate the con-
ditions objectively and 1 such a formulation demands in turn · 
complete abstraction from the qualities of sin and 
in R. Lepley, (ed . ), Value:A Cooperative Inquiry, 312-8. 
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righteousness, of vicious and virtuous motives', that is to 
say, moral qualities . Dewey is here not merely alluding to 
the repressive theological ethics of the past, but positively 
suggesting a procedure for formulating 'objectively or in 
terms of selected and ordered conditions ' the various 
aspects of a conflicting social situation. 1And such 
formulation•, he insists, ' is the sole mode of approach 
through which plans of remedial procedure can be projected in 
objective terms 1 • 36 But how from an objective formulation 
of conditions and consequence do we decide upon the 'plans 
of remedial procedure'? How from the description of 
conditions do we deduce a 1desirable 1 programme? The 
problem is when for purposes of 'scientific evaluation' a 
' moral ' situation is completely stripped of all the moral 
contents, how can the 1 should' be introduced again? In a 
scientific objective assessment of conditions and conse-
quences where do we get the 1 should 1 ? Can the 'should' 
come in at all except for emotive or persuasive purposes?37 
There is apparently nothing in Dewey's evaluative method-
ology to turn a de facto statement about experienced objects 
36 
See Dewey, Logic :The Theory of InQuiry, 494-5. 
37 
See Arthur E. Murphy, 11 John Dewey and American Liberalism", 
in The Journal of Philosoph£, Vol. LVII, 1960, 430-1. 
into a de jure one. In this respect, Morton White's 
analysis is clearly to the point. 
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How could Dewey fail to see this obvious gap in his 
method of valuation? Is then Dewey 1 s method of scientific 
inquiry something more than a mere fact-finding method? Is 
not that by 'intelligent action' or 'method of intelligence' 
(obviously as synonyms of the scientific method of inquiry) 
Dewey is often implying that this action or method is not 
only concerned with bare or mere consequences but with con-
sequences to be brought about in existence for the 
enrichment of human experience and betterment of human life? 
Is not the result of inquiry, in his mind, something that 
should be the outcome of intelligent striving? 
Let us come to the point directly. The ~idden link' in 
Dewey 1 s theory of valuation is not buried in the precarious-
ness of concrete situations (i.e., the necessity of solving 
problems) as Gail Kennedy seems to think:, 38 or in Sleeper's 
somewhat wide 1 metaphysical perspective•. The 1 hidden link' 
is a post-Darwinian preconception about evolution at human 
level, and therefore, nowhere explicitly stated and defended. 
It is Dewey's faith in human intelligence or creative 
38 
See Gail Kennedy, 11The Hidden Link in Dewey's Theory of 
Evaluation", in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LII, 1955, 85-94. 
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intelligence, in the scientific method as the sole 
embodiment of that intelligence and in all the other values 
that are, in his mind inextricably connected with it. For 
Dewey, science is not ethically neutral; science, as he says, 
is 'itself a value•. 39 The scientific method is for him a 
norm in a very significant sense. The 'method of intelligent 
action', he maintains, 1 is precisely ••• an ultimate value•. 40 
Now, in maintaining intelligent action as ultimate value 
Dewey is not obviously lining up all the various ends-in-view 
to one remote ideal. But the implication is not very 
different either, for it expresses his unqualified trust in 
intelligence as the power in man that can guide to the best 
solution of any problem. As early as 1891 he wrote in his 
flMoral Theory and Practice": 'Get the refined and clarified 
intelligence and the emotions will take care of themselves. 
They are there and all they need is freeing 1 • 41 The refined 
and clariefied intelligence is embodied in scientific method, 
Dewey's own pattern of inquiry being a formulation of the 
39 
Dewey, Theory of Valuation, 66. 
40 
Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value", in P.A. Schilpp, 
(ed.), The Philosophy of John Dewey, 594. Gp. "There is some-
thing unique in the value or goodness of reflection". 
Experience and Nature, 403. 
41
rnternational Journal of Ethics, Vol. I, 197, quoted by E.A. 
Burtt, "The Core of Dewey's Way of Thinking 11 , in The Journal 
of Philosophy, Vol. LVII, 1960, 418. 
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essentials of that method. So, once inquiry is instituted 
into the conditions and consequences of indeterminate 
situations, or in other words, freed intelligence is 
employed to straighten out existential entanglements, nothing 
else - no fixed ends or final goals - will be needed to 
relieve the tension, to obtain the best solution. Inquiry 
alone can deliver the 'goods' . Dewey can therefore talk of 
reconstruction, adjustment and growth without any great 
concern for direction. These ad hoc reconstruction and 
--
growth will be for the better, for his method is not morally 
undiscriminating, it is itself a value and inherently 
progressive . There is still more in this method. The method 
of science is shared intelligence, cooperative intelligence; 
and as freed cooperative intelligence it can objectively 
determine what is public interest and general welfare. To 
those who take up this method as the means of resolving deep 
and difficult social and political conflicts, it provides 
social orientation and democratic faith. It is therefore the 
method of progressive education. 
Dewey, we have noted in an earlier chapter, had never 
doubted the fact of progress. It was not that he thought 
nature on the whole had any bias towards progressive change. 
His belief in progress was rooted in the moving force of the 
time - science. It was based on a 'positive respect for human 
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nature when the latter is associated with scientific 
42 knowledge '. It seems that he never looked at human 
intelligence in a matter - of- fact way to discover that it 
could at least sometimes be conservative, and in a way, 
stationary. And so great was his faith in science as an 
instrument of progress that he thought the application of 
the scientific method to be, in itself, the panacea of all 
possible and conceivable evils . These are, however, 
different matters with which in the balance of this dis-
quisition we shall be increasingly concerned . The point we 
have been trying to make here is this: in Dewey's attempt 
to reduce statements of what ought to be desired to 
scientific objective terms there is a gap; and because of 
some of his very firm preconceptions Dewey was most unlikely 
to notice it . 
II 
In our discussion so far we have seen Dewey insisting 
that there is no fixed final moral end, only resolution of 
specific tensions by intelligent action, that is to say, no 
End, only ends - in-view. 'I ·have yet to see', he writes, 
42 
Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, New York, Henry Holt & 
C o. , 1 91+8 , 4. 
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'an answer even proposed to the question: Of what good is a 
"final" value unless it has "instrumental" value'. He 
objects to the use of any final value, for they are 'not only 
unattainable, but they lack directive power 1 • 43 But in 
spite of this oft-repeated injunction against the existence 
and use of any final principle, it is not difficult to see 
that in most of his 'first order' discussions on ethics and 
education Dewey is firmly relying on certain concepts for 
ultimate justification of moral and educational aims. One 
such concept is that of 'growth' and Dewey has on numerous 
occasions spoken of growth as 'the only moral end' and 'the 
only end 1 • 44 Now, an analysis of what is implied by growth 
will, we hope.,, not only indirectly bear upon what we have 
said so far about Dewey's faith in human intelligence and 
progress but will also be directly helpful in examining 
Dewey's social and educational philosophy, particularly in 
determining what he precisely has in mind as social and 
educational goals. 
The term 1 growth 1 does not appear in the index of the 
revised edition (1932) of Ethics (with James H. Tufts). But 
in explaining 'reflective morality' (in Part II, "Theory of 
43 
Dewey, "The Field of I Value' n-, loc. cit. , 70. Also, The 
~est for Certainty, 252. 
Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 177, 184. 
' 
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the Moral Life 11 - Dewey• s ovm contribution) Dewey speaks of 
discovering a 'rational principle' (p. 252), a •standard of 
approval' (p. 260 and p. 292), a 'comprehensive scheme' 
(p. 292) by which moral judgments 'should be regulated'. 
The 'standard' is growth. Dewey writes, 
A good person is precisely the one who is ••• most 
concerned to find openings for the growing self; 
he becomes "bad" (even though acting upon a 
relatively high plane of attainment) as soon as 
he fails to respond to the demand for growth. (p. 341-2); 
and a few sentences later the moral law is stated in the 
form of an 'injunction to each self on every possible 
occasion to identify the self with a new growth that is 
possible'. (p. 342). 
This growth is not obviously growing towards something 
fixed and static. It is the 'process of growth, of improve-
ment and progress, rather than the static outcome and result' 
that is 'the significant thing 1 • 45 'The principle of growth', 
Sidney Hook explains, is to be •conceived participally as 
the process of growing 1 • 46 And growing, in Dewey's language~ 
45
rbid., 177. Note how by the ' process of growth' Dewey 
means that 1 of improvement and progress' . 
46 
Sidney Hook, "John Dewey, Philosopher of Growth11 , in The 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LVI, 1959, 1013. Hook also thinks 
that growth is •an inclusive end' and embraces 'all the pos-
itive intellectual, emotional and moral ends which appear in 
everybody's easy schedule of good life and good education -
gro·wtb in skills and powers, knowledge and appreciation, 
value and thought'. Ibid. 
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is ' the continuous reconstruction of experience•. 47 In 
Democ~acy and Equcation Dewey maintains that 'Life means 
growth' and ' education is all one with growing; it has no 
end beyond itself ' . The educative process, he says in the 
same context, is continuous experience, it 1 is a continuous 
process of growth having as its aim at every stage an added 
capacity for growth 1 • 48 It is , therefore, neither possible 
nor is it necessary to draw a complete list of goods or 
values . Values are not~ priori , they are constructed in 
course of experience; and whatever in any specific situation 
enriches the ' intrinsic quality of living' helps gnawing and 
is therfore gooa . 49 Since good is not the approximation of 
anything settled and fixed, Dewey writes, ' Anything that in 
a given situation is an end and good at all is of equal 
47 
Dewey , Reconstruction in Philosophy, 184. 
48 
Dewey, Democracy and Education, 61-3. 
49 
See Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct:An Introduction t.Q. 
Social Psychology, 211 f . Also, Democracy and Education, 61. 
Dewey uses the expression ' intrinsic quality of living 1 to 
denote that 'a living creature lives as truly and positively 
at one stage as at another, with the same intrinsic fullness 
and the same absolute claims 1 • The business of education, he 
says , ' is with that quality'. This possibly means that one 
stage of life is not to be considered primarily as prepara-
tory and hence subordinate to another. In this way, every 
situation, though it could be used as a means to further 
growth, is itself a unique thing to be fully realized for 
its own sake . 
worth, rank and dignity with every other good of any other 
situation 1 • 50 
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1 Growth 1 , then, is not represented by or embodied in an 
ideal (of anything •perfectly grown'); as growing, it is an 
activity. It is the continuous construction of good by 
intelligent action. Dewey writes, 
There is seen to be but one issue involved in all 
reflection upon conduct: the rectifying of present 
troubles, the harmonizing of present incompatibil-
ities by projecting a course of action which 
gathers into itself the meaning of them all •••• 
Good consists in the meaning that is experienced 
to belong to an activity when conflict and 
entanglement of various incompatible impulses and 
habits terminate in a unified orderly release in 
action. 51 
The good does not consist in calculating or approximating 
future good or happiness, 'good, happiness, is found in the 
present meaning of activity'. This meaning, however, 
depends upon 'the proportion, order and freedom introduced 
into it by thought as it discovers objects which release and 
unify otherwise contending elements. 52 Now, we are familiar 
50 
Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 176. In some places 
Dewey seems to have suggested that values could be of differ-
ent kinds, some kinds better than others. See Theory of 
Valuation, 20; also, Experience and Nature, 4oo. 
51 
Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 210. 52 
Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 184-5. 
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with what Dewey is talking about: the resolution of problem-
atic situations, new adjustments by formulating intelligent 
course of action, release of tension. What he seems to 
imply by these in the present context is that it is this 
activity - 'growing or the continuous reconstruction of 
experience ••• a constant function' which is alone good and 'is 
the only end'. He therefore maintains that the 'acquisition 
of skill, possession of knowlege, attainment of culture are 
not ends: they are marks of growth and means to its 
continuity 1 • 53 
We have noted advisedly at the beginning of the section 
the grounds on which Dewey objects to the use of any fixed 
ideal as moral goal. For him, the aim of education and of 
all social reconstructions is growth in the sense of 
continually expanding and unifying experience. Now, it may 
be that education as growth, as continuous enrichment of 
experience, implies that all persons at all ages are educable, 
that each individual must be given full opportunities for 
self-development, and a number of other items that do not 
concern us at the moment. The question is: does this notion 
of growth taken in terms of Dewey's theory of valuation have 
any sense of direction (or 'directive power ' as Dewey calls it) 
53 
Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 184-5. 
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in it? There are, as everybody knows, all kinds of growth, 
some highly desirable, some extremely vicious. What about 
growing up as a hoodlum, smuggler and racketeer? Or, the 
growth of a political group as oppressive rulers and brutal 
mass murderers? In most of his writings this problem of 
direction does not seem to concern Dewey at all. It seems 
always assumed that growth is improvement, development, 
betterment, that is to say, change in the desirable direction, 
'moving to become better', 'passage of experience from worse 
to better 1 • 54 In Democracy and Education, for example, Dewey 
discusses what he calls 'Ungrowth, something which is no 
longer growing' (p. 50), meaning attachment to static ends, 
but does not even suggest that for educators and social 
reformers there could very well exist the problem of undesir-
able growth or growing in the wrong direction. It is in 
Experience and Education (1938), a book aimed at rescuing his 
philosophy of education from many alleged misconceptions that 
Dewey makes his reply. He writes, 
54 
That a man may grow in efficiency as a burglar, as 
a gangster, or as a corrupt politician, cannot be 
doubted. But from the standpoint of growth as 
education and education as growth the question is 
whether growth in this direction promotes or retards 
growth in general . Does this form of growth create 
conditions for further growth, or does it set up 
Ibid . , 176, 183. 
conditions that shut off the person who has grown 
in tnis particular direction from the occasions, 
stimuli, and opportunities for continuing growth 
in new directions? (p. 26). 
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But does this passage contain anything to specify direction? 
Is it possible, without admitted allegiance to certain pre-
conceived aims, to translate this passage as a guide to 
class - room practice and school policy? How do we know, when 
we are not supposed to look beyond a short-term end that 
arises in the mind as a response to a specific problematic 
situation, whether a particular growth will promote or retard 
growth in general? And what, after all, is ' growth in 
general'? It is possible that a particular growth in one 
direction will promote further growth in some directions 
while retarding growth in some other directions. Which way 
to choose? How do we determine what would contribute to 
' growth in general'? And above all, how does this notion of 
growth and further growth determine the nature of growth, 
that is to say, introduce the idea of desirability and the 
sense of that direction? It is possible to conceive the 
process of growth with 'an added capacity for growth' at every 
stage going merrily in the wrong (i . e., undesirable) directi on. 
Has not the Devil grown? 
Dewey would probably say that the Devil has not really 
grown , for there is a rider to his principle of growth. He 
has, it is true, often spoken of 'personal growth', of 'what 
is owed to a person' as nothing less 'than opportunity to 
become all which he is capable of becoming•. 55 But still, 
all growth is, in his view, social. The conception of growth 
is to be given 1 a universal and not a specialized limited 
application', which means that growth is not merely biolog-
ical and psychological, but also inclusive of the social and 
cultural matrixes. An individual grows with other individ-
uals, exercises his initiative 'in a social medium•; he is 
'not something complete within himself'. The moral norm or 
the ought cannot be conceived 'apart from social relations'. 
Dewey writes, '~orals ~ social. The question of ought, 
should be, is a question of better and worse in social 
affairs•. 56 Dewey therefore talks of growth as a norm for 
all. This commits him to the democratic way of life. Dis-
cussing the view that learning is 'continued capacity for 
growth', he says, 
55 
Now this idea cannot be applied to all the members 
of a society except where intercourse of man with 
man is mutual, and except where there is adequate 
provision for the reconstruction of social habits 
Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, 277. 56 
Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 319. Cp. 'The interest 
in individual moral improvement and the social interest in 
objective reform ••• are identified'. Reconstruction in 
Philosophz, 196. 
and institutions by means of wide stimulation 
arising from equitably distributed interests. 
And this means a democratic society.57 
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The two ideas of growth and democracy are similarly linked 
in another passage: 
A society of free individuals in which all, 
through their own work, contribute to the 
liberation and enrichment of the lives of 
others is the only environment in which any 
individual can8really grow normally to his full stature.? 
Now, if Dewey means, as he says, that all members of the 
society have somehow to work for the 'liberation and enrich-
ment of the lives of others' to make real growth possible 
for an:y: individual, then this growth 1to full stature' is 
clearly unattainable. Sidney Hook while quoting the 
passage recognizes this difficulty but glosses over it by 
commenting that the 'very over-emphasis should indicate how 
important for Dewey democracy as a moral ideal is•.59 But 
it is not the importance of the democratic ideal alone that 
concerns us, but also its practicability so that it can fit 
into Dewey's scheme of values. In a democratic society 
a particular group's firm devotion to any new growth 
57 
Dewey, Democraci and Education, 117. 
58 Quoted by Sidney Hook, "John Dewey, Philosopher of Growth", 
loc cit., 1015. w--
I bid. , 1 01 6. 
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may demand the sacrifice of some other group's new growth 
or some other individuals freedom to retain the amount of 
growth they might have at the moment. The basic problem is 
how the growth and new growth of all the members of a 
society can be continuously furthered. In the passage under 
reference this basic problem is altogether banished from 
sight by requiring all individuals to embrace the ideal of 
'liberation and enrichment of the lives' of all members as 
-
their most basic individual interest. The uncritical accept-
ance of such an ideal will create the well-known paradox: if 
no one's own growth (or happiness, or whatever it is) is of 
basic importance, how could it possibly be that everyone's is? 
We do not, however, mean to say that Dewey, despite such 
occasional superfluities, is unaware of this important 
problem. He recognizes 
that the democratic ideal poses, rather than 
solves the great problem: How to harmonize the 
development of each individual with the 
maintenance of a social state in which the 
activities of one ~ill contribute to the good 
of all the others.60 
What therefore interests us is to see how Dewey proposes to 
solve this great problem to secure the all-round growth of 
every member of society. 
60 
Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, 388-9. 
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One important question in this connection will be to 
see how Dewey brings in his metaphysical, logical and 
ethical formulations to bear upon the recommendations he 
makes about social and educational goals and procedures. 
How does he precisely connect his philosophical ideas with 
social and educational theory? To this wider issue, and 
also to the issues of democratic growth and democratic 
education in particular we shall therefore now turn. 
CHAPTER VI 
PHlLOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THiORY 
- - ------
We have seen in our earlier exposition of Dewey 1 s 
conception of philosophy that philosophical ideas arise, 
according to him, out of felt difficulties in social 
practice, and that they a re 'plans I or I proposals I designed 
to remove these difficulties. It is often the case, Dewey 
says, that philosophers, being a specialized class, use 
a highly technical language unlike the vocabulary in which 
direct difficulties are stated, and discuss metaphysical and 
logical issues which apparently seem to have no bearing on 
the attitude and conduct of personal and social life. But 
whether the individual philosopher is aware of it or not, he 
is nevertheless concerned with some basic social problems of 
his time and is busy formulating ideas which 'correspond to' 
some practical proposals. Dewey suggests that a philosophical 
idea, when approached 'from the side of' social conduct or 
educational practice, can be readily recognized as a proposal 
or programme of value. He suggests this not because he 
thinks that philosophy can somehow furnish the basis of 
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social conduct and educational practice, but because he 
takes up a position that seems to imply that philosophy is 
basically a proposal and a programme. This is linked with 
his view that ideas are practical, they are 'designations of 
operations to be performed or already performed'. 1 
This seems to imply that philosophical ideas, even when 
they are not directly concerned with problems of individual 
and social conduct, entail some sort of programme for the 
regulation of such conduct. Metaphysical and logical 
theories are not then purely speculative affairs; they are, 
in their intents and purposes, programmatic. It remains only 
to be sorted out, so it would seem, from Hume's tec.hnical 
arguments for scepticism or from Kant's wrestling with 
categories, what widely felt social difficulties Hu~or Kant 
was addressing himself to, and also what were his own 
practical proposals towards their solution. The social 
obligation of philosophy is evenrneper and the practical 
character of philosophical formulations much more significant. 
Since ideas, conceptions, theories and systems are 
instrumental to an active reorganization of a given conflict-
ing environment, Dewey maintains, 'the test of their validity 
uest for Certainty, 132. 
and value lies in accomplishing this work 1 • 2 This would 
seem to mean that in any attempt to judge the validity or 
philosophical worth of Spinoza's theory of substance and 
Berkeley's theory of matter, we shall have to find out the 
spcific social perplexities these theories were proposing to 
solve and then assess their social consequence to determine 
how effective these consequences wer e in resolving those 
perplexities. If a philosophical theory is not 1verbal 1 or 
just 'sentimental indulgence', it will, Dewey tell us, have 
social consequences. 3 Though we are not told how exactly to 
assess or measure these consequences - that would, as we 
shall see, involve a departure from his principles, and what 
sort of consequences make an idea valid, they are, anyway, 
the test of the truth of ideas. 'By their fruits shall ye 
know them'. 
All this will seem a little confusing and in need of a 
little exploration. We may begin to have a look at Dewey's 
conception of the practical and social character of ideas 
and of philosophy in general by alluding briefly to the 
principal intellectual novelty of pragmatism, e.g., its 
theory of truth. The pragmatic conception of truth is 
~-------- -2 
Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosonhy, 156. 
3 
Dewey, Democrac and_Education, 383. 
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generally understood to mean that the truth of an idea 
consists in its capacity to bring about the sort of activity 
in and through which it functions or operates to a satisfac-
tory eventuation. Ideas, Dewey repeatedly tells us, must 
make a difference in some such activity, and their validity 
as true is a function of their utility in furthering the 
ends of the activity in question. ' The effective working of 
an idea and its truth are the same thing' . This notion of 
truth is linked with the more general doctrine of the 
primacy of practice as contrasted with mere theory: the 
ultimate ends of life are not cognitive but practical living, 
and in so far as knowing helps in achieving the practical 
ends of life its validity and worth as knowledge can be 
established. 
In the Essays in Experimental Logic, Dewey analyzes what 
he calls the ' judgments of practice' , the complex type of 
judgment frequently found in ordinary non- technical thought, 
and concludes that the truth or falsity of these practical 
judgments is constituted by their outcome. Whileformally 
distinguishing judgments of fact which refer to a state of 
affairs and judgments of practice which refer directly to 
action, he attempts to assimilate the former to the latter. 
He asks: 
How far is it possible and legitimate to extend or 
generalize the results reached to apply to all 
propositions of facts? That is to say, is it 
possible and legitimate to treat all scientific 
or descriptive statements of matters of fact as 
implying indirectly if not directly, something 
to be done, future possibilities to be realized 
in action? (p . 347) . 
191 
The answer as developed in the earlier work~ The Influence 
.Qf Qa.rw·n on Philoso ~ (p. 141 f) and How We Think (p. 102), 
seems primarily concerned with the genetic consideration: the 
existence of ideas is bound up with the practical needs of 
life . Now , this may explain the origin of ideas, the 
motivation of thought , but this does not throw any light 
upon their nature or meaning, in other words, upon the 
logical content of ideas . It is in a later work, The Quest 
for_Certaintv, that Dewey starts arguing that all our ideas 
refer to operations, that ' thought , our conceptions and ideas, 
are designations of operations'. (p. 132). He writes, 
A definition of the nature of ideas in terms of 
operations to be performed and the test of the 
v.alidity of the ideas by the consequences of 
these operations establishes connectivity within 
concrete experience. (p . 111). 
The pattern of inquiry is the methodological formulation of 
this position. From what we have already seen it can be 
said that this way of treating statements about matters of 
fact is clearly stretching the notion of practical (or 
operational) a little too far to include everything, even 
the purely theor etical, and in a way that does scant justice 
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to the theoretical function of the scientific statements. 
But such criticism will not impress Dewey; he will tell us 
that the very distinction between the theoretical and the 
practical is old - fashioned dualism. 
Let us then try to look at the practical character of 
ideas from the side of Dewey ' s notion of truth. Let us ask: 
does Dewey, when he talks about validity and truth, make a 
distinction between ideas which work for the purposes of 
factual inquiry, where inquiry aims at the discovery of the 
nature of things and is successful in so far as it is able 
to disclose the 'facts of the case 1 , and other kinds of 
ideas which are not concerned with factual inquiry but which 
may in their working contribute to success of other sorts, 
social , political , educational and the like, without thereby 
justifying themselves as true in any ordinary sense of the 
term? The critics contend that Dewey's formula of successful 
working applies to both sorts of ideas, an imputation Dewey 
and the instrumentalists often deny. 4 But it is di f ficult to 
see how Dewey can claim to have maintained this distinction 
which alone, we believe, can give some cogency to the notion 
of 1 truth 1 • We may look at it this way. For Dewey, success-
ful thinking is not, and cannot be, the cognitive satisfaction 
4 
See Arthur E. Murphy, The Uses of Reason, New York, The 
Macmillan Company, 1943, 87-8. 
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derived fro~ our finding out what the objects inquired into 
actually are. For the purposes of knowing any assumption 
about the existence of such an object will raise the spectre 
of an 'antecedent reality •. For Dewey the 'objects' of 
science, as we have seen, are instrumental to human needs 
and uses, and are, metaphysically speaking, fictional in 
character. Dewey, therefore, maintains that the object of 
knowledge is the satisfactory completion of the activity of 
inquiry - without being willing to admit that such satisfac-
tory completion requires the attainment of factual knowledge 
about objects as they actually are. This can also be seen 
as confirming a doubt we raised earlier about the possibility 
of assessing the social consequences of an idea: any such 
assessment would involve a reference to the facts of the case 
which, if Dewey's theory of knowledge is correct, we can 
never know. It is, therefore, clear that Dewey, in terms of 
his doctrines, cannot discriminate between ideas which are 
the results of factual inquiry disclosing the facts of the 
case - the nature and behaviour of objects ande1ents in the 
world around us in so far as these can be found out by the 
methods of reliable inquiry, and other sorts of ideas and 
beliefs which no doubt affect the affairs of life but which 
do not claim any informational correctness, and no question 
of truth arises with regard to them. Dewey and the 
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pragmatists are assisted in this confusion about the nature 
and character of ideas by the confusion between verification 
or factual confirmation and successful working. If the 
idea of a 'common good' or apartheid leads to activities 
which result in the successful promotion of its ends, then 
it is, so it would seem, to be regarded as 'true'! 
Dewey conceives of philosophy as a social phenomenon, 
as the intellectual instrwnent by which a society at any 
given time reconstructs its culture, in whole or in part, in 
order to resolve the conflicts of the time. Philosophy is a 
part and parcel of culture; it is as much the product of the 
cultural forces in an environment as it is the sustaining 
force behind the distinctive development of a cultural system. 
This conception of philosophy as anecpression in thought of 
culture and cultural change is distinctly Hegelian. Dewey 
undoubtedly owes much to the Hegelian conception of history 
and also to the left wing Hegelians including Marx who 
suggested the importance of social conflict and the use of 
social experience to the active service of changing the world. 
There is, then, the general doctrine that all our ideas, 
including the scientific and philosophical ones, have social 
genesis and social consequences. But what is this social 
conception of philosophy like? It is, Dewey says, 'a critique 
of basic and widely shared belief 1 involving valuation, 
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'preferential attachment to special types of objects and 
courses of action'. It is 'concerned with problems of being 
and occurrence from the standpoint of value, rather than 
from thqt of mere existence 1 .5 And since philosophical 
systems arise out of widely felt social perplexities con-
cerning values, the test of their truth lies in bringing 
about the consequences which remove these perplexities. 
What is Dewey really talking about? How is he assign-
ing a social function to philosophy? He seems to be talking 
about social beliefs and the resulting habits of action, and 
of philosophy as if directly concerned in the formulation of 
new beliefs and courses of action as substitute for the pre-
vailing conflicting ones. The truth of these new beliefs 
consists in their operational capacity to resolve conflicts 
and ensure social satisfaction. The doctrine in this form 
does not seem to go beyond the question of belief; and as a 
theory of truth of our ideas about the nature and character 
of things and events it is irrelevant. It does at best 
suggest how we ordinarily come to accept certain beliefs as 
true: for social satisfaction - acceptance of and agreement 
about certain beliefs - even when achieved by such incredible 
devices as the skilful dissemination of lies and the ruthless 
~ -
Dewey, "Philosophy", encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 
XII, 122; see also, 12 -5. 
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silencing of those who question them, influences the 
formation of our beliefs . But this is not the test of the 
truth of a belief . Our reasons for accepting a certain thing 
as true is not what we mean by truth. 6 Now, it is not un-
common among philosophers to stretch their pet formulas too 
far, and Dewey certainly shares this weakness. He stretches 
'practical' and 'social' to such an extent that they do not 
seem to admit of any limitations outside or distinctions 
within. As a result, Dewey simply fails to see that a valid 
theory for the purposes of social planning and action is one 
thing, while the identification of theoretical validity with 
practical utility and social satisfaction is another. And, 
what about philosophy? Does Dewey thinlc that philosophy is 
just a matter of pushing ahead a certain kind of belief as 
a substitute for the prevailing older one? Why then does 
Dewey think that social difficulties and perplexities require 
us to attend to philosophical problems? Why can't social 
problems be disposed of without our having to bother about 
philosophy? And to put the question in another form: what 
does Dewey precisely mean when he says that Milosophical 
b 
See P. E. Partridge, "The Social Theory of Truth", I._h_g Austral-
asian Journal of Psychology and Philosophi, Vol. AIV, No. 3, 
September 1936, 161-175; also, Arthur E. Murphy, 1._he_ Uses of 
Reason, 80 ff. 
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ideas are 'plans' and 'proposals' about social reconstruction? 
Does he mean that philosophical ideas are more or less 
demands and claims about certain social ends and procedures? 
The political writings of Rousseau and Locke are, on the 
whole, examples of this special kind of theorizing we have 
in mind. We can, therefore, look a little closely into the 
nature of their theories to bring home a few i~portant points 
that concern us here. 7 
It cannot be denied that Rousseau was influenced by the 
social issues and struggles of his time. The idea he dropped 
into the French mind about thirty years before the French 
Revolution that men were born free and that if they were now 
in chains, it was because of injustices perpetrated by the 
few upon the many, had tremendous political effects. So was 
the case of John Locke: he was influenc ed by the political 
struggles of the time. The ideas he developed deeply 
influenced the American mind during the revolution; the 
American patriots, we are told, 'quoted him with as much 
reverence as Communists quote Marx today•. Now, if this is 
the kind of social need, the formulation of ideas and their 
workings Dewey has in mind as the 'office and function' of 
7 . 
See, Brand Blanshard, "Can the Philosopher Influence Social 
Change?' The Journal of Philosoph_y_:, Vol. LI, 1954, 741-753; 
John L. Childs, 11 Can the Philosopher Influence Social Change?" 
Ibid., 753-763. 
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philosophy, there are then certain things - rather important 
points - about these revolutionary ideas that must also be 
remembered. There is the question: how much credit for 
these revolutions is to be allotted to these ideas? An 
accurate answer is impossible; but as we know there were 
many other important factors beside the ideas. The ideas 
were conditions - admitted to be important, but never the 
sole determining causes of the existential transformations, 
that is to say, the political revolutions. Secondly, what 
were these ideas intended for? Rousseau's ideas emphasizing 
the sovereignty of the people and the equal right of every 
man in shaping the laws and institutions of society worked 
out in practice quite favourably towards the growth of the 
' idea of democracy, but as Bertrand Russell would say, the 
doctrines of Rousseau's Social Contrac~ 'though they pay lip 
service to democracy, tend to the justification of the total-
itarian state' . 8 There are others inclined to a similar view 
that a totalitarian potential lurks in Rousseau doctrine of 
the general will . 9 As for Locke, in the .I.wo Treatises of 
Governm,.ent_, he sought, as he said in the preface, 'to 
B. Russell, A History of Western Philosogl]y, New York, Simon 
and Schuster, 1945, 694; also, 700. 
9 
See Sabine, A History of Political Theou, New York, Henry 
Holt and Co . , New York, 1937, 593; J.L. Talmon, ,Ihe Origins of 
Totalitarian Democracy, London, Mercury Books, 1961. 
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establish the Throne of our Great Restorer, Our present King 
William; to make good his Title, in the Consent of the 
People'. To achieve this object, he formulated the concept 
of civil government in which ' government by the consent and 
the goodwill of the governed is the ideal'. This concept 
dominated the political philosophy of American Revolution 
which dethroned monarchy from the American soil. In what 
these ideas were possibly intended for, and what they event-
ually achieved, they may not, however, seem .to fit strictly 
into Dewey's notion of 'successful working 1 • 
Thirdly, and more importantly, what are these ideas 
really? Are they ~hilosoRhical? Rousseau no doubt introduced 
certain concepts (notably, that of the 1 general will') and 
also a few conceptual distinctions (e.g., between the general 
will and will of all), but these were not supported by 
metaphysical or logical analysis. Rousseau seems to imagine 
that the general will is something that will emerge in a 
certain social condition and proposes it as the basis of a 
social organization with a great deal of persuasive force. 
He does not raise and discuss the philosophical issues, e.g., 
the metaphysical character of the general will, the logic of 
its emergence, the question of its moral authority, that is 
to say, why it should prevail and the like. He does not give 
any indication by what logical criteria or practical signs 
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the general will could be recognized. Nor did Locke 
consciously try to connect in any way his epistemological 
and metaphysical theories with the concept of civil govern-
ment. One of Locke's purposes was to defend the moral 
validity of the Revolution of 1688; he devoted the latter 
part of the second treatise to discussing the right to 
resist tyranny. The most effective part of this argument, 
where he maintained that the English government and the 
English society were two different things, the first existed 
for the well-being of the second, was drawn from Richard 
Hooker's ~cclesiastical PoJJty. 10 It was for his concern 
about governmental affairs that Locke developed political 
insight and formulated a certain political theory. 1 1ocke 
did not write', as Peter Laslett says, 1 as a philosopher, 
applying to politics the implications of his view of reality 
as a whole' . 11 
Now, is it the sort of philosophizing of which Rousseau 
and Locke are examples that Dewey has in mind when he talks 
about the social function of philosophy? It is true that a 
large portion of Dewey's writings on social theory and most 
10 
See Sabine, loc. cit., 535; also Peter Laslett, 1,ockets Two 
Treatises of Government, Cambridge University Press, 1960, 56-7. 
1 1 
IblQ., x. 
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of the polemical material in his technical philosophical 
works convey the impression that philosophical enterprise is 
primarily a matter of direct social demand or claim about a 
certain kind of reconstruction or adjustment whose necessity 
is felt in the circumstances. His concern with the snecific 
. 
situation, his notion that all our ideas are plans of action, 
and his formula about successful working where, as we have 
seen, his position does not allow the possibility of a 
distinction to be made between the two sorts of ideas, the 
one conveying factual information and the other programmatic, 
may seem on the whole, to corroborate this impression. He 
often tells us that philosophers, consciously or unconscious-
ly, deal with the felt social difficulties of their times, 
and are concerned in formulating plans or proposals for the 
solution of those difficulties. The 'impact of philosophical 
reconstruction', he says by way of explanation, is to be 
fotmd in the 'reconstruction of specific situations rather 
1? than in any refinement in the general concepts'. - It is 
not only that philosophy is, according to him, always 
harnessed to a social programme, but a 'genuine' philosopher 
in the Deweyan 'complete act of reflective thinking' seems 
bound to find himself in the role of a social reformer. 
12 
Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 193. 
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Social reform and philosophy are at least tautologically 
identified ; both in their true import are being explained to 
mean ' the liberation and expansion of meanings of which 
experience is capable 1 • 13 On occasions he seems to dislike 
and discourage the intellectual detachment or the cultivated 
aloofness so necessary to arrive at independent objective 
judgments . 14 
A philosophical system is usually judged by its 
emphasis and general tendencies, and we can more or less see 
the reason why Dewey is often accused of confusing the 
philosopher ' s task with that of a social reformer. 15 It is 
therefore necessary to inquire how in Dewey ' s view the 
proposals of a social reformer are to be distinguished from 
the proposals of the philosopher . How exactly does philo-
sophy participate in social affairs? There are also, then, 
the other kinds of theorizing , e . g . , political, economic, 
educational and the like , which, Dewey would no doubt admit, 
are equally concerned in resolving the felt difficulties and 
13 
14
Dewey , Experience and Natur~, 411. 
'Better it is for philosophy to err in active participation 
in the living struggles and i"ssues of its own age and time 
than to maintain an irnmuI1e , monastic impeccabili ty 1 • is says 
in Honor of William James, 77. 0 
See B. Blanshard, "Can the Philosopher Influence Social 
Change'?', The Journal of Philoso hv, Vol. LI, No. 24, 741-753. 
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perplexities in their respective spheres. How is philosophy 
to be distinguished from the conceptual analyses, formulation 
of hypotheses, the theory-formation of other branches of 
theory? Supposing for the sake of argument that it were 
true that philosophical problems were always suggested by 
difficulties in social practice, and also that philosophical 
ideas have in fact had social consequences, there would 
still be need to explain what is the special character of 
the problems and theories we call J2.h.ilosophical, as distinct 
from those (which might be suggested in the same way) which 
we do not describe as philosophical. In other words, what 
according to Dewey is specifically philosophical about 
philosophical ideas? 
Dewey ' s considered answer, as we have seen, is that 
philosophy is crj_tici..§1] or a critical method of criticism 
which is marked off from other kinds of theorizing by its 
generality and objective . Exp.lai.ning the point about 
generality , he writes, 
Over - specialization and division of interests, 
occupations and goods create the need for a 
generalized medium of inter-communication, of 
mutual criticism through all- round translation 
from one separated region of experience into 
another . Thus philosophy as a critical organ 
becomes in effect a messenger, a liaison officer, 
making reciprocally intelligible voices speaking 
provincial tongues, and the.re by enlarging as 
as well as rectifytng the meanings with which 
they are charged.16 
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This means that Dewey conceives of philosophy as a critical 
organ, what he calls the ' general logic of experience', 
which functions as a medium of contact among the various 
modes and spheres of experience. Philosophy is a general 
logic which, he thinks, can be adapted and employed as 
speical logic to the various narrower fields of experience, 
e.g., scientific, moral, social and educational. Dewey 
believes, as we have seen, that the various modes or spheres 
of experience are interconnected. Philosophical formulations, 
he therefore thinks, can go into and penetrate all the other 
fields. A reconstruction in philosophy can thus bring about 
reconstruction of ideas in technically non-philosophical -
social, political, educational - fields. Similarly , 
reconstruction of ideas in narrower fields, as was the case 
in natural and biological sciences in the last century, can 
compel reconstruction in philosophy. 
What, then, is the reconstruction in philosophy like -
as distinct from the reconstruction Dewey believes philosophy 
can bring about in other non-philosophical spheres? In a 
long introduction to the enlarged edition (1948) of 
Reconstru~tion in PhJlpso~ (first published in 1920), 
16
newey, Ex2erience and Nature, 410. 
205 
Dewey says that reconstruction means the work of formula.t-
ing an ' intellectual standpoint, outlook, or what philosophy 
has called ncategories" to serve as instrumentalities of 
inquiry '. (p . xxvii) . He specifies 'the theory of knowledge' 
as the main field where the needed reconstructions are to 
be carried out . (p . x) . This should not be taKen to mean 
that he is less concerned about the practical objectives; he 
talks of the 
construction of a moral human science •. • as a 
needful precursor of reconstruction of the actual 
state of human life toward order and toward 
other conditions of a fuller life than man has 
yet enjoyed . (p . xxxvi) . 
But he clearly recognizes that reconstruction in philosophy 
is ' the work of developing, of forming, of producing the 
intellectual instrumentalities' for the purposes of inquiry. 
(p . xxvii) . 
But the 'intellectual instrumentalities', the principle 
and methods of philosophical inquiry, Dewey has in mind are, 
however , somewhat peculiar . And Dewey's exag gerated claims 
about their all- round competence is clearly a major source 
of confusion. Let us explain the point briefly. It can be 
said that the methods and results of philosophical inqui ry 
can possibly exert influence upon the social mind, upon 
social beliefs, habits of thought and action. Descartes, for 
example , had very little social theory or none at all, yet 
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his criteria of 'clearness and distinctness' set a new 
standard of clearness and honesty in thinking about all 
matters, including social matters. This is equally true of 
Hume's rigorous method of philosophical discourse. But the 
methods of philosophical inquiry or discourse by themselves 
do not indicate any definite end, they do not tell us the 1 acts 
to be performed• in a specific problematic situation. Then, 
again, philosophical inquiry may be concerned with the 
formulation of comprehensive conceptual 'categories• through 
an analysis of being or knowing or both. Descartes and Kant, 
for example, introduced fundamental philosophical conceptions 
or categories (e.g., the Cartesian dualis.m, the Kantian con-
ception of the moral order) which no doubt had great 
influence on a wide field of thinking. It is, however, not 
easy to determine exactly the nature or to assess the limits 
of this kind of influence; but that is, anyway, beside the 
point. The point is: the Cartesian or the Kantian conceptions 
or categories - and so is Plato's Idea, Spinoza's Substance 
or even Hegel's Absolute - are developed primarily as 
theoretical intellectual principles; they are, on the whole, 
descriptive, explanatory or interpretative, and only 
iQdirectl prescriptive. They are not 1 practical' in the 
sense the Deweyan intellectual instrumentalities are. For 
Dewey has a peculiarly holistic conception of ~e~x::..-.:~~ 
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and the method - the method of inquiry - he derives from it, 
he believes, can and does tell us _g_irect,lx not only the acts 
to be performed in a specific problematic situation, but 
whjch, being more than mere intellectual, involves action 
and existential transformation of the objects inquired into. 
An act of philosophizing, therefore, involves operations other 
than those ordinarily regarded as philosophical. We have, 
however, seen in the preceding chapters that much of what 
Dewey says about his intellectual instrumentalities, e.g., 
about the categories of nature, experience and creative 
intelligence, about inquiry determining the end to be sought 
and effecting existential transformation, are extremely 
vague and confusing. These no doubt account for much of 
Dewey's philosophical loose talk. He moves at ease from the 
descriptive to the programmatic, from idea to action, from 
philosophy to social reform. With all the dragons of dualism 
lying dead he moves freely and in a wide sweep from the 
generality of a descriptive category to the specific need of 
a particular problematic situation. In Dewey's writings -
about his ovm views or that of others - it is therefore often 
difficult to determine whether it is the philosophical 
theory, the 'general logic', or what he takes to be the 
result of its 'mediation' in the social sphere, that is to 
say, social theory, he is talking about. This is an abiding 
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confusion in Dewey's philosophical position, and this makes 
much of what Dewey writes about the nature and function of 
philosophy difficult to follow. 
But there is , at least, a point that we might try to 
salvage and examine a little more closely. It is the 
contact or connection Dewey seeks to establish between the 
' general logic of experience ' and the various narrow spheres 
of experience . We can ask : how far does Dewey succeed in 
connecting his reconstructed generalized medium with what he 
describes as the ' theory of activity in social matters 1 ?17 
An inquiry into the nature and extent of any possible contact 
between Dewey ' s philosophical formulations on the one hand 
and his social and educational theories on the other could 
be useful in a number of ways . We can hope that a look into 
his philosophical categories as adapted and applied to the 
concrete affairs of life, in action so to speak, might help 
us to penetrate through the vagueness and looseness in 
Dewey's earlier arguments about them that kept some con-
fusions from being faced in the open. By exploring the 
point about contact a little more deeply we may come to see 
how far his reconstructed intellectual instrumentalities 
serve to fulfil what he tells us to be his philosophical 
17 
Dewey, J:.roblems of Men, 203. 
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objective. In other words, we can find out whether Dewey 
himself is an example of his general thesis about the social 
character and role of philosophy. We can also hope that 
the discussion might help us in a general way to determine 
the issues and problems involved in a programmatic conception 
of philosophy, that is to say, the conception about the 
nature and function of philosophy based on an assumption 
that philosophical formulations can provide some sort of 
basis for theories on social, practical, educational ends 
and procedures . 
We should remember that Plato, Hegel, Hobbes and Marx 
similarly tried to connect schemes of social, political, 
economic and educational programmes with their technical 
philosophical generalizations. Many of these philosophers 
have been, like Dewey, deeply involved in the problems of 
their contemporary society and have been social reformers or 
revolutionaries as well . But they clearly formulated a 
philosophical perspective raising and answering questions 
about the nature of knowledge and world, and attempted to 
connect their theories on s ocial, political, economic and 
educational matters to the perspective so developed. This 
does not, however, mean that they did not have 'practical 
objectives' or were not motivated by interests other than 
philosophical . What it means is that they were concerned 
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with conceptual analysis of problems of a more general and 
fundamental nature than with the specific social and 
political problems of their times; and that they also showed 
a great deal of eagerness to support their views about 
social , political and educational affairs by systematically 
connecting them to wider philosophical generalizations. 
Now, Dewey is often confusing about the social connection 
and obligation of philosophical ideas , but he nonetheless 
recognizes the need of connecting his views on social and 
educational matters with his reconstructed philosophical 
categories . He makes the point when, in his characteristic 
way , he says that in education ' other problems, cosmological, 
moral , logical , come to a head ' . 
In formulating the concepts of nature and experienc~, 
of intelligence and valuation, Dewey is then trying to 
straighten out a set of categories designed to provide, when 
specifically applied to the social or educational or any 
other sphere of ex:perience, an aim and a procedure for the 
regulation of individual and social activity in that sphere. 
Now , speaking particularly of education, this is not just the 
case of an educational theorist, like Rousseau or Froebel or 
Pestalozzi, who takes his departure from concrete educational 
proble~s and tries to -solve them by formulating a few broad 
generalizations more or less in line with a certain 
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philosophical outlook. Nor is it like what Kant says on 
matters of education , which is undoubtedly very wise and 
humane , but has no direct connection with his philosophical 
Critiques . (Something quite analogous can be said about the 
educational writings of Whitehead and Russell). As a philo-
sopher of education , in a narrow and technical sense, Dewey 
must , then , take his stand on social and educational matters 
upon philosophical grounds : he must develop his philosophy 
into the social and educationalspheres . 
Here we wi l l also seek to draw a few lines. For the 
purposes of the present discussion the important thing is not 
so much to attempt an independent assessment of Dewey's 
social and educational ideals and methods: much of what 
Dewey has said on these matters is no doubt interesting and 
important , and deserves attention in its own right. Nor 
shall we try to ' test ' their worth by the extremely dubious 
Deweyan method of assessing their social consequences: John 
Dewey had been for decades an 'international school teacher'; 
the 'Dewey Movement' in education exerted tremendous 
influence for more than forty years in the U.S.A. and for 
shorter periods in a few o~her lands, but the nature and 
effects of this influence, as the current literature on the 
subject shows, are much in dispute. Our main purpose in 
the following chapters will be to exmnine Dewey's claim 
that his ' theory of activity in social matters' is 
'definitely rooted 1 in his 'very philosophy'. 
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CHAPriR VII 
THE DEMOCRATIC WAY OF LIFE 
I 
In most of Dewey's mature writings the issue, sooner 
or later, always comes round to democracy. The reason is 
that to Dewey (and to the American tradition which he shares 
and interprets) democracy is not, as the jurist Austin 
would have put it, •properly a form of government•,1 but 
rather an all-embracing ideal, a way of life. 
1 
Democracy [Dewey writes], is much broader than a 
special political form, a method of conducting 
government , of making laws and carrying on 
governmental administration by means of popular 
suffrage and elected officers. It is that, of 
course. But it is something broader and deeper 
than that. The political and governmental phase 
of democracy is a means, the best means so far 
found, for realizing ends that lie in the wide 
domain of human relationships and the d~velop-
ment of human personality. It is as we often 
say, though perhaps without appreciating all 
that is involved in the saying, a way of life, 
social and individual.2 
Austin, A Plea for the Constitution, London, John Murray 
1859, 1 • 
2 
Dewey, Problems of Men, 57-8; see also, Reconstruction in 
Philosophy , 209. 
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Democracy, for Dewey, is a word with 'many meanings'. But 
basic to his conception of democracy is 1 a moral and ideal 
meaning' whose implications, when worked out, yield the 
other meanings, namely, the political , economic, legal and 
social aspects of democracy. It is democracy in the 'higher' 
moral and ideal meaning one always finds invoked in Dewey's 
writings as a sort of •essential justification'. 
'In the early 1900 1 s', Eric F. Goldman reports in his 
fascinating account of American reform movements, 'saying 
"democracy" was semantic magic. One argued for or against 
anything on the grounds that it did or did not represent the 
truly democratic way'.3 One need not look long into 
Democ..r,acy.a.nd ~ducation (1916) to discover Dewey dismissing 
the 'three typical historic philosophies of education', 
namely, the Platonic, the 'so-called individualism of the 
eighteenth-century enlightenment', and the 'idealistic 
philosophies of the nineteenth century', by considering them 
'from this point of view•, that is to say, by claiming to 
have shown that their programmes involve an undemocratic 
social ideal. A few years later in Reconstruct~n in 
Philo~ophi (1920) Dewey is seen speaking of this kind of 
approach as one of the 'new standards of judging' traditional 
3
Eric F. Goldman, fl_end~zvo..11.s with DestiM, New York, Alfred 
Knopf, 1 9 52, 1 32. 
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philosophical theories. In his attempt to reconstruct 
philosophy Dewey explicitly avowed a genetic approach to 
philosophical ideas in order to ' expose' the roots and 
motives of the traditional philosophers. 1 It seems to me 1 , 
he writes, 'that this genetic method of approach is a more 
effective way of undermining this type of philosophic 
theorizing than any attempt at logical refutation could be 1 • 4 
Now, what Dewey is really trying to expose is not the alleged 
inability of past philosophies to dissociate themselves from 
social and moral aspirations 'imbedded in traditions'; in 
Dewey's view, philosophy is inevitably committed to the con-
sideration of •precious values' in the social and moral 
tradition. In fact, he urges philosophers of his ovm and 
coming generations to undertake 'openly and deliberately' the 
task of clarifying 1 men' s ideas as to the social and moral 
strifes of their own day' , a task, he alleges, past 
philosophy did only 'unconsciously, without knowing or 
intending it, and, so to speak, under cover' .5 Dewey does 
not therefore seem to have a strong point to urge against 
the 'province and business' of philosophy in the past. His 
sustained polemic against traditional philosophy is clearly 
4 
5 Dewey, Reco!l§_tructiori in Philosoph1z:, 24. 
l,Qid ., 26. 
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not so much against its natur__g, as against the alleged 
value_§_ upheld, directly or by implication, by traditional 
philosophers. He therefore comes to think that I a more 
effective way of undermining ••• than logical refutation' 
would be to demonstrate the fact that philosophers in the 
past, though not always consciously or with intent, had 
stood for values characteristic of a closed world and 
undemocratic society. 
On the positive side, to quote an appraisal from H.S. 
Commager's Ihe_American Mind, Dewey 'formed a whole network 
of alliances - with science, with politics, with education, 
with aesthetics, all directed toward advancing the happiness 
of mankind' (p. 99). Dewey believes, as Commager quotes 
from him, that the task of philosophy is to project 'an idea 
or ideal which, ~nstead of ecpressing the notion ~of ••• some 
far-away unrealizable goal ' would be used as• a method of 
rectifying social and moral defects from which mankind 
suffers. He therefore tries to work out a philosophical 
synthesis - connecting his views on metaphysics, logic and 
ethics with the notion of a way of life which defines and 
determines the political , economic, social and educational 
goals . ' More fully than any other philosophe~ of modern 
times', R.S. Commager remarks admiringly, 1 Dewey put philo-
sophy to the service of society•. (p. 99). 
. I 
But from the way Dewey often falls back upon the 
democratic 1 ideal 1 one can gather the impression that for 
him it is an ultimate or absolute (in the sense that it 
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needs no further justification) and in like manner, arbitrary. 
Dewey, as we have seen, considers it illicit to fall back 
upon a value which is not scientifically grounded. Ultimate 
and absolute have become in his hands terms of opprobrium 
and have been repeatedly used to indicate the very antithesis 
of experimental philosophy and the democratic way of life. 
Dewey argues that his preference for democracy is not 
arbitrary, not merely due to the fact that he was born in a 
society that called itself democratic and taught him 1 that 
democracy is the best of all social institutions•. 6 
But one wonders why Dewey nowhere attempts to establish 
democracy as a value, as 'desirable', in the manner he claims 
values can be empirically demonstrated. He often speaks of 
the democratic idea as involving, among other things, the 
notions of liberty, equality and fraternity.? Are these to 
be regarded as pervasive qualities of experienced situations 
which can be directly felt or had? Assuming that they can be 
b 
See, Dewey, Experience and Education, 25. 
7 
See, Dewey, Problems of Men, 57 ff; also, "Philosophy and 
Democracy", Character and Events, New York, Henry Holt and 
Company, 1929, Vol. II, 841-855. 
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immediately 1 had 1 as satisfyin experiences, what sort of 
intellectual operation can demonstrate that they are also 
satisfactor? Where do we look for the 'conditions and con-
sequences ', the objective facts that can establish the 
' desirability' of liberty, equality and fraternity? Do the 
lessons of history provide us with any clear unambiguous set 
of facts that might warrant us to assert their desirability? 
le do not see any . Shall we then look into human nature for 
these facts? But there cannot be anything fixed and final 
about human nature as such that can provide empirical 
grounds for the desirability of anything. The problem itself 
is one of changing and moulding human nature in desirable 
direction. 
Why is then the democratic way of life desirable? Dewey 
argues , as others did before and after him, that democracy 
gives human life the dignity it deserves. Democracy, we are 
told , helps individuals to grow. It means freedom for the 
individual . It makes man, individually and socially, happy. 
And so on. But why is human life, an outcome of natural 
transactions, and an ' affair' among countless natural affairs, 
dignified? Why should an ipdividual ever try to grow? The 
members of the Hopi, a North American Indian tribe, do not 
prefer to compete and grow. 8 Why is freedom better than 
%ee , E . Gol dhank, "Socialization, Personality and the 
Structure of the Pueblo Society", American Anthropologist, 
Vol . XLVII, 1945, 516-539. 
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servitude? Has not freedom its crushing burdens? Do men 
always know what to do with their freedom? Do they always 
feel relieved and happy when they are free? Is submission 
always bad? The history of such movements as Calvinism or 
Islam or Communism shows how submission can liberate human 
energies in many directions . And what really does make a man 
happy? Why must one seek happiness through associated living? 
The Hindu ascetic seeks happiness in a lonely forest 
hermitage . There are these and many other philosophical 
questions which Dewey does not discuss. Where does he then 
get all his ideas about human dignity, freedom, social 
cooperation and the like? How does he construct these 
values? Now , it is not at all difficult to recognize the 
valuational overtones of Western liberal culture in Dewey's 
own preferences . Dewey would probably admit thi s readily. 
Values are not constructed in vacuo , he would say, they are 
rather reconstructed by scientific evaluation out of 
traditional values in circulation. But this clearly raises 
a number of problems . To what extent are value pr efe r ences 
culturally determined?9 How do we judge the values of 
cultures different from our own? Can we judge them at all? 
9 
Some instrumentalists like John L. Childs seem to admit the 
inevitability of culturally determined values. See his 
Education and Morals, New York , Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950, 94 ff . 
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Scientific evaluation, as Dewey has expounded it, amounts to 
nothing more than an examination of the means of an unexamined 
end. How shall we assess the 'value' of apartheid in South 
Africa or the practice of untouchability in India? Can we 
oppose them 1 in principle'? If scientifically grounded 
values are just reconstructed cultural norms, we do not see 
how we can reasonably talk of opposing anything as a matter 
of principle. Dewey seems to avoid the positivists ' 
dilemma - the bashing in of each other's head in a contest 
about values, but the reconstruction he speaks of is, as we 
shall see, after all a •compromise' and an 'adjustment•. As 
a result, many social and political arrangements, which Dewey 
will passionately hate, can be supported by the use of his 
logic. There can hardly be a way out of this predicament 
when cultural relativism is made absolute. 
Above all, there is a basic philosophical problem here. 
This concerns the justification of a value-system or what 
Dewey loosely calls a •way of life'. Dewey 1 s philosophical 
position demands that his acceptance of a way of life as 
preferable to any other must be empirically validated, 
objectively vindicated, or in his own words, shown to be 
warranted. For he emphatically repudiates the positivists' 
suggestion that the basis of any such value-system is bound 
to be a 'practical decision' and an 'ultimate presupposition'. 
But Dewey nowhere addresses himself to the philosophical 
problem of justifying a way of life. In Ethics (with 
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J.H. Tufts) he makes the distinction between ethical 
'principle s ' and ethical 'rules ' (as ' fixed' and 1 practical' 
prescriptions within those principles), but eventually 
concerns himself with the 'influence of the social environ-
ment' in the formation of those principles (p. 304-313). He 
does not make the distinction sharp enough to see the 
difference between the decision about a system and statements 
within the system. Now, what really constitutes the 
justification of a value-system is itself a vexed problem. 
But the point is, one needs to accept certain things, a 
standard or some criteria to start with, and this, in its 
turn, will need further justification, and so on ad 
infinitum. 10 But what does Dewey really start with? 
Dewey seems to think that his metaphysical and logical 
formulations go a long way to warrant the democratic way of 
life. He seems to argue that in a world where contingency 
is real, and experiment is required to change things for the 
better, democracy is the only conceivable social ideal. The 
logic behind this argument is that the scientific method 
itself is shared experience ('shared experience is the 
10 ~ 
I have argued this point in a note on "Mr. Taylor on Justi-
fying a Way of Life", The Indian Journal of Philosophy, April, 
1962. 
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greatest of human goods'); its application means: conditions 
of free association, free inquiry, and free communication in 
the investigation and solution of social problems. 11 Thus, 
scientific method, which alone can liberate the minds of men, 
is democratic in character and rests upon democracy (and can 
also defend democracy from the 'overwhelming pressure of 
events'). Dewey therefore seems to maintain that democracy 
is not for him a matter of mere political option, it is 
rather implicit in what he believes to be the very nature of 
genuine reflective thinking. In some places Dewey even 
reverses this line of argument and claims that democracy 
implies 'a world in which there is real uncertainty and con-
tingency, a world which in some respect is incomplete and in 
the making ••• a field for experimentation'. 12 He seems also 
to argue in places that 'the democratic idea itself demands' 
an end of the dualism of thought and action, theory and 
practice; that it involves the notion of 'creative intelli-
gence ' and faith in the power of 'cooperative experience 1 • 13 
All such statements seem to suggest that Dewey not only 
believes that his metaphysical and logical formulations 
1 1 
See , Dewey, Experience and Nature, 202, 204 ff. 12 
Dewey, ttPhilosophy .and Democracy11 , loc. cit. , Vol. II, 851. 13 
Dewey, Problems of Men, 59, 66. 
somehow warrant the democratic way of life, but also that 
they hold a monopoly on it. 
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Now, what Dewey says about the nature of such things as 
existence and inquiry is, taken in his ovm terms, descriptive. 
What , on the other hand, he says about the democratic way of 
life, its 'moral and ideal meaning', is programmatic (in 
other words, 'normative'). How are these two systematically 
connected? Assuming that Dewey's descriptions of the generic 
traits of nature and the method of problem-solving are 
accurate, do they make the programme of associated living 
desirable? Or, assuming that Dewey 's model of democracy is 
a worthwhile way of life, does it prove that his description 
of the essentials of reflective thinking is accurate? Now, 
Dewey nowhere raises these questions specifically; and from 
his rather loose expressions it is difficult to understand 
what he thinks to be the precise logical significance of the 
continuity he seeks to establish in his system 'between the 
material, the mechanical, the scientific and the moral and 
the ideal' •14 
The important point , however , is this notion of contin-
uity between metaphysics and logic on the one hand and the 
moral and the ideal on the other. Dewey is, as he says, 
14 
Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 173. 
troubled by the intellectual scandal that seemed 
to be involved in the current (and traditional) 
dualism in logical standpoint between something 
called usciencen on the one hand and something 
called morals" on the other. 
He then adds that he has, 
long felt that the construction of a logic ••• 
which would apply without abrupt breach of con-
tinuity to the fields designated by both of the 
words, is at once our needed theoretical solvent 
and the supply of our greatest practical want.15 
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But tnis ' logic' so far as we have seen when considering his 
method of valuation seemed quite pointless. The knowledge, 
as a result of inquiry, of all the 'objective facts' about a 
situation does in no way tell us about the end to be pursued . 
And so long as Dewey assumes that questions of morals are 
questions about 'the end to be pursued', inquiry (in so far 
as it is concerned in establishing 'the objective facts') 
cannot provide a solution to moral problems. A new and bigger 
difficulty seems to be now added in claiming that the 'logic' 
can attain and secure a social 1 ideal 1 • The end Dewey 
originally spoke of was just an 1 end-in-view1 , something that 
could effectively solve a specific problem, one like the 
desire for roast pork. To this is now added the idea of an 
'ideal' - a particular 1 end-in-view1 must in the long run 
15 
Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism11 , loc. cit., 23; 
see also, The ~uest for Certainty, Ch. I. 
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promote a certain ' way of life' in order to be adjudged a 
' value •. But does the pattern of inquiry lead to a social 
conclusion? By instituting scientific inquiry in social and 
political affairs can we attain a democratic way of life? 
Does the model of inquiry clearly apply to complex and con-
flicting social situations? Let us discuss these points 
more fully. 
II 
The ' moral meaning ' of democracy, says Dewey, 1 is found 
in resolving that the supreme test of all political institu-
tions and industrial arrangements shall be the contribution 
th k t th 11 d th f b f . t I 1t ey ma e o ea -roun grow o every mem er o socie y. 
This means , as he explains a few sentences earlier, that in 
a democratic society the social institutions, government, 
industry, church, etc . , have the 'meaning and purpose' to set 
free and develop the individual capacities of all the members 
irrespective of race, class, sex or economic status. The 
democratic ideal also implies, as he says elsewhere, 'that 
a social return be demanded from all'. 17 This means that 
16 
Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 186 . 
17 
Dewey, Democracy and Education, 142. 
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while social institutions and arrangements offer every 
opportunity for the development of distinctive capacities 
of each individual , the individual, in his turn, makes a 
social return by making himself a part of the social com-
munity , by parti cipating in a social ideal and by enriching 
the social life in possible ways. 
The notion of democracy involves , Dewey tell us, a 
departure from the grand concepts of 'the Society• and 'the 
Individual ' both conceived in splendid isolation and with a 
sharp ' either - or' choice between them. Traditional polit-
ical philosophy , in his view , is full of •pompous and 
sonorous generalities ' about antecedent conceptions of 
individual and social which make dialectical controversies 
inevitable and specifi c social problems insoluble. 18 
Society and individual are not 'pre - existing' entities; 
society is not a separate entity , nor do individuals live 
and act in entire isolation. Society is individuals in their 
manifold relations to each other. The notion of interaction, 
as we can readily see, is crucial in ~ewey 1 s interpretation 
of experience in the social sphere . The social institutions 
are the result of diverse interactions among individuals; 
they do not have any supra-personal character. Nor do they 
1 
See, Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 199. 
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arise from any innate social instinct in man. The diverse 
wants , choices , and purposes lead to the formation of 
various sorts of groups and institutions in society. 
To a social group 1 distinctive enough', Dewey gives the 
name ' The Public '. The public is not an outer expression of 
an inner instinct nor a mystical entity. It arises out of 
transactions between individuals when the consequences of 
transactions •extend far beyond those immediately engaged to 
produce them 1 • The individuals who are thus affected form a 
group based on common interest and seek 'control over the 
actions which produce them '. Such a public is formless in 
the sense that it is comprised merely of certain common 
segments of some individuals ' interest . One particular 
individual may belong to a number of such publics at the 
same time, a religious group, a sports club, a debating 
society , a political party. The public can, however, be 
organized, and can effectively take care of its interests 
19 
by means of representatives who as guardians of 
custom , as legislators , as executives, judges, 
etc., care for its special interests by methods 
intended to regulate the conjoint actions of 
individuals and groups . Then and in so far, 
association adds to itself political organiza-
tion , and something which may be government comes 
into being: the public is a political state. 19 
Dewey , The Public and Its Problem~, 35. 
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The state comes into being to regulate a large variety of 
inter actions that go on between groups within a society. It 
' represents the conspicuous culmination of the great movement 
of social integr ation '; but it also implies a multiplication 
of all kinds of gr oups and associations . The more such 
groups are multiplied 'the state tends to become more and 
more a regulator and adjuster ' of their conflicting interests 
and activities. The state is therefore not an end in itself; 
like every other social organization it is a means 'to 
facilitate and enrich the contacts of human beings with one 
another '. Dewey sharply opposes the 'exaggerated theories ' 
of the sovereignty of the state and its 'legal rights' over 
the individuals . The ' supremacy ' of the state, he writes, 
' approximates that of the conductor of an orchestra, who 
makes no music himself but who harmonizes the activities of 
those who in producing it are doing the thing intrinsically 
worth while 1 • 20 
Now , it is only natural that the interests and purposes 
of the various publics will be at times conflicting. The 
democratic idea requires that the conflicts be resolved by 
20 
Dewey , Reconstruction in Philosophy, 203. For a critical -
though somewhat biased, discussion of Dewey's notions of sov-
ereignty and law, see , ~.Y. Elliot, The Pragmatic_Revolt in 
Politics , New York , The Macmillan Company, 1928, 222 ff. 
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'intelligent method ••• mutual and free communication instead 
of force'. Democracy means, Dewey says, 
voluntary choice, based on an intelligence that is 
the outcome of free association and communication 
with others . It means a way of living together in 
which mutual and free consultation rule instead of 
force, and in which cooperation instead of brutal 
competition is the law of life.21 
But this and similar statements about the 'broad social and 
moral import' of democracy 'as an ethical and social ideal 1 
are at once sweeping and vague; they seem more like expres-
sions of a wish and aspiration -than an attempt at a precise 
formulation of thecemocratic method of action. 
Democracy has, however, a meaning 1 distinctly political', 
denoting a 1mode of government'. Although to Dewey 'this is 
not the most inspiring of the different meanings of democracy', 
he nevertheless addresses himself to the problems of political 
democracy particularly in The Public and Its Problems. Trac-
ing the evolution of the ' democratic state' in relation to 
distinctive religious, scientific and economic changes, Dewey 
arrives at the conclusion that 1 the same forces 1 which have 
brought about the forms of democratic government have also 
introduced conditions which ' halt the social and humane ideals' 
of democracy . (Ch. III) . He means that •associated action' 
21 
Dewey, t1 Education and Social Change", Social Fron ti er, 
Vol . III, May 1937, 238. 
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of certain orders, particularly that 'of the present 
economic order' has become so 'mas sive and extensive' that 
they 'control present politics'. Aspects of modern life, 
technology for example, have created many publics with con-
flicting interests; one group often does not know how its 
own interests are related to that of other groups, or even 
in what direction its own interests lie. The so-called 
popular elections mostly express the will of a group of 
financial forces, propagandists, or 'consolidated factions 
under the name of parties'. There results 'The Eclipse of 
the Puplic' and political democracy becomes ineffective. 
(Ch. IV). In a long chapter entitled 'The Problem of Method', 
Dewey attempts to formulate what he calls the 'intellectual 
antecedents' of the method necessary for realizing the idea 
of a democratic Public. He talks of banishing the 'unreal 
problems' of older political theories, and of inventing new 
ways of securing full expression of the wants and interests 
of 'all individual members of all groupings•. He suggests 
that information about public matters 'now reserved for few 
experts' should be made available to all and free discussions 
about matters of state policy should be encouraged to give 
the masses their due 'share in political affairs•. Free 
communication of all ·information, participation of all, 
debate and discussion - these are the important conditions 
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for the application of the scientific method or the method 
of intelligence to determine and secure the Public Good. 
The method consists of - and Dewey is now speaking specifical-
ly of the 1 problem 1 of freedom and authority in a democratic 
society - 'inquiring into consequences of some particular 
distribution, under given conditions, of specific freedoms 
and authorities and for inquiring into what attired dis-
tribution would yield more desirable consequences'. (p. 193). 
Continuing, he explains that the question of what social 
transactions should be left to voluntary initiative and what 
should come under regulation must be determined by careful 
observation of 'time , place and concrete conditions', and 
since 'it concerns consequences', by perceiving the 'nature 
of consequences' that follow from such regulation. 1 Social 
control 1 , even those worked out by scientific method, he now 
admits, means 'regulating the doings and results of some 
individuals in order that a larger number of individuals may 
have a fuller and deeper experience 1 • However, in the follow-
ing sentence he states that ' Both ends' - meaning the growth 
of personal capacities of all individuals and the all-round 
growth of all - 'can be intelligently attained only by 
knowledge of actual conditions in their modes of operation 
and their consequences'. (p. 194). 
I 
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The gap between the desired and the desirable is sure 
to appear wider now, for here inquiry into 'conditions and 
consequences' is expected to integrate - not the incompat-
ible desires of an individual within a given situation - but 
the conflicting interests of various publics. The desirable 
in this context is not the one that enhances an individual's 
or a particular group's capacity for further development, but 
the one that ensures the all-round growth for all. It will, 
however, be useless to re-open the question whether inquiry 
can, as Dewey seems to assume, determine an end or ideal. 
In formulating the method of social inquiry, Dewey does not 
really say anything new on this point. There are obviously 
a few other matters that we may try to analyze: about Dewey ' s 
social model as well as about inquiry. How are Dewey's con-
ceptions of individual and society - bridged over by the 
public - related to his ethical and social ideals? And more 
important, how far does his pattern of inquiry apply to the 
social model? 
Dewey advocates the all-round growth of an individual 
within the community. Sucp growth demands, he tells us, 
that the individual must harmonize his segmental interests 
and purposes to become what he calls a 1 whole 1 individual or 
a 'unitary thing'. Dewey also maintains that a single 
individual - to expand his experience through interactions 
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must become member of many , many publics . The individual 
is a socius, a companion , and Dewey ridicules the 'image of 
a residual individual who is not a member of any association 
at all '. It is here , as Gordon W. Allport mentions, 
that one serious difficulty arises • •• • If a given 
citizen is, say, a veteran, a "dry", a believer in 
free trade , a broker , a motorist, a home owner, an 
urbanite , a pacifist, how shall he vote to gain 
total inclusion for his pattern of interests? Or 
what groups shall he join that will bring unity 
into his life?2l 
Dewey believes in the growth of an individual as an inte-
grated whole personality as ethical end; he at the same 
time prescribes more and more vigorous participation by the 
individual in the segmental public activities of the 
democratic society. But what is there in such participation 
that could help the individual to acquire an integrated 
personality? Or , how else can the individual achieve this? 
In his reply to Allport ' s criticism Dewey states, 
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I certainly admit that at the present time the 
problem is unsolved , and would go so far as to say 
that as a practical problem it is the problem of 
our day and generation •• •• But I cannot admit the 
incompatibility between individual human beings 
integrated in themselves and a community life 
marked by diversity of voluntary groups represent-
ing different interest is inherent. It is an 
Gordon W. Allport, 11 Dewey ' s Individual and Social Psychology" 
in P. A. Schilpp, (ed.), The Philosophy of John Dewey, 287. I 
am also greatly indebted to Gail Kennedy's treatment of this 
problem in his "The Process of Evaluation in a Democratic 
Cornmunity11 , The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LVI, 253-263. 
incompatibility which is historic and which is 
always changing its constituents so that the 
problems it sets have for ever to be solved 
anew in construction of new forms of social 
relationships . 23 
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hat does this mean? Dewey seems to agree that an individual 
by being a member of two publics, say, a trade union and a 
consumers' cooperative , or a church group and a teachers' 
association , may find himself supporting antagonistic 
demands . How does he reconcile these special interests? 
How does his faith in cooperative intelligence and the use 
of scientific method help him? And why does Dewey call it a 
' practical ' problem? He seems to thihk that if we accept 
his conception of the individual as socius, a product of the 
social transactions in which he participates, and also accept 
his proposal to substitute for the 'existing modes' of social 
inquiry the method of lntelligence, which at its best is 
embodied in the scientific method, the problem is, at least, 
theoretically solved . For he seems to assume further that 
when cooperative intelligence (and the social orientation it 
provides) is employed to solve a social conflict ('peopl e 's 
problem ' ), it can find out ' the public interest'. If, in 
the aforesaid instances, th~ individual needs an allegiance 
to something 1 higher 1 to subordinate his conflicting 
23 
Dewey, uExperience, Knowledge and Value 11 , loc. ci t., 556. 
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'special' interests, Dewey seems to believe that his theory 
provides the necessary instruments. He, therefore, does not 
think that the difficulty Allport complains of is inherent. 
But is there not a basic theoretical difficulty which 
Dewey in his unbridled faith in the capacity of scientific 
m~~nod is plainly overlooking? In Logic:The Theory of Inquiry 
and also in the brief concluding section ("Valuation and the 
Conditions of Social Theory") of the Theory of Valuation, 
Dewey deals with some of the practical difficulties in 
applying the Dattern of inquir~ (i.e., the scientific 
method) to the resolution of social conflicts. But one 
thing he seems to take for granted all through, that is, that 
the process of evaluating a desirable plan of action in a 
conflicting situation as it occurs for an individu~l can be 
simply carried over and applied to conflicting social 
situations involving many, many publics. In this respect, 
at least, he seems to agree with the Platonic dictum that 
society is the individual writ large. But for Dewey there 
is a difficulty here. Inquiry into an indeterminate situation 
requires, we can remember, the 'institution of a problem'. 
In the case of an individual facing an indeterminate situation 
there is but one problem. In Dewey's example of a fire alarm 
in a crowded assembly hall, the problem is one of getting out 
safely. This specific problem has one definite solution to 
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be striven for. Inquiry can determine the best and 
surest means to attain this end-in-view. Do social 
conflicts always fit this paradigm? Let us take as an 
example the case of the closure of the Roman Catholic 
schools in the Goulburn area in New South Wales on the issue 
of State aid to denominational educational institutions. In 
a sense, this is one particular issue, that of State aid to 
church schools and can be talked about as such. But the 
moment one thinks of instituting a problem, it becomes clear 
that there is not just one problem but a plurality of 
problems. In a complex society with its various interest 
groups or publics, an issue like this surely gives rise to 
a plurality of problems. Each of the publics concerned, 
viz., the CaJbholic Church demanding State aid, the 
Council of Protestant Churches and various groups within 
the Council opposing it, the Teachers' Federation, various 
other 'interest groups• having their own views about the 
best way of educating the young or of spending public 
money, and so on and so forth, will have their own 
problems in relation to the issue. There will be in fact 
separate problems as there are separate interest groups -
guarding their cherished values - are concerned. Each of 
these groups may - in Deweyan fashion, institute the 
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problem, inquire into the 'conditions and consequences• and 
seek to resolve it in a way that will, as far as possible, 
help the group to realize its own interests and enhance its 
own growth. But this will take us no nearer the resolution 
of the social conflict. Now, in case of such conflicts 
what can and usually does happen in a democratic society is 
this: when the publics concerned adhere to the method of 
discussion and persuasion - and the government concerned 
also believes in consultation, debate and discussion go on 
within and among the various groups, pressure is exerted by 
the conflicting publics on each other, some direct or 
indirect negotiations take place. The outcome of all these 
.£.ml be either surrender or some sort of compromise. But 
neither of these can be called a 1 solution1 • 
What can the scientific method do in a conflicting 
situation like this? Can it function in a way to resolve all 
the separate problems of the contesting publics into~ 
problem first, and then prescribe, assuming it can, the 
solution? The scientific method, in terms of Dewey's formu-
lation, starts operating with the institution of~ problem 
in an indeterminate situation. It is difficult to see how 
it can adjudicate in a conflict of aims and interests to 
determine~ problem. And unless we can determine the 
common problem, the talk of solution is useless. For, 
resolving the problem of one public to its satisfaction will 
create fresh and deeper problems for the other contesting 
publics. 
Dewey, we have seen, talks at great length about the 
necessity of instituting the correct problem, for he says, 
'A problem represents the partial transformation ••• of a 
problematic situation into a determinate situation•. Who 
besides the conflicting publics institute problems in a 
social situation? But what they institute is not~ problem, 
but their separate problems. Does the state, through its 
elected officials, namely, the government, institute the 
problem in those matters which come under its regulation? 
The elected government is, however, another public. Dewey 
harbours a big confusion in thinking that a government can, 
in such conflicting situations, act like the conductor of an 
orchestra without having some special music of its own to 
play. Anyway, what a democratic government actually does in 
such cases is too well-known, and is not the question. 
Suppose that the government is impartial and that it assesses 
objectively the •conditions and consequences' of the compet-
ing interests of the various publics. Does a convergence of 
the conflicting aims of the various publics automatically 
result from such assessments? Does the public interest or 
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the common good relating to the situation become convincingly 
revealed to the publics that they can now be persuaded to 
subordinate their special problems to the solution of a 
common problem? Dewey 1 s answer is consistent but of very 
little use. He tells us to have unswerving loyalty to the 
scientific method to solve all our social problems. But 
there are certain gaps, and we cannot be sure that his 
pattern of inquiry applies to a complex and conflicting 
social situation. 
The oversimplification becomes clearer when we look 
into Dewey's model of democratic society. It is framed on an 
analogy to the community of scientists working together 
using 1 a public and open method 1 • He writes, 
The contribution the scientific inquirer makes 
is collectively tested and developed and, in 
the measure that it is cooperatively confirmed, 
becomes a part of the common fund of the 
intellectual commonwealth. 
This emphasis on collective confirmation instead of recog-
nizing the specific methodology, i.e., the methods of 
verification as the distinguishing trait of the scientific 
pursuit of truth, may seem a little confusing, but let us 
try to follow Dewey's point. He says that the •operation 
of cooperative intelligence' as displayed by science in 1 a 
limited and relatively technical area' is the 'working model' 
of regulating 'the relation of human beings to one another 
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in social life and institutions•. He thinks that a community 
of scientists while allowing the individual his freedom, or 
rather promoting his creative freedom, allocates authority to 
the group, for 'the authority of science issues from and is 
based upon collective activity, cooperatively organized'. A 
democratic society will similarly operate on 'the working 
model of the union of freedom and authority• and will 
similarly depend upon the utilization of results 'which are 
the consequences of the method ••• of corporate intelligence 
embodied in science 1 • 24 
Now, what can be made out of this 'working model' of 
democracy? We need not question Dewey's image of a community 
of scientists at work, or introduce nonscientific issues -
like the desirability of making hydrogen bombs which the 
community could not scientifically settle. The point is, 
can we carry the analogy over to a larger society composed of 
many, many publics? Dewey's community of scientists, so far 
as their scientific pursuit is concerned, discusses common 
problems (or do not discuss at all), analyse the various 
issues in more or less common objective (experimentally 
determined) terms, their common interest lies in the solution 
24 
Dewey, "Science and Future of Societyn, in J. Ratner, (ed.), 
Intelligence in the Modern World, 359-361. 
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of their common problems. Can we now substitute a 'public' 
guarding and seeking to promote its own interests against 
antagonistic interests for the open-minded scientist 
dedicated to a common interest with other members of the 
community of scientists? What kind of community will it be? 
Why should the results 'which are the consequences' of the 
scientific method be binding to a public as it is to a 
scientist? Will not the public in playing the role of a 
scientific inquirer cease to be a public? And the 
scientific inquirer, as Dewey portrays him, is far removed 
from the pressure exerting public. In fact, the analogy 
seems too remote to be of any use. 
Once we get out of Dewey's vaguer complexities certain 
things can be seen to emerge quite clearly. Dewey thinks 
that the democratic 'faith' is entangled, in its old 
traditional form, with many obsolete ideas which are not 
scientifically grounded. Democracy, therefore, needs 
'reconstruction•. To keep in line with modern scientific 
and technological developments, it must be, he thinks, 
experimental and social. Certain values, like the tradition-
al ideas of individual rights and personal freedom must be 
reconstructed and be grounded on 'social' values. He writes, 
So long as freedom of thought and speech is 
claimed as a merely individual right, it will 
give way, as do other merely personal claims, 
when it is, or is successfully represe~ted to be, 
in opposition to the general welfare.2J 
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What is this 'general welfare'? Dewey's answer is that 
social conflicts 'are to be settled in the interest of the 
widest possible contribution to the interests of all - or 
t 1 t f th t · ·t' 26 G 1 lf . ht a eas o e grea maJori y. enera we are is w a 
Dewey calls 'the public interest', which he believes will 
prevail, when the scientific method is employed to resolve 
the social conflicts over special interests. Scientific 
method, we must repeat, is cooperative intelligence; and 
cooperative intelligence, being both social andacperimental, 
and also involving such prerequisites as free information 
and communication, is able to determine the interests of 
1 the people'. What Dewey wants to say is that so long as 
different publics are operating from prejudice, partisan-
ship, habit, unscientific ways of looking at things, they 
might naturally look at a conflicting situation With a view to 
seeking how their own special interests might be best con-
served. But if instead, they apply the scientific method, 
what this method of cooperative intelligence will give them 
will be a view of the public interest or general welfare; 
25 
Dewey, Liberalism and Social .Action, 66 . 26 
Ibid., 79. 
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and the conflicting publics will then readily see that they 
have arrived at a solution which transcends all interested 
and partial solution of the problem in question. 
Now, this clearly involves the assumption that there is 
'the public interest• - the kind of solution of a conflicting 
social situation which is the best possible solution for all 
the diverse interest groups affected. But there cannot be, 
in fact, any such solution that will, say, in the rather 
simpler issue of direct government aid to denominational 
schools, be the best solution for all the contending publics. 
Underlying this notion of a non-existent public or general 
interest there is also the asaumption that a solution which 
gives something to every individual or group concerned is 
morally better than a solution which gives much more to one 
or several groups, but to others less than they would have 
got from the first solution. But the assumption can be 
challenged, and on somewhat obvious grounds. Let us take 
such a case as the following one. Most of the countries in 
Asia, Africa and South America have quite limited resources 
in men, money and equipment for the purposes of introducing, 
say, universal primary education on modern lines throughout 
their respective countries. The resources a particular 
country might have to begin with can, however, be used in 
introducing such system of education in some limited selected 
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areas. The operation, to be effective and fruitful, can 
only be slowly and gradually extended over to other areas. 
What should a state do in such circumstances? Should it for 
the sake of general interest distribute its resources 
throughout the whole country to achieve in the end practically 
nothing nearer the objective, or should it be more concerned 
in the realization of the good or value, even though in a 
limited area , and therefore should begin with determined 
operations in carefully selected areas? The former type of 
solution (the wider sharing out, so to speak) can lead to a 
morally worse result: that is to the loss of values which is 
not compensated for by the fact that something at any rate 
is provided for everyone. It would, again, be reasonable to 
assume that there is a hierarchy of values, that all values 
are not on the same level, equally deserving to be 'realized'. 
The basic needs - for food, clothes and housing - of a 
minority suffering from the devastating effects of a flood 
or earthquake have priority over the demand for luxury or 
non-essential items by a great majority. Dewey does not seem 
to take these problems into consideration; he thinks of 
public interest in terms of the satisfactions of individuals 
or persons. As a result, his idea of general welfare and 
social good, despite all his polemic against old-fashioned 
individualism, remains thoroughly individualistic; it is in 
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the end no more than the sum of the satisfaction of a 
collection of individuals and separate groups. We shall see 
more of it as we proceed. 
Now, what Dewey is trying in attempting to connect the 
scientific method with the notion of public interest is to 
give a philosophical meaning to the idealogical content of 
democracy. The application of the scientific method - which 
is the method of evaluating all values - to determine the 
common interest of the entire community gives a basis for 
progressive social action. The basis is the •common good 1 • 
It is the (scientifically determined) ethical basis of 
reconstructed democracy. This is what Dewey seems to mean 
when he talks about the 'moral and ideal meaning' of the 
democratic way of life. 
The talk about the •reconstruction• of democracy, we 
can now clearly see, is primarily an attempt on Dewey's part 
to identify the principle of democracy with that of morality. 
It will be remembered that the identification of a political 
principle with a wider moral or rational principle is, more 
or less, what Rousseau, Hegel, and the neo-Hegelians, for 
example, Bosanquet in The ~hilosophical Theory of the State, 
attempted to do. It can be argued, we believe, that such 
attempts end in setting on the political throne a crowned 
abstraction, and are also, philosophically speaking, 
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foredoomed to failure. In Dewey's case, for example, it can 
be asked: how do men know what is the 'common good' or 'the 
public interest' - when it is probably no indifidual's or 
group's good or interest - that can be distinguished in its 
cooperative intent and purpose from the push and pull of 
fiercely competing interests? Can this public interest be 
determined by a positive standard so that it can become a 
legislative authority or a source of positive law, or provide 
a standpoint for social reconstruction? Dewey's answer, when 
it is not morally empty or practically equivocal, is that it 
is some 'adjustment' - intelligently engineered - that 
satisfies the 'great majority'. This may, relatively, appear 
to be somewhat articulate and may seem to indicate a shift 
from the opinion that would logically follow from his position. 
This may again seem to suggest that, politically speaking, 
Dewey is not losing the sovereign like Rousseau by pinning 
his faith on a 'general will' which no state can possibly 
find or recognize. 27 But the shift suggested by the use of 
the word 'majority' is only apparent and not real. 
27 
Hegel found fault with Rousseau for conceiving the 'general 
will' in the determinate form of individual will, as a common 
will proceeding out of the individual will. Hegel's 
universal will, on the other hand, is a pure metaphysical 
principle, the Absolute. Rousseau mixed up a political 
principle With metaphysics; Hegel mixed up the two the other 
way round. 
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Rousseau, it will be remembered, identified the general 
will with the good Will. General will, he explained, is the 
moral sovereign; it cannot err. Hegel's universal will of 
which the state is an aspect or an embodiment in time and 
place is absolutely rational will. Bosanquet spoke of liberty 
as 'being ourselves' or 1 willing ourselves' and identified 
it with 1 the life of the state• as Dewey seeks to identify 
individual liberty and personal freedom with something wider 
than ourselves - the 'social' values. But Bosanquet's 'life 
of the state• embodies, as he says, 'a nreal" or rational 
will'. Can Dewey, in terms of his philosophy, avoid the 
impossible identification of the •majority interest' - what-
ever it does mean - with the ethical 'common good 1 ? It is 
difficult to see how he can; for our moral obligation 
through our unswerving loyalty to the cooperative intelligence 
is to the 'adjustment' which satisfies the 'great majority'. 
What else can Dewey possibly mean by the 'interest' of 
the 'great majority'? He is ~ot obviously talking about the 
consensus on a wide range of matters one now finds in 
democratic states. Such consensus is important for a state 
to function democratically but it does not provide any 
definite standpoint for social action, progressive or other-
wise. Dewey, to be sure, does not talk of 'majority interest• 
decided by vote; ballot is an instrument of recording the 
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decision; the decision must be arrived at by the application 
of the scientific method. The interest of the great 
majority is, therefore, not something decided by the force 
of mere number, but something discovered, or as Dewey would 
say, 'constructed' rationally. But this does clearly pre-
suppose, as Schumpeter argues with regard to the concept of 
the will of the people, the •existence of a uniquely 
determined common good' that all people, a few stupids and 
rogues excepted, could agree on or be made to agree on by 
the force of rational arguement. 28 But scientific method, as 
we have already seen, cannot determine a value, far less a 
•common good'. And once we -recognize that there is nothing 
empirical or experimental about a postulated •common good', 
that it is rather an ethical maxim or a mystical hope, we 
clearly come to face some of the paradoxes of •traditional' 
political thinking centered around conceptions of moral 
standard and good life. 
There is, so it may seem today, a certain point in 
Rousseau's dangerous paradox that an individual can be 
28 
J.A. Schumpeter, Ca italism Social sm 
edit.), London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 
Dahl makes a similar point that the theory of 
democracy •consists only of logical relations 
postulates'. See his A Preface to Democratic 
University of Chicago Press, 1956, 34 ff. 
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forced to be free. But one can, philosophically speaking, 
always ask questions about the nature of the general will, 
or about Hegel's absolutely rational universal will, sub-
mission to which, paradoxically, amounts to self-rule. 
Since Dewey's scientific method cannot acquit itself of the 
task that his position imposes upon it, the whole conception 
of reconstructed democracy can now be seen suspended from a 
hook in the sky. In practical terms the theory comes to 
mean that 'the vote of the majority always binds all the 
rest' (Rousseau) or 1 the absolute sovereignty of the 
majority' (de Tocqueville). Dewey seems to be simply telling 
us to hitch our conscience to the time's strongesttrend. 29 
But sociologists and political theoriests have also been 
telling us over the years that the people at large do not 
29 
Commenting on the role of the progressives during America's entry into the First World War, Harold Stearns attacked Dewey's philosophical position thus: 'Succinctly, it was the method of compromise; ••• the method whereby one hopes to con-trol events by abandoning oneself to them •••• It is a philo-sophy so enamoured of mingling with the warm living stream of everyday that it turns with ferocity upon any claims for ethical resistance to the main current of events. It is typically American in the sense that it is a philosophy which is afraid to be alone•. Liberalism in America, Boni and Liveright, 1919, 183-4. See also, Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1952, Chs. XII and XIII; Morton G. White, Social Thought in America, New York, The Viking Press, 1949, Ch. XI; Arthur E. Murphy, "John Dewey and American Liberalism", The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LVII, No. 13, 23 June 1960, 420-436. 
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care much about the affairs of the state, and in the game of 
politics anything can get done in the name of 'the people'. 
One reason, apart from the ideological concern, why 
Dewey does not recognize some of the abvious gaps and short-
comings in his theory of democracy is probably his psycho-
logical approach to social relations and institutions. Dewey, 
as we have seen, is primarily concerned with 'desire', 
'interest', 'interaction', 'intelligence• - rather unstable 
psychological categories - in elucidating how men, conscious-
ly or unconsciously, build up social relations and all sorts 
of social organizations.3° Though Dewey thinks of social 
theories as instruments of social action, as plans to remove 
felt specific difficulties of the time, he is much less 
interested in a careful analysis of the forms of social 
organizations and the mechanisms of social actions as they 
objectively are. The point is, to offer a theory of social 
action, the latter, namely, an anatomy of social structures 
and types, and a systematic formulation of the mechanisms of 
social action, are no less necessary than a broad analysis 
of the psychological drives. This would have been a 
necessary corrective to Dew~y, and would have helped him to 
30 
This is, on the whole, true of American sociology during 
the first few decades of this century. 
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see some of his own shortcomings. Dewey never, for example, 
takes the trouble of distinguishing society and state 
clearly. The state is a public, he tells us; but its 
relation to the elected government, another public, is never 
brought out clearly. He defines the public as 'interest 
groups', while 'all the time referring disparagingly to the 
'pressure groups' that operate in democratic countries. How 
would his 'publics' function in a society? He talks of 
binding •special interests• of social groups. What are the 
interests that usually bind individuals? What are generally 
the characteristics of the social groups and the character 
of their respective ties? What sort of interests can be 
found to be commonly shared by the various groµps? In other 
words, what can be the common goals? Can the public interest 
or the interest of the great majority have the intensity that 
it will be preferred by the various publics to their own 
special interests? Some of Edward Shils' sociological 
analysis seem particularly relevant here. Shils argues that 
the 'primary groups• in a pluralistic society are generally 
bound by 'primordial, personal and sacred' ties, that they 
are characterized by an extreme 'we-consciousness' within 
their respective groups with only a 'modicum of attachment' 
to the common value system of the larger social organization. 
Intense participation by the primary groups in a central core 
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of ultimate values is, as he says, 'not the spirit of the 
primary group•.31 Now, the kind of society Dewey seems to 
be envisaging - a great majority integrated around a common 
core of ethical values ('public interest' dressed as the 
ethical 'common good') is, if we follow Shils' arguments in 
The Torment of Secrecy, bound to be destructive of liberty 
and other values. 
What, again, are the institutional methods of arriving 
at decisions in matters of public affairs? Dewey only 
suggests free information and com.rnunication, discussion and 
debate, and participation by all. What sort of institutional 
arrangements are necessary to ensure all these? Dewey seems 
to dislike 'consolidated factions' under the name of 
political parties, and the political leaders. But, who in 
their absence will raise issues, bring proposals for change, 
take sides in conflicting issues to make discussion and 
debate possible? Dewey also talks of discarding 'established 
political forms tied up with' older institutions. He writes, 
There is no sanctity in universal suffrage, 
frequent elections, majority rule, congressional 
and cabinet government. These things are 
devices evolved in the direction in which the 
current was moving •••• In this retrospective 
glance, it is possible; however, to see how the 
doctrinal formulations which accompanied them 
31
Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties", 
British Journal of Sociology, Vol. VIII, 1957, 130-145. See 
also, R.A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, 50-51. 
were inadequate, one-sided and positively 
erroneous. In fact they were hardly more 
than political war-cries •••• The doctrines 
served a particular local pragmatic need. 
But ••• they lived to cumber the political 
ground, obstructing progress •••• No wonder 32 they call urgently for revision and displacement. 
2~ 
But one may wonder why Dewey talks disparagingly of devices 
which evolved in the direction in which the current was 
moving, and of doctrines that served certain specific needs. 
Anyway, what are Dewey's substitutes? What new devices must 
we formulate to give Dewey's democratic theory an experimental 
try? Dewey does not say a word. But these things he should 
have taken into account and should have marshalled together 
by broad formulations that alone can correlate the various 
parts of a social theory together. Dewey's social theory 
lacks the analytical unity - interdependence of the various 
parts - so characteristic of the theories of Plato and Marx. 
Democracy is for Dewey a moral commitment, but he is no 
revolutionary. He believes in gradualism and reform, in 
tackling specific problems by peaceful means. He tel ls us 
that all social and political decisions are hypothetical i n 
nature, and they must be experimented with before finally 
accepted. This could be difficult, for many social and 
political decisions of fateful importance are of a nature 
32 
Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, 144-6. 
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that makes it impossible for the public to experiment With 
them at moderate cost. Even if that is possible, however, 
final decision is not easy to arrive at because effects are 
not easy to interpret. Anyway, Dewey believes in the 
experimental approach to specific problems, in gradual recon-
struction by intelligent method. Now, we are aware that in 
the democratic countries practical politics are concerned more 
or less with limited objectives and adjustments. But the 
practice of getting things done by way of piecemeal adjust-
ments presupposes a wide and strong consensus on principles 
and\Qlues, on political forms and institutions, that always 
keeps social and political conflicts within botmds. But 
Dewey's programme of change, if the passage quoted in the 
preceding paragraph is any indication, seems to be a very 
radical one. He calls for urgent 'revision and displacement' 
of some very important structural features of the existing 
democratic system. The relevance of a policy of gradual 
reform and experimentalism to this sort of radical programme 
is far from clear. 
There is also another approach from which it can be 
argued that Dewey carmot accept limited goals and types of 
social and political change as ends-in-view without deviating 
from the standpoint that would logically follow from his 
position. The pursuit of limited objectives usually means 
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the mitigation of the grievances of one public against 
another or against the rest, like safeguarding and promoting 
the interests of the school teachers against the school 
boards or the state. There is the question how does one 
know what is the public interest or the interest of the great 
majority in this matter, which alone is the standpoint of all 
progressive social and political actions. The point is, a 
social or political reformer takes sides as Dewey himself 
took sides on social and political issues throughout his 
long career. We can see, for example, Dewey talking of con-
flicting interests of two classes - 'a small class having a 
highly privileged position maintained at the expense' of the 
other class 'the masses'. He says, 'Everything that is said 
about the reality of the conflict between these two groups I 
believe to be true'. He then asks the teachers that they 
'as a body do and must make a choice between these opposed 
social orientations and all they practically imply'.33 For 
the progressive social reformer 'the public' has become 1 the 
masses' and the business of the cooperative intelligence is 
to take their side against the privileged class which opposes 
them. So long as there are _underprivileged masses or classes, 
the liberal-progressive can on their behalf wage a relentless 
33 
Dewey, Problems of Men, BO~ 
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war against the firmly entrenched 'special interests'; and 
fighting for the rights of the underprivileged can be 
plausibly dignified as that for rights for all alike.34 But 
this is clearly far short of the promise Dewey 1 s method -
'the adoption of the scientific habit of mind in application 
to social affairs' - held before us. The cooperative intel-
ligence in action, in trying to remove a 'suffering' or a 
'form of constraint' of some class or group, is seeking an 
adjustment whose necessity is felt in the circumstances. Its 
connection with the postulated 'common good' of the democratic 
way of life is a matter of faith and hope. We thus come to 
see the gulf between Dewey's doctrine and practice. The 
point is: faith in a postulated common good is a mighty 
weapon in the hands of a revolutionary seeking a total trans-
formation, but to a gradual reformer working for a certain 
adjustment here and there the justification is always a 
little too far. 
To sum up. Dewey seems to think that experimentalism 
and democracy are mutually justificatory, as well as 
justificatory of all sorts of ends-in-view. Consequently, he 
seems to suggest that any one of them can conveniently be the 
34 
See Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, 48 ff. See also, 
A.E. Murphy, "John Dewey and American Liberalism", loc. cit. 
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yardstick of measurement in assessing the value of any con-
templated end-in-view. Of the questions: does it encourage 
experimentalism? does it promote democracy? only one need be 
asked at a time; for it is assumed that what encourages 
experimentalism also promotes democracy and vice versg. The 
upshot of the foregoing discussion is that the assumption is 
groundless. We could not see any real connection or point 
of contact between the scientific method and the notion of 
•common good', between experimentalism and democratic faith. 
CHAPTER VIII 
EDUCATION AS GROWTH 
The general principles of Dewey's theory of education 
can be described in a number of ways. One of the~,suggested 
and worked upon by Dewey himself, would consist of a series 
of alternative proposals in which the traditional old ideas 
about education are contrasted With the progressive newer 
ideas. There is, obviously, a certain danger in presenting 
even opposing principles as a set of clear disjunctions, for 
that might encourage a strict either-or approach which, as 
Dewey reminds us in his later writings, is never really 
meant or intended. Keeping this in mind we shall begin by 
quoting a passage from Dewey's latest work on education 
where he contrasts the old education with the newer. 
To imposition from above is opposed expression and 
cultivation of individuality; to learning from 
texts and teachers, learning through experience; 
to acquisition of isolated skills and techniques 
by drill is opposed acquisition of them as means 
of attaining ends which make direct vital appeal; 
to preparation for a more or less remote future is 
opposed making the most of the opportunities of 
present life; to static aims and materials is op-
posed acquaintance with a changing world. 1 
1Dewey, Experience and Education, 5-6. 
2~ 
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It hardly needs to be said that the ideas behind the 
progressive education are not wholly or entirely Dewey's own 
formulations. They can be traced back to the revolution in 
education since the time of Rousseau. Many of these ideas 
were known and were operating in the U.S.A. before Dewey 
founded his Laboratory School at the University of Chicago 
in 1896. Dewey was positively influenced by the educational 
practice of Francis W. Parker (an account of which is given 
by Lelia E. Patrick in The Quincy Methods, New York, 1885), 
Anna E. Bryan's reformed kindergarten, and the Herbartians, 
particularly Charles and Frank McMurry. We need not, however, 
go into the details of the background situation, 2 for Dewey's 
major contribution to educational thought lies in what the 
background practices clearly lacked, namely, an adequate 
theory of education purporting to be based systematically on 
a distinct philosophical outlook. In presenting the general 
principles of his educational.theory, Dewey tells us that they 
2 
For an analysis of the background situation, see William H. Kilpatrick, "Dewey's Influence on Education", in P. A. Schilpp, (ed.), The Philosophy of John Dewey, lt47-473; Merle Curti, Te Soc·a1 Id s of Amer an Edu tors, New Jersey, Pageant Books, Inc., 19 9, 99 ff; ~.F. Butts, A Cultural History of Education, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc., 1947; L.A. Cremin, 0 The Progressive Movement in American Education:A Perspective", Harvard Educat1onal Review, Vol. XXVII, 1957, 251-270. 
do not themselves solve any of the problems of the 
actual or practical conduct and management of pro-
gressive schools. Rather, they set new problems 
which have to be worked out on the basis of a new 
philosophy of experience.3 
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It is, in fact, comparatively easy to see the ground and 
the appeal of the general principles of Dewey's educational 
programme. One of his major points is that education is not 
a preparation for living, nor any one aspect of living, such 
as the acquisition of knowledge or skill, but is life itself. 
Life is experience, and the key concept in education is 
experience in the sense of a process and transaction. 'Edu-
cation is one with life'. This may appear somewhat vague, 
more on account of the narrow meaning we ordinarily attach to 
the term education. Dewey would say - and of course we know 
- that a child begins to learn practically from the moment of 
its birth; by the time it goes to a school to begin formal 
education it has already learned a vast number of things. It 
has learned things informally, as a member of a family, 
through what might be generally described as social activity. 
Before the advent of the industrial revolution and the 
resulting complex civilization most children used to get all 
· their education in this manner through direct participation in 
the activities that went on in the environment. The factory 
3 
Dewey, Experience and Education, 9. 
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system, Dewey says, has replaced 'the household and 
neighborhood system' wherein, for example, 'the clothing 
worn was for the most part made in the house'. The members 
of the household, he goes on to explain, were familiar with 
the shearing of the sheep, the carding and spinning of the 
wool, and the plying of the loom. All the household goods, 
food, building materials, etc., were fashioned in the house 
or produced in the immediate neighbourhood 'in shops which 
were constantly open to inspection and often centers of 
neighborhood congregation'. In such economy children used 
to learn what these things were by direct experience, by 
participating in the activities which produced them. 
The children, as they gained in strength and 
capacity, were gradually initiated into the 
mysteries of the several processes. It was a 
matter of immediate and personal conc~rn, even 
to the point of actual participation.~ 
Dewey goes on to tell us about the 'factors of discipline 
and of character-building' involved in this kind of life. 
There was always someth~ng needed to be done in cooperation 
with other members of the household or neighbourhood. There 
was the opportunity to have an intimate acquaintance with 
nature at first hand, with real things and materials, with 
4 
Dewey, Tee Slhool and Societ~, The University of Chicago Press, 19 9, -7. 
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actual processes of their production and manipulation and 
the knowledge of their social uses. The developed factory 
system of our time, Dewey points out, has robbed the household 
and the immediate neighbourhood of such opportunities for 
the young to learn its way about as a social being through 
directlf experiencing ~nd sharing in the activities of the 
community. In consequence, Dewey believes, a greater burden 
has been thrust upon the formal schools in the industrializ-
ed societies. 
But the traditional type school, Dewey maintains, has 
devoted itself almost exclusively to reading, writing, and 
the like - the means of acquiring knowledge (in the tradition-
al sense). For reasons of expediency items of such knowledge 
have usually been imparted abstractly, that is to say, with 
no allusion to their relevance to the concrete situations in 
life; and a passive receptivity on the learner's part has 
been regarded as a virtue. As a result, the school has been 
far removed from a genuine form of active life; it has been 
•a place set apart in which to learn lessons'. In the 
traditional type school, Dewey observes, children therefore 
did not like their school tasks. 
The evils of old education, Dewey now tells us, are the 
'results which have flowed from' the dualism of traditional 
philosophy. The dualism of mind and body, for example has a 
number of striking effects on educational practice. Since 
bodily activity is thought to have nothing to do with mental 
activity, the former becomes an intruder, a distraction, an 
evil to be contended with. Bodily activities are not utiliz-
ed in occupation with things, instead they are thought to 
lead the pupil away from the lesson with which his mind ought 
to be occupied. The teacher in the traditional type school 
therefore spent most of his time on the 'problem of discipline• 
- in suppressing the bodily activities which take the mind 
away from its material. The senses, eyes, ears, hands, vocal 
organs and muscles, which are required even for the applica-
tion of the mind, •are used not as organic participants in 
having an instructive experience, but as external inlets and 
outlets of mind'. On the intellectual side, this separation 
of mental activity from direct occupation with things 1 throws 
I emphasis on thing§ at the expense of relations or connections'.· 
In Dewey 1 s view, a thing cannot be properly known without 
determining its bearings, use, cause and consequences, that 
is to say, relations and connections. Dewey therefore 
believes that the traditional type schools in attending 
exclusively to children's intellectual development do an 
unprofitable thing for the great majority, and they, due to 
5 
See Dewey, Democracy and Education, 165-9. 
a very narrow and •unscientific• notion of intellectual 
activity, do even this in a wrong way. 
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Dewey advocates a type of school which he believes will 
lead the children naturally into the activities that go on 
in the modern industrialized societies. Schooling will 
socialize the growing child; learning activities will bring 
home the importance of those activities which are socially 
useful; education will teach the need and utility of social 
cooperation. The process of education will be such that it 
will not raise any barrier between the natural interest and 
activity of the child and the1Baching of curricula. The 
activities in the school will be planned and organized in 
such a way that there will be no discontinuity between the 
experienceswlthin the school and that in the society outside. 
Dewey holds that educational experience, like all experience, 
is a continuous process, a series of transactions, and in 
that sense active. The experiencing child is not just a 
passive receiver of lessons but an active participant in the 
situations that hold his interest and attention, and demand 
purposive activity to cope With. The school will, therefore, 
so arrange its programmes t~at the young are provided with 
every opportunity to engage in activities which are educative. 
Dewey offers the following criteria to judge the educational 
value or worth of an activity: 
We may say that the kind of experience to which the work of the schools should contribute is one marked 
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by executive competency in the management of resources and obstacles encountered (efficiency); by sociabil-ity, or interest in the direct companionship of others; by aesthetic taste or capacity to appreciate artistic excellence in at least some of its classic forms; by trained intellectual method, or interest in some mode of scientific achievement; and by sensitiveness to the rights and claims of others - conscientiousness.6 
These are, Dewey tells us in the same context, not to be taken 
as •standards for the valuation of concrete topics and 
process of education•. These are, he says, •a survey of aims' 
sufficiently wide to give breadth and flexibility to the 
enterprise of education. These 1 aims 1 are abstractions or 
generalizations which sum up a multitude of particular 
•concrete goods' found in the •specific realization' of 
experienced situations. But these aims or values are not to 
be regarded as 'ultimate ends 1 to which 1 the concrete satis-
faction of experiences are subordinate'. What does all this 
mean? Dewey seems to give us, on the one hand, a set of 
criteria based, as he says, upon the concrete goods of 
experienced situations to determine the educational worth of 
an activity, while on the other hand, he tells us that these 
surveyed aims are not really aims, these criteria are not 
really 'standards for the valuation of concrete topics and 
process of education•, that 'the concrete satisfaction of 
6 
Ibid., 285-6. 
266 
experiences are not subordinate to the •concrete goods 1 
found in the specific realization' of experienced situations. 
If all these seem somewhat paradoxica~, they are nonetheless 
revealing. Dewey does not want to set any 1 aim 1 for educa-
tion. He does not want to make the concrete experiences of 
the pupil subordinate to any predetermined educational goal. 
But there is then the problem: what is deliberate education? 
For Dewey education is not a preparation for the future, 
not a movement towards any fixed goal. Education is a contin-
uous enrichment of experience, and any 'specific realization• 
of experience is as valuable as any other. Education is, 
therefore, a process; we cannot get an education or have an 
education, we can continuously engage ourselves in educational 
activities. Education is continuous growing; like growth, it 
is not having an end, but being an end. 'Since in reality 
there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth, 
there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more 
education•. 7 This seems to mean that education like growth is 
so fundamental that it needs no external or ulterior warrant 
for its justification. 
7 
Our net conclusion [Dewey says] is that life is 
development, and that developing, growing, is life 
Translated into educational equivalents, this means 
Ibid., 60. 
(i) that the educational process has no end beyond 
itself; it is its own end; and that (ii) the 
educational process is one of cont8nual reorganiz-ing, reconstructing, transforming. 
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This and similar passages seem to imply that education 1 is a 
good in and of itself. It is an absolute•. 9 But this does 
not at all explain what sorts of ecperience are educative and 
why are they so. Commenting on this passage John L. Childs, 
an ardent follower of Dewey, admits, 
This conception of education as its own end has been 
found to possess a certain ambiguity •••• Put in 
this extreme form, the principle signifies the 
negation of adult guidance, and is thus contradict-
ory to the very essence of deliberate education.10 
Let us explain the difficulty fully. 
For Dewey 1 growth 1 is the only goal and the only moral 
end. Dewey speaks of education as growth in the sense of 
continuous growing. What does this mean? The growth 
metaphor, as Black points out, •was once the fitting expres-
sion of revolt against a repressive authoritarianism• in 
education. 11 As Israel Scheffler explains, there is an 
8 
Ibid., 59. 
9J.S. Brubacher, "The Absolutism of Progressive and Democrat-
ic Education", School and Society, Vol. LIII, 3. 10 
John L. Childs, "The Educational Philosophy of John Dewey", 
in P.A. Schilpp, (ed.), The Philosophy of John Dewey, 44-3. 11 · 
See M. Black, 'Education as Art and Discipline", Ethics, 
Vol. LIV, 1943-44, 290 . 
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obvious similarity between the growing child and the growing 
plant . In both cases the biological aspects of development 
go through stages or phases which are relatively independent 
of the wishes and efforts of the teacher or gardener. The 
teacher or the gardener can, however, be helpful. They can 
provide the optimum conditbns for natural growth. Where such 
conditions are provided, we can reasonably expect that 
natural development will take place stage by stage. The 
growth m~taphor seems plausible, as Israel Scheffler 
suggests, 'with respect to certain aspects of the develop-
ment of children, that is, the biological or constitutional 
aspects• . 12 But this biological , that is to say, physical or 
constitutional development with age and through proper 
nourishment is obviously not what Dewey intends to mean by 
educational growth. His criteria of education, as we have 
seen in a passage quoted earlier, are development of execu-
tive competency, aesthetic taste, interest in scientific 
achievement, sensitiveness to the rights and claims of others, 
and so on and so forth. These clearly suggest that educa-
tional development, according to him, is not the unfolding 
of natural stages of biological or intellectual growth under 
favourable conditions. Since according to Dewey there is 
12 
Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education, Charles C. 
Thomas, 1960, 49. 
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nothing native to human nature, education must involve in 
terms of his own criteria determination of direction. And 
it is here that the growth metaphor breaks down. As 
Scheffler points out, 
If we once ask • • • toward what the temperamental 
energy of the child is to be directed, what sorts 
of conduct and what types of sensitivity are to be 
fostered, we begin to see the limits of the 
growth metaphor.13 
Speaking of education as growth or taking the proces~ 
of education itself as the end, does not solve the concrete 
problems of deliberate education. Such expressions seem 
rather barren, vacuous. If, as Dewey says, the value of an 
experience, say, a curriculum or any particular subject, is 
instrumental or relative to something else, how do we judge 
the value of the curriculum or the subject unless we know 
whether that something else is valuable or not? In 
Democracy a,nd Education, while discussing 'Educational Values', 
Dewey comes to face this problem. He recognizes that in the 
run of instrumental values at some point we must call a halt. 
He says, 
For we cannot stop asking the question about an 
instrumental good, one whose value lies in its 
beingg>od for something, tmless there is at some 
point something intrinsically good, good for itself.14 
13Ib"d 50 
-=----1-., . 14- - . 
Dewey, Democracy and Education, 283. 
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He immediately goes on to assure us that there are some such 
goods, that •some goods are not good for anything; they are 
just goods'. This will no doubt appear a little strange; in 
his theory of valuation Dewey has been persistently refusing 
to admit of any object or phase of life as 1 just good'. 
Anyway, what does Dewey consider to be a •just good 1 , in 
educational pursuit? He says, 
As long as any topic makes an immediate appeal, 
it is not necessary to ask what i is good for 
•••• The proof of a good is found in the fact 
that the pupil responds; his response ,ll use. 
His response to the material shows that the sub-ject functions in his life.15 
Dewey seems to imply that any subject or topic or material 
that has an immediate appeal to the child, or anything to 
which the child eagerly responds, is a value in itself. It 
is not necessary in such eases, as he says, for the teacher 
or pupil to point out some definite assignable future use to 
which it is to be put to justify its value. This may, 
however, remind one of some of the well-known caricatures of 
the 'progressive' class-room. 
15 
The teacher comes in smiling and pleasant, thereby 
hoping to win the confidence and co-operation of 
her students. 0 What shall we do today, children? 3 
she says. When somebqdy suggests Cops and Robbers, 
••• the teacher gently insinuates the suggestion 
Ibid., 283-4-. 
that perhaps the children should enact one of 16 the great battles. And so it goes with history. 
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Such caricatures are, however, very close to what a progress-
ive class-room is expected to be. Close, but Dewey would say, 
a rather poor picture of what he stood for in education. 
There is, he would say, an important difference. 
Dewey tries to bring out this difference by contrasting 
his own principles of ('newer') education with both 1 old 1 
and •new' education. He writes, 
Just as, upon the whole, it was the weakness of 
the "old education" that it made invidious com-
parisons between the immaturity of the child and 
the maturity of the adult, regarding the former 
as something to be got away from as soon as 
possible and as much as possible, so it is the 
danger of the "new education" that it regard the 
child's present powers and interests as something 
finally significant in themselves. 17 
Dewey does not believe that a child of a given age 'has a 
positive equipment of purpose and interests to be cultivated 
just as they stand'. He, in fact, points out the danger of 
taking the idea of development in 'altogether too formal and 
empty way'. The child cannot think or work things out for 
16 
N.M. Lawrence1 "Education as Social Process 0 , in C.W. Hendel, (ed.), Jo D w a h E er·me t 1 S · r· ·n 
Philosoph~, New York, The Liberal Art Press, 19 9, 3. 17 
Dewey, The CW.ld and the Curricu~, published with The 
School and Society, Chicago, 1956, 1 • 
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himself 'without being supplied ••• environing conditions 
which are requisite to start and guide thought'. Guidance 
is rather crucial, for development of experience and into 
experience means, as he says, achieving that which is 
•really wanted'. This requires that selected educative 
medium, that is, suitable experiences be provided for the 
development of 'powers and interests that have been selected 
as valuable'. The problem of direction in education is thus 
the 'problem of selecting appropriate stimuli' for the 
development of powers and interests, instincts and impulses 
'which it is desired to employ in the gaining of new 
experience•. But there is still the problem of determining 
what new experiences are desirable. The child does not know 
them, nor how best he could attain them. Dewey is driven to 
conclude, 
What new experiences are desirable, and thus what 
stimuli are needed, it is impossible to tell 
except as there is some comprehension of the 
development which is aimed at; except, in a word, 
as the adult knowledge is drawn upon as
8
revealing 
the possible career open to the child.1 
But, is not Dewey clearly trying to have things both 
ways? On the one hand, he is teiling us that educational 
activity is not aimed at preparing the child for any future 
18 
Ibid., 17-18. 
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goal, while on the other hand, he is nonetheless concerned 
about the effects of present experiences upon the future. He 
tells us that for educational purposes what is desired by the 
child, that is, what is of immediate interest to him, is the 
'just good' and it is not necessary to ask what it is good 
for, while at the same time exhorting the teacher that 1 it is 
his business to arrange for the kind of experiences which are 
more than immediately en~oyable since they promote having 
desirable future experiences 1 • 19 Here the cake is had and 
eaten! But why? 
Dewey's philosophy prevents him from asserting anything 
definitely to be the end of the process of education. He is, 
therefore, continually preoccupied with the satisfaction of 
the present experience of the children. But mere satisfaction 
of present experience, he seems to realize, lacks the very 
essence of deliberate education. The immature cannot be 
left exclusively to their own trial and error experiences. 
Direction and guidance by the adult are, therefore, 
necessary. But matters of direction cannot be left to adult 
whims either. The teachers, most of them, may not be 
19 
Dewey, Experience and Education, 16. , C.D. Hardie misses the point when he interprets the 'desirable' in this passage as meaning what is desir~. His conclusion about 'what Dewey actually means' is, therefore, incorrect. See Truth and Fallac~ in Educational Theorx, Cambridge University Press, 1942, 2. 
philosophically competent to construct or reconstruct the 
desirable. Dewey, therefore, formulates the set of criteria 
to help the teacher determine the educational worth of activ-
ities. But why must one accept these criteria? How is the 
'survey of aims' conducted, and the directive 'values' con-
structed? Are they not culturally determined? Is then there 
any sense in describing them as criteria of education as such? 
If one believes in Dewey's philosophical position that ends 
and standards of life are constructed from within the 
process of on-going experiences, why should one accept a set 
model of aims? And when one so does, how does this approach 
to educational goals differ from the traditional approach, 
except probably in the nature of goals sought? 
Anyway, Dewey's theory requires that the teacher knows 
the desirable. What his educational practice probably means 
is that the teacher must not consider the d·esirable aims as 
something to be realized at the expense of children's present 
satisfaction. Instead, she should introduce the desirable 
through subjects, topics, materials and methods which are 
appealing, interesting, and therefore desired by the children. 
Individual care should be ta..}:cen, and every child should be 
encouraged to tackle problems posed for him by his own 
interest; but the materials and method are to be so provided 
that they not only help the child to work out the solution and 
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learn, but also that they direct his interest and experience 
in the desirable direction. The point is that the child 
must not feel that anything - even the desirable - is 
arbitrarily imposed on him. His sense of freedom must not 
be affected; his initiatives in the organization of 
class-room activities must be encouraged. The 'business of 
the educator is to see in what direction an experience is 
heading'. The adult educator evaluates each experience of 
the young in a way in which the one having less mature 
experience cannot do. The necessary guidance in each case 
is to be provided intelligently, through organization of the 
conditions of the experience of the immature to enable him 
to discover for himself the solution of his own problem in 
the desirable direction. 
There is, of course, the question of method, the how of 
education, which our foregoing discussion skirted, advisedly, 
but With difficulty. Our purpose so farms been to focus on 
the basic issue of deliberate education, i.e., the problem of 
direction and guidance. In Dewey's writings this issue is 
often obscured by his use of the growth metaphor and such 
morally equivocal definition of growth as the 'cumulative 
movement of action toward later result', and also by such 
other ambiguous expressions as that 'educational process has 
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no end beyond itself; it is its own end 1 • 20 We can now see 
that Dewey recognizes the fact that deliberate education 
involves the question of direction, that after all it is con-
cerned with the desirable. Dewey could not even help telling 
us in an obliaue fashion what the desirable is for education • 
• 
But anyway, he also insisted that there could be no fixed and 
rigid goals. Philosophically, the desirable is to be con-
structed from within the on-going process of transactions 
through the application and use of intelligent method. In 
other words, the direction of educational activities is to 
be determined through the operation of the educational method. 
We are therefore aware that Dewey would, from his point of 
view, object to our _foregoing discussion if in dis·cussing the 
question of aims of education we took aims as separable from 
the means. The 'criteria of aims•, he would tell us, are to 
be taken in their proper context, that is, the functioning 
of the school within a social matrix. The aims or values 
are, he would say, the outcome of transactions involving 
intelligent creatures and their environment; and their 
character can be found and understood in that context. In 
Dewey's view the distinction between ends and means, aims 
and method, theory and practice, are not worth draWing. 
20 
Dewey, Democracy and Education, 49, 59. 
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'The only distinction worth drawing is ••• between those modes 
of practice that are not intelligent, not inherently and 
immediately enjoyable, and those which are full of enjoyed 
meanings 1 • 21 Educational activity, Dewey would tell us, is 
intelligent activity, activity based on inquiry or reflective 
thinking. This is the unique character of human activity, and 
it is the proper organization of such activities that makes 
an association a school. The concept of method - intelligent 
method or method of intelligence or the scientific method -
is central to Dewey's theory of valuation and of education. 
The most important point about Dewey's philosophy of 
education is, therefore, the how of education. The function-
ing of a school or that of a class-room is not controlled by 
philosophically or otherwise predetermined goals. It is the 
method of functioning that matters, for control of direction 
•resides in the very nature of the work done 1 • 22 
We cannot possibly deal here with all the aspects of 
Dewey's 'activity method' or with such other details as to 
its application to specific subjects like arithmetic and 
history. We shall, therefore, try to expound and examine the 
21 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, 358. 
22 
See Dewey, Experience and Education, 60 f. 
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method in a general way with a view to determining how far 
it rests upon Dewey's philosophical theories and to what 
extent it fulfils his social objectives. Dewey's technical 
definition of education as 'the continuous reconstruction of 
experience' is, as he says, rooted in his philosophy of 
experience. If it is so, what is this education like? Human 
experience takes place within a social matrix. Educational 
experience is a social process in a more significant way. It 
is through education that a society perpetuates its hopes, 
standards, opinions and ideals. Education is a task directed 
not by personal interest but by social need. Dewey's 
philosophical interest in the problems of education is due to 
his concern with wider social welfare - the promotion of the 
democratic way of life. The democratic way of life can be 
increasingly realized only through continued reconstruction of 
its values. This is not possible unless individual intelli-
gence learns functioning in a social context. The business 
of schooling is, therefore, a vital affair for the philosophy 
of social reconstruction. 
We may begin from the philosophical root. Dewey 
develops his theory of knowledge from a starting point which 
is essentially different from the usual one found in most 
epistemological theories. He is, for example, much less con-
cerned with the usual epistemological questions like: How can 
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we know? and what can we know? He instead concentrates 
mainly on the methods we employ to obtain knowledge: What 
are the processes through which we arrive at knowledge? 
What is the process or pattern of successful inquiry? His 
analysis of the pattern of inquiry leads him to think that 
an intelligence functions or operates only when presented 
with situations which are indeterminate or problematic. He 
also comes to believe that effective thinking, which means 
the actual transformation of the problematic situation is 
possible only by the use of the experimental method. When 
applied to educational practice these mean not only a 
criticism of book learning, recitation and drill as methods 
of education, but a new theory about learning. 
One important feature of this new theory of learning 
is tha~ learning is concerned solely with the new, the novel. 
A familiar object or event does not present a problem; it 
raises no difficulties for the intelligence. Re cognition of 
anything that has already been learnt involves no reflection 
or inquiry. In such recognition there is 1 no judgment and 
no idea proper 3 , and it is not learning. 23 Dewey tells us 
that 1 in modern science, le~rning is finding out what 
nobody has previously known•. 24 In ordinary educational 
23
see Dewey, How We 
24D E . ewey, xperience 
Experimental Logic, 
Think, 110. 
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practice learning means the same except for a slight 
difference about the previously known. The child of three 
who discovers what can be done with blocks, or of six who 
finds out what we can make by putting six pence and six pence 
together, is in fact discovering something new •even though 
everybody else in the world knows it '. We can naturally 
ask, what of the innumerable cases in which some facts are 
well-established? Is there not intelligible sense in which 
we can say, for example, that one can learn the well-known 
facts about gravitation or the composition of water? Dewey 
does not deny the possibility, but he makes the point that 
it must be of the nature of discovery. The criterion of 
learning is that the student must grasp afresp the problem 
out of which the item of knowledge originally emerged. He 
must, in a way, go through the whole process of inquiry, and 
perceive the bearings the problem has upon the solution. 
The next step is somewhat obvious. Dewey identifies 
learning with knowing. Knowledge, according to him, is the 
out-come of the process of inquiry. It is an affair, as he 
says, 'of making sure, not of grasping antecedently given 
sureties•. Learning is the same. Learning does not mean the 
awareness of a fact, or the ability to remember and recall 
things or events with complete accuracy; it does not mean 
accumulation Of information. In learning, as in knowing, one 
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must have some purposive part in the production of the 
discovered item of knowledge. But does this mean that 
acquisition and accumulation of information is just useless? 
Again, Dewey does not mean that; he rather tries to relate 
information to knowing and learning. He says, '"Knowledge", 
in the sense of information, means the working capital, the 
indispensable resources, of furt~er inquiry; of finding out, 
or learning, more things'. What Dewey opposes is taking 
information 1 as an end itself'; this static, cold-storage 
ideal of learning and knowing is, in his view, 'inimical to 
educative development ••• it swamps thinking•. 25 
Dewey finds it easy to explain motivation in learning 
in terms of his theory of knowing. One cannot learn unless 
one has a desire for learning. A desire can arise only when 
an impulse is impeded. One cannot be interested in learning, 
say, arithmetic or geography unless he faces a problem in not 
knowing it, unless his impulse or activity is blocked or 
hampered due to his lack of arithmetical 0 or geographical 
knowledge. A pupil cannot persistently strive to learn the 
meanings of things unless he is made to feel or encounter 
problems in his ignorance. The task of the teacher is, 
therefore, to keep the pupils engaged with problems. The 
25 
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teacher must, however, exercise caution as to the degree of 
difficulty; if the problems are too familiar, the pupil will 
lose interest; if on the other hand, they are baffling, he 
will be discouraged. The class-room activities are to be 
planned and organized in such ways - experience presented as 
a mixture of the familiar and the precarious - that the 
pupils derive immediate satisfaction out of problem-solving 
and learn 'through the experience of consequences•. Dewey 
sums up the several phases of the 'problem method' in the 
following passage. 
The important thing is that thinking is the method 
of an educative experience. The essentials of 
method are therefore identical with the essentials 
of reflection. They are first that the pupil have 
a genuine situation of experience - that there be 
a continuous activity in which he is interested for 
its own sake; secondly, that a genuine problem 
develop within this situation as a stimulus to 
thought; third, that he possess the information and 
make the observations needed to deal with it; 
fourth, that suggested solutions occur to him which 
he shall be responsible for developing in an 
orderly way; fifth, that we have opportunity and 
occasion to test his ideas by application, to make 
their meaning cl~ar and to discover for himself 
their validity.26 
Before touching upon the one other important feature of 
the method, we may at this stage make a few observations. 
There is little doubt that Dewey's formulation of the 
structure of the problem-solving. method is firmly based on 
26 
Ibid., 192. 
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his metaphysical and epistemological principles. But there 
can be doubts as to what this business of problem-solving 
exactly means as a method of learning and teaching. Dewey 
seems to push the analogy between his notion of experimental 
or scientific knowing and learning a little too far. The 
child or the immature learner is obviously not a little 
scientist. A scientist comes to experimentation after a 
long and rigorous apprenticeship; he does not select problems 
just in response to his needs; the needs are to a great extent 
presented and determined by the discipline he serves. A 
child or a beginner cannot be expected to see problems easily, 
or when he sees problems to seek their solutions independently. 
Dewey would say that the child needs to be presented with 
problematic materials, and that he must also be supplied with 
relevant information. But the problem must arise in course 
of the child's own experience, that is to say, his own 
reaction to the given materials, and the need must be his. 
But can the educator entirely depend on what a child may need 
for his personal satisfaction at a given time? Dewey seems 
to stress too far the importance of the child's own needs 
and interests. We do not, however, deny that the child's own 
needs and interests are to be cared and catered for; but 
there is a limit. Russell somewhere described, as an example 
of a legitimate use of force, how he himself cured a boy of 
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irrational fear of the sea, and taught him to enjoy bathing, 
by holding him in the water despite struggles, and thereby 
showing that no harm came from it. But it is not just some 
such rare and morbid behaviour that need be corrected in this 
way. The point is that there are some things like cleanli-
ness, respect for other people 1 s property, road safety, 
punctuality, etc., which the human beings have to learn which 
apparently have to come from external imposed authority and 
cannot be handled entirely on the basis of the child 1 s 
'intrinsic' motivation. Anyone who knows a child knows this. 
It can further be argued, we believe, that it is often the case 
that a child only gets 'caught up' in some type of mood or 
interest gradually by undergoing a lengthy period of enforced 
discipline that at first he may find very painful, e.g., 
playing the piano or acquiring the disciplines of scholarship 
or science. 
Dewey believes that his pattern of inquiry is the course 
necessarily pursued by all those who acquire knowledge. But 
the pattern is clearly no description that could fit or cover 
all the activities of the scientists and of the ordinary 
people in search of knowledge. As the method of learning it 
is clearly too narrow and artificial. How do we employ and 
use the method in studying such subjects as astronomy and 
history? No amount of learning activity can change 
285 
existential astronomical relations and historical facts. 
How do we teach children to eschew what we consider vice? 
Need one engage in vice - experience it, experiment with it 
- in order to learn to refrain from it? Or again, what 
about having such experiences, like viewing great art and 
hearing edifying music, which may not give rise to any 
problem? Or the acquisition of knowledge which solves no 
problems? 
Then, again, Dewey's rigid pattern does not permit him 
to recognize that different methods can be effective in 
learning. Mechanical drill, for example, is quite effective 
in learning such things as the multiplication tables. And 
learning through drill could be quite useful in solving the 
type of problems that requires the knowledge of multiplica-
tion tables. Now, Dewey can possibly say - as Brubacher 
writes by way of explanation - that 'if the pupil sees the 
significance of drill, if he sees how it will help him 
achieve his own ends, drill will be accepted and gladly 
practiced•. 27 What if the immature pupil in his strong dis-
like for mere repetitition does not see that significance? 
It is not expected of the child to recognize the necessity 
27 
J.S. Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education, McGraw-
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of painful practices by which alone habits of skill, 
techniques, are acquired. And again, this admission that 
drill can be useful, that the pupil when he sees or is made 
to see its significance can practice it in the hope of solv-
ing future proble~s constitutes a clear departure from 
Dewey's problem method. For, then, only present problem 
solving is not learning. And an educational method that 
allows practices which the pupil thinks will help him to 
achieve ends in the future is quite appropriate to the aim 
of education as preparation. 
Dewey's pattern of inquiry is, as we have seen earlier, 
based on a hopelessly narrow conception of the character and 
structure of knowledge. As a learning method it therefore 
requires the organization of the learning environment in the 
form of problems. It unduly minimizes expository 
(•authoritative') instruction. It unnecessarily wants the 
learner to question many simple things which he can very 
well take · as settled. The trial-and-error procedure of 
i' learning can therefore be wasteful of the pupil 1 s time and 
energy, especially when in problematically approaching known 
truths he is allowed to repeat errors which with a little 
instruction he could have been able to avoid. But again, 
Dewey does not seem to deny 'that information through book 
learning, expository instruction, or even drill can be useful 
7 
! 
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in educational practice. What he seems to say is that 
information acquired through book learning and instruction, 
retained through drill, is to be used in problem-solving to 
become learning. What does this mean? Is not Dewey taking 
•problem-solving' as a criterion of what he believes to be 
the adequate ( 1 good') method of learning? This is not easy 
to follow, since 'problem- solving' is not admittedly a 
criterion for judging other methods of learning, it is rather 
the very structure and character of what he believes to be 
the method of learning. Dewey cannot help us out of this 
difficulty. In his means-end, fact-value continuum a dis-
tinction between method and criterion is not worth drawing. 
It is thus difficult to determine what the pattern of inquiry, 
this business of competent problem- solving, precisely means 
as a method of learning and teaching. 
Learning is an activity. But activity does not 
necessarily mean or imply productivity or 'participative 
experience'. Even passive listening, or the culture of a 
•mental discipline' may be called an activity. Dewey, 
therefore, explains that learning experience, like all 
experience, is a process and a transaction. The student 
must be in the centre of genuine situations of experience; he 
must be a dynamic participant in the transactions. Thi s 
implies, according to Dewey, that the effort and achievement 
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of the student cannot be isolated or independent. To him it 
further implies that the school must organize its business to 
promote 'common and productive activity' by the students. Let 
us explain these points as clearly as possible. 
The task of education is to enable children to partici-
pate, now as well as afterwards, in social activity and 
community life. The educational procedure - life and 
activity in school - must therefore expose the child to the 
life and activity that goes on in the society. In other 
words, there must not be a break or discontinuity in the 
life and activity within the school and those outside or 
those faced after leaving the school. The traditional 
schools, Dewey maintains, ignored this important fact and 
sought to educate the young for social life and activity in 
an unsocial and artificial manner. He says, 
A society is a number of people held together 
because they are working along common lines, in 
a common spirit, and with reference to common aims. 
The common needs and aims demand a growing inter-
change of thought and growing unity of sympathetic 
feeling. The radical reason that the present 
i.e., traditional school cannot organize itself 
as a natural social unit is because just this 
element of common and productive activity is 
absent.28 
Our earlier reading of Dewey's social aim and method can help 
28 
Dewey, The School and Society, 11-12. 
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us to determine what Dewey wants the school to be as a 
'natural social unit'. Society is composed of individuals 
who form themselves into various institutions and publics. 
The acts and responses of the individual members within a 
particular group or that of one particular group in relation 
to other groups, are selected in the light of their conse-
quences upon others. The activities thus determined is the 
-
'shared goal', and the result of the entire social trans-
action, when intelligently carried on, reveals the 'common 
good'. Dewey wants that 'the school shall be made a genuine 
form of active community life 1 where the children will learn 
the use of the cooperative method of intelligence. Each of 
them will learn to select acts and responses in the light of 
their consequences on the aims and interests of every other, 
and thus to determine the shared goal. Intelligent 
activities will ensure the growth of the special capabilities 
of each child and the all-round growth of all. Dewey writes, 
29 
To do this means to make each one of our schools 
an embryonic community life •••• When the school 
introduces and trains each child of society into 
membership within such a little community ••• we 
shall have the deepest and best guaranty of a 
larger society which is worthy, lovely, and 
harmonious.29 
Ibid., 27-8. 
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In insisting that the school must be made a genuine 
form of active community life, Dewey does not, however, mean 
that all the complexities of the society outside should be 
introduced into the school. Dewey has often been misunder-
stood on this point and criticized for demanding a school of 
1hard knocks'.30 Dewey recognizes that the ordinary 
associations ,of life are rather too complex to be assimilated 
in toto into the function of the school. He therefore says, 
The first office of the social organ we call the 
school is to provide a simplified environment. 
It selects the features which are fairly funda-
mental and capable of being responded to by the 
young. Then it establishes a progressive order, 
using the factors first acquired as means of 
gaining insight into what is more complicated.31 
The point, at least in principle, is simple. Children need 
not be presented in the school with the numerous relation-
ships and problems of our present social life. The school 
will make them participate and share only in those experiences 
which they can grasp and use. For the curriculum planners 
and teachers the task of simplifying social situations is 
obviously a difficult one. It requires a clear perception 
of tbe relation of various sorts of experience in their 
30 
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progressive order. It involves selection. And the question 
of selection is important. For it is the selection of 
experiences that makes the school, qualitatively speaking, a 
formal educational institution. In Dewey's theory the issue 
is rather crucial; for the business of the school is to make 
the child learn to live an active community life, and the 
community life within the school, he tells us, must be a 
simplified version of such life outside. The aim of 
education is socialization; the school simply serves to 
develop the sociality of the human child. 
Now, socialization itself, where the word carries no 
ethical or evaluative connotation, is learning and growth. 
No development takes place in complete independence of the 
environmental conditions. For the human child the social 
environment is a sine-™ non of existence, and his develop-
ment as a member of a group or society is related to his 
socialization. Margaret Mead expresses this inter-relatedness 
of growth and socialization when she says, 
32 
It is necessary to recognize that the growing child 
is systematically patterned in every detail, in 
posture as well as in gesture, in tempo as well as 
in speech, in the way of thinking as well as the 
content of his think~ng, in his capacity to feel as 
well as in the forms which his feelings take.32 
M. Mead, "Research in Primitive Children19 in L. Carmichael, 
Manual of Child Psychology, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 
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Anthropologists and social scientists tell us that the 
values, customs, rituals of the group form the base and 
frame-work of the individual's life. The primary forces 
involved in the personality formation of an individual are 
social or cultura1. 33 Socialization, in this non-evaluative 
sense, is learning; it refers to the educative processes by 
which the individual comes to conform to the norms of the 
society into which he is born and of which, as a socialized 
person, he becomes a functioning member. 
Dewey recognizes the fact of automatic social training 
that goes on in every society; he explains at great length 
'how the social medium nurtures its immature members'. But 
there is, as he puts it, a 1differentia 1 of such •unconscious 
influence of the environment' from the ' special environment' 
which is the school. The school is different from 1 chance 1 
environments because it is designed to insure adequate 
transmission of the written heritage and other achievements 
accumulated from generation to generation which are com-
paratively foreign to everyday life or temporarily out of use. 
Inc., 1946, 669; see also, Ruth Benedict, "The Study of 
Cultural Continuitiesn in The Influence of Home and Community 
on Children Under Thirteen Years of Age, Paris, UNESCO, 8. 
33 
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It is designed to teach, among others, the kind of things 
that cannot be picked up in accidental social intercourse. 
But this office of the school, though necessary for the con-
servation and transmission of the social heritage, is 
subordinate to the more important function which is to 
'influence the mental and moral disposition' of the children 
and of the members of the society in the desirable direction. 
The school is a deliberately regulated environment; it is 
organized to offer a 'special mode of social intercourse'. 
It has a mission besides conservation and transmission of the 
social culture. Dewey writes, 
It is to eliminate, as far as possible, the 
unworthy features of the existing environment 
from influence upon mental habitudes. It 
establishes a purified medium of action. 
Selection aims not only at simplifying but at 
weeding out what is undesirable. Every society 
gets encumbered with what is trivial, with dead 
wood from the past, and with what is positively 
perverse. The school has the duty of omitting 
such things from the environment which it supplies, 
and thereby doing what it can to counteract their 
influence in the ordinary social environment. By 
selecting the best for its exclusive
4 
use, it strives 
to reijnforce the power of this best.3 
It is just here that Dewey's philosophy of experience is 
expected to help us. Has he not insisted that the actual and 
practical conduct and management of the schools are to be 
•worked out on the basis of a.new philosophy of experience'? 
34 
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Has he not also told us that a genuine philosophy achieves 
its most practical embodiment in the aim and practice of 
education? We need therefore ask: what are, in terms of 
Dewey's new philosophy of experience, the unworthy and 
undesirable experiences to be weeded out of the school and 
the desirable ones to be supplied with? 
Now, supposing that we do determine, and are able to 
indicate what the desirable is like, the Dewey-teacher would 
still have the difficult problem of 'unifying' the desirable 
with what is intrinsically desired by the Dewey-pupil. The 
teacher cannot impose the desirable, for compelling the pupil 
to subordinate his interest, attitude and thinking to adult 
patterns will 1 break the child 1 s will'. Nor can the teacher 
always allow the pupil to pursue the 1 just good'. Dewey's 
answer is that this is not an either-or situation; what is 
necessary is that the teacher will supply the child with all 
the relevant information about the 'conditions and consequences• 
of the desired 8 just good 1 • The child by the use of 
intelligence in the social environment, will come to recognize 
what assumedly the teacher in his or her adult judgment 
believes to be the desirable. But the survey of the 
'conditions and consequences' of situations does not, as we 
have seen, make much sense. The specific content of the 
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desirable even in connection with the problem of educational 
direction remains as elusive as before. 
It may seem possible that the desirable in its 
educational rendering is socialization, a sort of selective, 
evaluative socialization. 1All education', Dewey says, 'which 
develops power to share effectively in the social life is 
mora1 1 .35 But, sharing effectively in what kind of social 
life? Is sharing in any kind of social life moral? Like 
Plato, Dewey believes that virtue can be taught; education 
indeed teaches us to be virtuous. For, 
to possess virtue does not signify to have 
cultivated a few nameable and exclusive traits; 
it means to be fully and adequately what one is 
capable of becoming through as~gciation with 
others in all offices of life.j 
But, capable of becoming what, through what sort of 
associations, in what offices of life? One can hardly help 
but feel that there is a curious emptiness about all this 
talk about the liberation or development of capacities, 
about effective functioning in social life. Do such prefixes 
as 'effectively' and 'fully and adequately' to a statement 
of a function make the function worthwhile? One may fully 
and effectively function as a member of a family or a civic 
35 
Ibid., 418. 
36 
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group. But is it not precisely the kind of home or family 
life, the kind of civic activity that people disagree about? 
Dewey has, however, an answer. He might reply that he has 
not left any doubt as to what kind of social life and activity 
he considers to be desirable and worthwhile. He would tell 
us that 'The conception of education as a social process and 
function has no definite meaning until we define the kind of 
society we have in mind 1 • 37 Now, this is in general true; an 
expression of preference for some definite pattern or form 
of social life is more or less inherent in every educational 
programme. Dewey would, therefore, tell us that his 
educational plan must be read and understood as part and 
parcel of his conception of the democratic way of life. 
Education is grounded in the reconstructed democratic con-
ception of social life. 
How are Dewey's educational principles connected with 
and supported by his reconstructed conception of the 
democratic way of life? And, what does the democratic way 
of life really mean? We have seen that Deweyss democratic 
way of life envisages a unified society. He, therefore, seeks 
to organize the school ao as to give the young actual 
experience in the process of making adjustments - by learning 
37 
Ibid., 112. 
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the use of the method of intelligence - wi_thin the school, 
and in and through school activities with the standards and 
manners of life prevalent outside. This is obviously one of 
the aims of 'democratic' education. He writes, for example, 
'An education which should unify the dispositions of the 
members of society would do much to unify society itself 1 .38 
What does this mean? Does Dewey want the school to produce 
men and women with identical mental and moral dispositions -
minds all alike - and like that of the great majority? But 
what kind of education could this be? What will be the 
standard or norm for the school to use to evaluate prevalent 
social culture? Will that norm be capable of supporting the 
kind of education necessary for directing major social 
reconstruction? 
The issues are in fact many, and most of them are far-
fetched. One important issue - crucial in Dewey 1 s position 
- is that of the role of the school in the social order. But 
this being a rather vast and complicated topic we can hope to 
consider it only in a general way. The question, to put it 
broadly, is whether the school should be an agent for preserv-
ing the heritage (which on examination may appear in most 
cases as a plea for the consolidation of the status quo), or 
38 
Ibid., 305. 
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whether it should consciously and deliberately be an 
instrument of social change (or the value-word for it, social 
progress). Now, it is possible that either attitude may be 
held in its extreme or uncompromising form, or that the two 
competing attitudes and their respective implications may be 
combined and balanced together in various ways. In each 
case the method of teaching, curriculum material, etc., will 
be somewhat different to suit the respective point of view. 
It is again possible that a few disciplines (e.g., natural 
sciences), whose content of knowledge will have little direct 
and immediate bearings on the envisaged social order, may 
not be affected. But one 's views on such controversial topics 
as the administration of schools, academic freedom, civil 
liberty of teachers ('loyalty oaths') etc., will no doubt be 
determined more or less by what one assumes to be the proper 
role of the school in the social order. 
Anyway, the school can be conceived, for example, as a 
supporting pillar of the existing social order, the status 
quo, or as an instrument of revolutionary change. In the 
latter case it is likely that once the revolutionary goal is 
achieyed the procedure of ~ttacking the old social order will 
change. When education draws its inspiration from those who 
believe that they know for sure what kind of social order -
old or new - is the best, it is not difficult to see that the 
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curriculum material will be heavily censored and the 
infinitive •to teach' will come to mean authoritative 
imposition or 'indoctrination•. In some cases there is that 
possibility that contrary views on a few matters will be 
presented, but the tendency Will always be to show in the 
light of accepted dogmas that such views are 'false' or 
'misguided'. The points can be easily illustrated from the 
educational practices of the Catholic Church, or the 
communist state, or for that matter from the educational 
theory of Plato. It will be remembered that Plato remarked 
to an interlocutor in The Republic (Book III) that 'Whither 
the argument may blow, thither we go' . But in spite of this 
unqualified endorsement of free inquiry - which no doubt 
forms the very basis of his philosophical ('Socratic') method 
- what do we find to be the main task of education in the 
ideal republic? Once the ideal state is approximated by some 
happy accident (Plato does not preach revolution) the task of 
education is to prevent digression from the ideal social 
order. To guard against all sorts of possible innovations -
whether coming from such widely different sources as Homeric 
poems or children•.s games ~ Plato thinks it absolutely 
necessary to censor the curriculum. In the Platonic plan 
there is no provision for deviation from the ideal, and it is 
therefore difficult to conceive that the philosopher-ruler of 
the Platonic republic is really free to re-think and, if 
necessary, to modify the Platonic concept of justice. 
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Plato's ideal state is obviously not the place where a 
Socrates, doubting himself and raising doubt in the minds of 
others, can hope to live. In Dewey's view an education which 
merely perpetuates a society is not the best education. 
But it is by no means correct to say that only a 
definite bias for a certain preconceived social order, old 
or new, prompts one sooner or later to conceive of school as 
an agent for conservation. It is quite understandable, and 
nearly all educational theorists agree that the school must 
be, to a certain extent, conservative in function. The 
school is obviously expected to acquaint the young with the 
culture of the society, with the stock of solutions which the 
preceding generations have accumulated at a great cost of 
time and suffering. But there are certain things involved 
in conservation through formal education which differentiate 
it from the preservation of social culture through automatic 
socialization. There is the question of norm and also that of 
extent. The culture of an advanced society is always over-
whelming in quantity and for the purposes of education both 
simplification and selection are necessary. The norm used 
for the selection of what is considered precious and worthy 
of preservation and transmission may itself become the 
301 
determinant of the extent to which the traditional beliefs 
and attitudes will be nourished by the school. A look at 
the reading materials used in some subjects by a particular 
school will more or less explain its orientation towards the 
issues of norm and extent of conservation. 
Again, even when the primary aim of education is the 
conservation or consolidation of the status quo, it does not 
necessarily imply that the norm and method of such education 
are rigidly fixed for good. In an advanced society a given 
status quo is the result of interacting social forces. In 
the social order the pressures of the old forces wax and wane, 
and that of the new forces intervene; stresses and strains do 
occur in the social structure which in the long run offset 
each other. In this continuous process the somewhat balanced 
state of affairs is referred to as the given status quo. It 
is an equilibrium seldom static, rather usually uneasy and 
shifting. Education for the preservation and consolidation 
of the status quo does not, therefore, necessarily mean a 
'static' sort of education. It rather seems that the task of 
the consolidation of the status quo requires such education 
to take note of the changing content of knowledge and the new 
directions in social tension. Such education need not be 
blind or hostile to those new ideas which do not contradict 
the fundamental values in the tradition or create major 
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disturbances in the prevalent social order. In fact, the 
educational theory which seems to be most widely honoured in 
practice is that the function of the school is to conserve 
the social order, but it is nonetheless expected to introduce 
changes or improvements inside the tradition. 
But for Dewey and the progressives the normative function 
of the school is creative or reconstructive rather than con-
servative. Dewey thinks that educational aims should not be 
determined by such external social conditions as may happen to 
obtain in politics, business, or religion at any time. Rather 
the converse is true, that is to say, those engaged in 
education should look upon the educational process itself as 
an •autonomous way• of formulating the aims of education. 39 
This may appear incompatible with his view (quoted earlier) 
that the business of education as a social process and 
function can be ascertained only in relation to the society 
in question. Or, we may ask, how can education be an 
Rutonomous way of setting up its own aims when it is 'contin-
uous' with the social process at large? Dewey would reply by 
saying that education is cooperative intelligent activity; it 
uses external social conditions and forces as 'materials' that 
raise the problems for intelligence, and provide the testing 
39
see Dewey, The Sources of a Sci 
Liveright Publishing Corp., 1929, 
of Educa ion, New York, 
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ground •to judge the effect of the educational process'. 
Since intelligence functions only in the face of problems and 
works out the solutions by changing or reconstructing the 
existential situations, it cannot accept without playing 
false to its very nature an external condition, a given 
tradition or the status quo as the end. Education means 
facing problematic situations and working out novel adjust-
ments; the infinitive 'to teach' means causing the pupil to 
inquire, to investigate, to deliberate, to experiment with. 
The school, where the prevalent social beliefs and values are 
investigated into, should therefore be the source of new 
ideas, novel programmes of social ~djustment. The education-
al institutions, Dewey thinks, should have the primary 
interest in independent study of social problems and of the 
course of the social evolution. This notion of education, 
Dewey believes, fits in with his reconstructed conception of 
the democratic way of life. The democratic way of life pro-
vides the means and opportunities for the intelligence to 
function freely; it also needs continuous reconstruction 
through intelligent activities of its own structure and 
norm. In the democratic ~ociety it is therefore the school 
which has the responsibility of suggesting and implementing 
the changes leading to better social adjustments. In other 
words, Dewey thinks that the normative function of the school 
involves in originating changes in social structure and 
norm. 
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There are, obviously, certain problems about this con-
ception of education as critical and creative or reconstruct-
ive of the existing social order. It can be argued, for 
example, that this view assigns too important a role to the 
school in social progress. The real source of social change, 
it can be argued, is not to be found in the school at all; 
alteration of the social pattern is usually effected by 
such things as political revolution, racial migration, 
religion, military conquest, and scientific invention. The 
school simply completes or consolidates changes in social 
form and institution once they have been forced upon the 
society - by ballots, bullets or any other cause. Even in 
a democratic society, it can be pointed out, it is the 
adult community which decides and implements through the 
constitutional framework of government what kind of social 
norms the schools shall nourish. Even in a democratic 
society the school will no doubt find it practically 
difficult to adopt a frame o.f reference which is either 
markedly different from or deliberately critical of the status 
quo. The difficulty seems to be more pronounced in Dewey's 
position since he is committed to the public school system, 
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and secondly, his school demands no independence or remote-
ness from the existing social order. 
Although there are these and certain other difficulties 
in the conception of education as critical and creative or 
reconstructive of the status quo, it is, nevertheless, 
possible that on the whole the view should be accepted. The 
point is, how far is this notion of critical and creative 
education supported by Dewey's philosophy and social theory? 
Does Dewey's method of inquiry (or learning by problem-
solving) provide the means of making the distinction between 
adjustments or changes which are morally desirable and those 
which are not? Can the desirable in its social rendering 
provide the norm for critical and reconstructive education? 
Can the Deweyan democratic way of life support and sustain a 
sort of •autonomous' education which 1 1s its own end', and be 
guided by it? 
Our earlier readings of Dewey's philosophical theories 
and his conception of the democratic way of life can be 
particularly helpful in assessing how far these tend to 
support his educational theory. We have seen, for example, 
that an inquiry into 1 con4itions and consequences' does not 
in any way indicate the morally desirable; such inquiry can 
at best provide the sort of answer which is morally empt1 
and therefore practically equivocal (Ch. V). In its 
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democratic rendering the morally desirable (or the socially 
best) is the 'general welfare' or the •common good' which 
Dewey believes will prevail, when the scientific method is 
employed to resolve the conflicts of interests and aims. 
But we have found on examination that there is not really 
anything like 'the public interest' or 1 the common good 1 in 
a conflicting social situation affecting the interests and 
aims of various individuals or groups. What Dewey parades 
as the sciantifically constructed 'common good' is in fact 
the kind of social change or adjustment that •satisfies• the 
'great majority' in the society. (Ch. VII). 
Now, Dewey thinks that it is one of the tasks of the 
school in a democratic society to distribute 'its special 
values and its special purposes and aims' to all members in 
soch a ay that 'they become part of the mind and will of the 
members of society 1 • 40 But is this not something that the 
school, as an educational agency, tries to do in any society, 
including antidemocratic societies? Now, Dewey's point is 
that it is the operation of the method of intelligence, which 
is both critical and cooperative, that makes the basic 
difference. The values, purposes and aims of the democratic 
society are not rigidly fixed; they are not imposed; they are, 
Dewey, Probl~ms of Men, 37. 
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on the contrary, continuously reconstructed by critical 
intelligent activity. Since the school is deliberately 
organized to carry on such activities, it is the place where 
the newly felt social needs are studied and examined, and 
proposals for social changes are worked out to meet such 
needs in an intelligent way. This then means that the 
school, in its simplified and selected (begs the question!) 
social environment, confronts the problematic social situa-
tions in a scientific way, determines the common interest 
or the common good (by experimenting witb it), and thereby 
formulates its own educational aim or end-in-view as well as 
the norm or basis for progressive social reconstruction. 
Now, suppose we ask: what if the school offers a proposal 
which is not liked and accepted by the great majority in 
society? In the functioning of the method of cooperative 
intelligence such a problematic situation is not seriously . 
contemplated. For, Dewey assumes that the school by using 
the method of intelligence can find out a common purpose and 
a common good to which all the special purposes and ends can 
be surrendered in order to be fully realized. Now, once we 
recognize that the scientific ·method or the method of 
intelligence cannot acquit itself of this task of revealing 
a common good in a conflicting social situation, all the talk 
about 'autonomous' education formulating its own aim becomes 
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meaningless. For what in fact a Dewey-school accepts as 
educational aim, and the norm of social reconstruction, are 
those 1 adjustments 1 which satisfy the great majority. But 
how does the school come to know the 1felt needs' of the 
society at large? Even if it does (for the school is 
continuous with society at large), how does it know what 
sort of adjustments will be satisfactory to the majority? 
By social acceptance and consent, which is for Dewey the 
•successful working•, the 1verification 1 , of an idea. 
This will seem like deserting the ideal of disciplined 
intellect and accepting in its stead the fallacious notion 
that educational aims and the goals of progressive social 
reconstruction should be determined on the basis of 1 felt 
needs', the immediate, short-sighted demands and their 
satisfaction - of those in society who have least concern and 
comprehension of what education is for and how it can 
accomplish its own ends. It would seem like prescribing 
medicine not by the qualified physician out of his knowledge 
and experience but by the suffering patient out of his 
ignorance. Dewey, it is true, does not mean this, but this 
seems to be the plain consequence of his own methodological 
stipulation. 
In Dewey's social model it is, however, possible that 
a given socially 'desirable may alter in the course of the 
309 
push and pull of the various conflicting 1felt needs 1 and 
their satisfaction, and that the specific content of the 
desirable may change. Harnessed firmly to the Deweyan 
desirable the school - which is of course continuous with 
society - shall have to adjust its own policy and programme 
with every variation in the social weather. That such 
variations, the reconstructed proximate goals, will be 
progressive will now appear more to be a matter of faith 
than logic: faith in human nature in its cooperative intent 
and capability, in the scientific method as revealing a 
common good, and social unity around a set of common values 
as inherently progressive • 
. We think that the difficulties involved in Dewey's 
position can be explored further by considering another 
related but important issue. It concerns the development of 
the personal capacities and the individuality of each and all 
through cooperative intelligent activities in the school. 
Dewey, as we have seen, clearly recognizes the fact of 
automatic conditioning or ;life-adjustment' that goes on in 
every society. The forces devoted to social conditioning -
the church, the state, and many other anonymous forces in the 
community that insist on •togetherness• or 'belongingness• -
are indeed powerful in modern societies. In the nature of 
things, it can be said with considerable truth that these are 
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the pressures for conformity. In most of the social realm -
even in advanced societies - criticism causes annoyance, and 
dissent is a stumbling block in 'getting along 1 with people. 
Dewey seems to realize all this, and he seems no less con-
cerned in keeping the glowing spark of intellectual independ-
ence and individuality alive in the school. He believes in 
individual difference; he insists that the social environment 
in the school must be so organized that it g·ives full 
opportunity to each and every pupil to develop his specific 
capabilities and his individuality. He tells us on many 
occasions that the development of criticial intelligence or 
free thinking - which means freedom to think differently -
is the overriding objective of progressive education. 
How far is this supported by Dewey's philosophy? Dewey 
believes that the measure of individual experience and ability 
is social experience; that individual rights and privileges, 
individual 'excellence• must be grounded on social values. 
(Ch. VII). This is the moral and ideal meaning of the recon-
structed democratic way of life, and children must learn it 
in the school operationally. Dewey, therefore, plans the 
1 democratic 1 class-room as. the place where the various 
individual wills and interests, attitudes and capacities, are 
redirected or reconstructed so that they will coalesce in a 
common purpose and programme. Participation in the common 
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purpose of the community (class-room) is the only medium 
through which the individual can achieve the liberation of 
his personal capacities. In a common-purpose class all the 
children (and the teacher) enter on a problem-project, and 
they all come out at the same ('desirable') end. It is the 
way the common problem and the end are shared by the 
participants - the scientific way - that ensures, Dewey 
believes, the free play of creative, critical thinking, and 
the development of each and every participant's specific 
capabilities. 
We can no longer accept this with confidence. For 
Dewey's method of intelligence, as we have already seen, does 
not determine the common problem; it does not connect the 
common purpose and common interest with the diverse 
individual interests, aptitudes, and abilities. But the 
activities of the 1 democratic' class-room are planned on an 
assumption of the convergence of the conflicting interests 
and aims. In the nature of things, such convergence can be 
worked out only on the basis of what is desirable to the 
great majority in the class. And in that case school 
activities can only mean reinforcement of the already strong 
pressures of social adjustment. Instead of encouraging 
resistance to the pressures of social conformity so necessary 
for the development of critical intellect, the school will 
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come to place unusual importance on such things as the 
acceptance of group decisions, frictionless personal 
relations, capacity to go along with all and sundry, and so 
on. In other words, the school will lack the power to resist 
conformism. The common-purpose school can, therefore, be 
disadvantageous to the small minority who might have unusual 
intellectual or other ability; it may stifle any individual 
•excellence' that is not shared and appreciated by the great 
majority. This, of course, is not what Dewey really meant 
to be the outcome of 'democratic' education. But once we 
recognize that there is no real contact between the method of 
intelligence and the postulated common purpose or common good, 
that his method fails to harmonize the development of the 
specific capabilities of each individual with the so-called 
general welfare, his educational theory ceases to have the 
kind of philosophical support it needs. 
To sum up. The relation of the problem-method of 
learning to the epistemological instr·umentalism presents no 
difficulty to Dewey because thinking, purposive activity and 
learning become in his hands almost indistinguishable from one 
another. We have indicated earlier the confusions and limit-
ations involved in the translation of the pattern of inquiry 
into a theory of learning and teaching. On the basis of his 
preconceptions Dewey thinks that this strict adherence to the 
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method of inquiry solves for him the problem of educational 
direction as well as the problems of freedom and discipline, 
cultivation of individuality and social unity, and the like, 
His attempted solution of these rather knotty social and 
educational problems rests, as our foregoing analysis shows, 
on his notion of the method of intelligence or the method 
of inquiry. But, if inquiry into the so-called 'conditions 
and consequences' does not after all indicate the 'desirable', 
and the socially best turns out to be merely what is desirable 
to the majority at a given moment, we do not see how Dewey 
can hope to derive the kind of education he seems to want 
from his philosophical instrumentalities. The upshot of the 
foregoing discussion is that Dewey's philosophy fails to 
meet the demands of his educational theory, that it does not 
succeed in providing the needed theoretical basis for the 
Deweyan educational practice. It is not our purpose here to 
inspect the fruits that Jo.tm Dewey's educational plant could 
or actually did bear; but whatever they are, they do not have 
any real connection with the supposed philosophic~l roots. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I 
In our reading of some selected aspects of John 
Dewey ' s technical philosophy and his social and educational 
theory we have been primarily concerned with the more 
general point of logical or philosophical contact between the 
two . Dewey, it seems, always believed that there was an 
organic connection between his philosophical ideas - 'plans• 
or 1 proposals 1 as they were - and his specific social and 
educational recommendations . He translated freely some of 
his metaphysical and logical ideas into social and educational 
principles and methods, and often argued that the soundness 
of his concrete proposals about social and educational 
reconstruction constituted some evidence that his technical 
philosophical formulations were, on the whole, fruitful and 
valid. But our foregoing analysis of the structure of Dewey 1 s 
philosophy of education does not support and confirm this 
view; it reveals, on the other hand, that at crucial points 
the application of his technical philosophical ideas to 
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complex social and educational affairs was not fully 
warranted, and that his philosophical model could not provide 
the kind of theoretical support he in fact needed to develop 
his theory of the democratic way of life and that of liberal 
democratic education. 
The analysis, as far as it went, also revealed some 
fundamental weakness in Dewey's technical philosophical 
position. Dewey's conception of philosophy as always con-
cerned with the resolution of conflicts by converting the 
contesting elements 'into a u..nified whole' is undoubtedly 
holistic. He tries to explain traditional philosophical 
controversies as always arising out of partial or 'selective 
emphasis', and seeks to undercut alleged dualisms in various 
domains by evolving some comprehensive unified frameworks. 
Dewey has spent a good part of his life, as Morton White 
remarked somewhere, 'hunting and shooting at dualisms 1 • Since 
the need for thinking in general and philosophizing in 
particular arises, according to him, from a need for 
unification, Dewey is keen on seeing things together. The 
central principle of his philosophical system is the 
suggestive but vague notion of continuity. 
But in his insistence on continuity and concern for 
synthesis Dewey habitually overlooks distinctions when they 
are called for or mistakes valid and fruitful distinctions as 
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traditional dualistic dragons to be dispatched as quickly as 
possible. Consider, for example, one of his key concepts, 
namely, experience. It stands for the natural process - the 
transactions that automatically go on between living organisms 
and their environing conditions. It is an affair in nature, 
and continuous with the rest of nature. It also includes all 
sorts of experience from passive beholding to active and 
purposeful scientific experimentation. It includes, in his 
words, not only the planted field, the sowed seeds, the sun 
and rain, but also one who plants and reaps, his plans, hopes 
and fears. Experience is for Dewey an 'unanalyzed unity•; it 
does not even admit of such distinctions as that between 
'thing' and 'thought' which in his view 'refer to products 
discriminated by reflection' out of the 'fullness of 
undivided meaning•. 1 But we have, on our part, found this un-
restricted fullness of meaning difficult to grasp. 2 Consider 
again, Dewey's notion of a situation. A situation is, accord-
ing to him, a 'qualified existential whole'. On account of 
his insistence on continuity there arises, as Bertrand Russell 
has pointed out, a problem about the delineation of the 
logical boundaries of a specific situation. 3 Anyway, so long 
1 Dewey, Experience and Nature, 8-9. 
2
supra, 65-81. 
3B. Russell, "Dewey's New Logic", in P.A. Schilpp, (ed.), 1.2.£. 
cit., 139-140. 
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as a situation is a unified whole it is nobody's problem. 
It becomes indeterminate and problematic only when the 
elements within it somehow get divided, in other words, the 
organic uhity becomes disturbed. But in calling a situation 
problematic Dewey all along ascribes the character (or 
quality) of the initial response or reaction of the sentient 
being to an encountered environing condition to the 'whole 
complex of interactions•. A situation, no doubt cut into a 
smaller size for 'practical' purposes, remains a slice of 
that unanalyzed 1llli.ty and as vague. 4 For Dewey even the 
purpose of scientific inquiry, when such inquiry is 
instituted to resolve a problematic situation, is to 'convert 
the elements of the original situation into a unified whole'. 
On the whole, Dewey's main philosophical purpose has been 
to formulate inclusive conceptual categories to overcome such 
traditional dualisma as between mind and body, theory and 
practice, fact and value, means and ends, and the like. But 
it seems that the spirit of combat was so much with him that 
he failed to recognize that something out of those traditional 
'divorces• could probably be saved as valuable distinctions, 
and that there might be some danger in trying to bridge con-
ceptual gaps with too sweeping generalizations. Consider, for 
4 
Supra, 127-134. 
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example, Dewey's insistence that all thinking arises in our 
desire to get out of practical troubles and in our effort to 
control the environment. Consider the way he stretches the 
meaning of the word •practical' to include everything, even 
the purely theoretical. Based on the general contention that 
all thinking is problem solving of a practical kind his con-
ception of science does scant justice to the theoretical 
structure of scientific theories and to the descriptive 
function of scientific statements.5 Assuming continuity 
among the various •modes' of experience Dewey then employs 
the narrowly conceived scientific mode (method of inquiry) to 
erect bridges across the traditionally encountered gaps 
between finding a fact and constructing a value, between the 
descriptive and prescriptive functions of thought, between 
philosophical enterprise and social action. 
In the preceding analysis we have seen Dewey's 
philosophical position to be weak at crucially important 
junctures. There is a chasm between nature and experience 
(intrinsic quality and experienced quality), and a similar 
gap between primary or direct experience and reflective 
thought. His problem solving model of reflective thinking 
does not seem to be either adequate as a description that 
5 
Supra, 82-6, 143-6. 
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could fit or cover all activities of the scientists and the 
common people in search of knowledge or successful in 
connecting within specific situation the pre-reflective with 
the post-reflective mode of experience. Some of the more 
vague complexities of his pattern of inquiry, e.g., the 
indeterminate situation and the existential transformation of 
antecedent materials are almost unintelligible. The role of 
inquiry as a transforming process - as effecting existential 
changes in the materials that originally give rise to inquiry 
does not seem to fit in with his basic contention that our 
knowledge can have no reference or relation to any antecedent 
reality. 6 
The model of inquiry does not either seem to be 
particularly helpful in the more direct form of the method 
of valuation. There is an abiding confusion as to ·what is to 
be inquired into (the conditions and consequences of 1 acts 
of liking' or of •experienced objects' or both); and there 
is apparently nothing in the evaluative methodology to turn 
a de facto statement about experienced objects into a£& jure 
one. We have seen that as a result of Dewey's methodological 
stipulation the specific content of what he considers 
morally desirable remains painfully elusive. 7 Dewey insists 
6 Supra, 138-142. 
7supre, 165-175. 
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on our using this method in resolving social and political 
conflicts; he hopes that this will enable us to attain and 
secure the socially best - the continuously reconstructed 
values of the democratic way of life. But social conflicts 
do not seem to fit this paradigm of inquiry at all. As a 
result, Dewey's method cannot be a reliable defender of the 
democratic way of life he pleads for; it cannot work out 
that •organic union' of collective authority and individual 
freedom which is the basis of his social and educational 
liberalism. 8 That Dewey's model of inquiry is based on a 
hopelessly narrow conception of the character and structure 
of knowledge becomes clearer when it is put in more directly 
educational terms. As a method of learning and teaching it 
is narrow and artificial. 9 When worked out on the basis of 
his philosophical instrumentalities and their implications on 
social theory it does not seem to ensure the kind of education 
and school Dewey stands for. The method of cooperative 
intelligence in its moral-social rendering does not ensure 
that a Dewey-school would be able to live up to its proclaimed 
values, namely, the free play of critical, creative thinking 
and the full development of each and every pupil's specific 
8 
Supra, 232-241, 248-250. 
9 
Supra, 282-7. 
capabilities. 10 On the whole, Dewey's technical 
philosophical formulations do not seem to provide much 
support to this 'theory of activity in social matters'. 
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On the basis of these findings we can therefore conclude 
that Dewey's attempt to connect his independently espoused 
technical philosophical doctrines to his views about the 
basic social and educational values and the methods to secure 
them has not been successful. By following Dewey's arguments 
we have also seen that the social and educational implications 
that we may deduce from his philosophical formulations are 
somewhat at variance with his social and educational 
objectives. It therefore seems not only possible but also 
perhaps rewarding for an investigation into the soundness of 
Dewey's educational proposals to be made independently and 
not merely in the context of his general philosophical 
position. This has no doubt been recognized by other readers 
of Dewey. Sidney Hook has argued that the acceptance of 
Dewey's educational recommendations does not necessarily 
entail the acceptance of his technical philosophical position. 
He wrote, 
10 
Now as I understand it, and as Dewey often explained, 
progressive education is based on two generic 
principles, The first is that the verified results 
Supra, 309-312. 
of scientific psychology should be brought to bear 
on the processes of learning. The second is that 
the values and ideals of democratic life should, as 
far as possible, be introduced at the appropriate 
levels in the student's own educational experience. 
Acceptance of either or both of these principles 
does not entail acceptance of Dewey's technical 
philosophy of instrumentalism. 11 
Speaking about Dewey s educational liberalism Israel 
Scheffler similarly maintained, 
For aside from consideration of strategy hinging 
on the fact that such liberalism may validly be 
supported on widely differing philosophic grounds, 
I think that certain features of Dewey's general 
position are independently weak and contribute 
irrelevant difficulties to the defence of 
educational liberalism.12 
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Now, although Dewey's m&iy more specific suggestions or 
proposals about aims and methods of education would merit 
examination in their own right, this has not been the object 
of the present study. We have been interested in one problem 
and in one aspect of Dewey's thought, a problem that might 
be described as strictly philosophical, namely, the logical 
or philosophical connections between Dewey 1 s epistemological 
and metaphysical views and his social and educational 
doctrines. Our ulterior interest has been in the general 
11 . 
Sidney Hook, "Modern Education and Its Criticsn, Israel 
Scheffler, (ed.)~ Philosophy and Education, Boston, Allyn 
Bacon, Inc., 195~, 278. . 
12 
Israel Scheffler, 'Educational Liberalism and Dewey's 
Philosophy", Ibid., 264. 
and 
question: what is the character of a philosophy of 
education? In what ways can the technical philosophical 
positions of a philosopher be relevant to the answers he 
might give to questions that arise in educational theory? 
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We have suggested before that there are a few philosophers 
whose writings one might subject to detailed scrutiny in 
seeking some answers to these questions; Plato is one 
philosopher who purported to connect epistemological and 
metaphysical theories with social and educational conclusions 
or recommendations as parts of a single philosophical 
position. But in the twentieth century there have been very 
few philosophers who have attempted to write about education 
within the framework of a more general philosophical system. 
Probably Dewey has gone further than any recent philosopher 
in claiming a direct connection between his metaphysics and 
logic on the one side and his social and educational theories 
on the other . For this reason it has seemed worthwhile to 
approach a discussion of the nature of a philosophy of 
education through a close examination of the philosophy of 
John Dewey. It must be confessed that the results have not 
been encouraging: at alm~st every point, the upshot of this 
particular examination has been to suggest that the logical 
links that Dewey claimed or assumed do not in fact exist. 
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II 
It has not been our purpose in the present essay to 
attempt an assessment of Dewey's theory of education as a 
whole. Any such investigation into the soundness of Dewey's 
educational proposals is bound to be a very large task, and 
as we shall presently indicate, will involve two distinct 
though not unrelated tasks, namely, clarification and testing. 
For an adequate assessment of an educational theory it is 
necessary that we understand as clearly as possible what the 
talk is about and what it intends to achieve; and secondly, 
that we find out whether or not its assertions and 
recommendations are supported by evidence. 
To take the second point first. Education is a 
practical affair of life - social engineering' as it is 
often called. Educational recommendations are purposive, 
and they often contain suggestions as to how to achieve the 
proposed objectives. An educational theory, in other words, 
suggests its own technology. Education being a practical 
matter of great importance and urgency, it is all the more 
necessary to have concrete factual information - where such 
information is available ·or can be made available through 
continued research - from tne relevant sciences to assess 
the soundness of an educational practice or any specific 
recommendation about it. Besides the usual assertions 
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concerning aims, norms or desirable goals, educational 
discourses also contain a large variety of statements about 
thinking and understanding, learning and teaching, interest 
and need, memory and motivation, effects of language and of 
other symbols, individual differences and adjustment, 
measurement and achievement, and the like, and recommended 
procedures about them. Now, scientific inquiry alone can 
provide accurate and reliable information on these matters. 
It is,therefore, necessary to find out by continued scientific 
inquiry whether or not the statements that underlie 
recommended educational procedures are supported by available 
factual evidence. Scientific inquiry into relevant sciences 
or into education (especially contrived 'educational research' 
as the overlap of various sciences with bearings on education-
al issues) can yield information indicating what educational 
procedures would be effective in achieving a certain object-
ive and what other procedures would be useless. The point is 
that recommendations about educational practice - whether 
they originate from a wise man's insight, a philosopher 1 s 
idea, or are just customary rules - must be subjected to 
scientific inquiry. Such inquiry is endless; and what the 
available scientific information at the moment might indicate 
as a relatively sound procedure may be found upon further 
progress in scientific inquiry as nnsatisfactory. The 
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relation between 'medical research' - which covers research 
in a variety of autonomous sciences relevant to medicine -
and the clinical practice of medicine is a case in point. 13 
It is only fair to acknowledge that Dewey's experimentalist 
view of knowing and learning favours in principle the increas-
ing use of scientific methods and results in testing and 
evaluating educational procedures, and that he himself did 
over a long period of years whatever he could to encourage 
continued research in the relevant autonomous sciences and 
in 'educational research'. 
An educational theory usually cuts across various 
domains, such as, psychology, politics, science, morals, 
religion, and others, and contains assertions both of 
theoretical worth and practical implication. Now, these 
assertions, in so far as they involve terms, concepts and 
arguments, charactertistic of a specific area or field, can 
be clarified only by referring them to the relevant science 
or appropriate discourse. Careful and critical analysis of 
concepts, of the various types of arguments and inferences 
as they obtain in specific areas, is necessary to understand 
what they mean or imply, _and also what they may mean or imply 
13 
For a treatment of related issues see, D.J. O'Connor, An 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, 92-110, and 
Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education, 72-5. 
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when transplanted beyond the boundaries of their specific 
domains, and into an educational context. Analysis of this 
sort is a characteristically philosophical task, and can be 
helpful in improving our understanding of an educational 
theory and of educational discourses generally. 
In the present essay we have been primarily interested 
in understanding the general structure of Dewey's philosophy 
of education. We, therefore, attempted to find out firstly, 
whether or not Dewey's pervasive philosophical categories 
are clear, logically consistent and sound; and secondly, 
whether or not his social and educational recommendations -
what he says about social and educational aims and methods -
logically follow from these categories, or are rendered more 
likely by them. We devoted considerable time to examining 
the central concepts and arguments - such fundamental ideas 
as, experience, intelligence and inquiry, which figure 
prominently not only in Dewey's technical philosophy but also 
in his social and educational theory. We explained and 
examined some selected aspects of the method of inquiry, 
variously described as the method of experience, the method 
of intelligence and the s_cientific method, and followed 
Dewey's arguments as he went on applying this method in 
moral, social and educational contexts. We analyzed the 
relevance and the implications of the notion of inquiry in 
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these different spheres. Our analysis revealed that the 
ostensibly common notion of inquiry was endowed with various 
preconceived meanings to serve the variety of contexts, and 
that in its original form it was either useless or irrelevant 
in moral, social and educational contexts. Certain plausible 
distinctions habitually ignored by Dewey in his eagerness to 
connect various domains - distinctions between the descript-
ive and the prescriptive functions of thought, between the 
verification of an idea and its practical workability, fact 
and value, and the like, were introduced from time to time 
to clarify the significance and limitations of Dewey's 
pervasive concepts and arguments in the different contexts. 
It was also necessary, as occasion demanded, to point out 
and examine the various underlying assumptions - Dewey's 
ideas about our concern for security, his faith in the 
cooperative intent of human intelligence, in the capability 
of science, and in the fact of social progress. Dewey tried 
to connect his philosophical categories to some basic social 
and educational ideas, namely, common purpose and common 
good, all-round growth or development of the individual and 
of all, creative role of _the school in the social order, 
which were required by him to be the sole support and 
justification of many specific social and educational 
recommendations. It was therefore necessary to examine 
LIi ... 
r 
1, 
these ideas in order to determine their logical dependence 
on Dewey ' s wider philosophical categories. 
We may be permitted in this context to devote a word 
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to the role contemporary philosophical methods of analysis 
can play in the domain of education. 14 The necessity of 
extending the rigorous standards and procedures of analysis 
to education scarcely needs to be argued. Many fundamental 
educational concepts are ambiguous and obscure. Many key 
terms used in educational discourses do not seem to have any 
settled significance. Consider, for example, such familiar 
educational concepts, as, participation, adjustment, achieve-
ment, success, etc •• These concepts are generally used as 
value standards in educational writings, but with little or 
no clarification of their meaning and significance. Take a 
word like ' need 1 - a Deweyan concept and one commonly used in 
educational discussions. It has various facets and means 
different things in different contexts. 15 Since educational 
14 
For a brief account of the methods of analysis, see, Israel 
Scheffler, (ed.), Philosophy and Education, "Introduction: 
Philosophical analysis and Education", 1-10. In The Language 
of Education Scheffler has employed these methods to clarify 
certain features of educational thought and argument. 15 . 
For an analysis of the concept of 'need', see, R.D. 
Archambault, "The Concept of. Need and its Relation to Certain 
Aspects of Educational Theoryu, Harvard Educational Review, 
Vol . XXVII, 1957, 38-62. 
I 
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discourses embrace a variety of spheres it is necessary to 
determine how far a particular concept or argument is relevant 
to the context in which it is used. Dewey's use of the 
biological concept of growth in moral and educational 
contexts serves as an illustration to this point. It is 
therefore necessary to extend the methods of linguistic and 
logical analysis to education in an attempt to determine the 
standard use of crucially important educational terms and 
their contextual limitations. Until such clarification is 
forthcoming it will remain difficult to understand what an 
educational theory is trying to say and consequently, it will 
be impossible to put its various practical recommendations 
to rigorous scientific tests. 
Now, the unpacking of concepts and arguments that we 
have just been talking about makes up a considerable part of 
the argument of the present essay. We have not, however, 
attempted in an exhaustive way to bring into the discussion 
all of the more general and fundamental concepts which appear 
in educational theorizing. We have been concern~d with the 
work of one philosopher and educational theorist, and with 
certain aspects of his tnought. It would not be legitimate 
7 
' 
i 
to claim that our foregoing account of Dewey is enough for a ·1 
clear and complete grasp of his philosophy or educational 
theory. It is scarcely necessary to say that there remain 
l 
many unexamined terms, concepts, arguments and areas in 
Dewey's social and educational theory which cry out for 
semantic and logical clarification. The concepts, 
arguments and assumptions which we have been able to 
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consider only in a general way no doubt require more detailed 
examination. We will, however, consider to have achieved 
something of our present purpose if we have succeeded in 
isolating the general concepts which are important in Dewey's 
thinking about the aims and general character of education 
and which also play a role in his philosophical writing, in 
exhibiting their lack of clarity and precision; and in 
analyzing and examining Dewey 8 s claim about an organic 
connection between his technical philosophical position and 
his basic educational recommendations. 
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